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THE 13THMINNESOTA VOLUNTEER REGIMENT ANDTHESPANISHAMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS, 1898-1899
Kyle Ward
This thesis describes and analyzes the role of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer
Regiment in both the Spanish-American and Philippine-American War's, 1898-1899. I
have done this by looking at the recent literature on this topic ruong with researching the
letters, diaries, government documents, books, and newspapers that were written by the
people of that time.
With the onset of war in 1898, many Minnesotans, along with much of the United
States, found themselves preparing for a war against Spain. This war was sold to the
American people as an opportunity for them to bring their style of democracy to
colonialized people in Cuba and the Philippines.
For many Minnesotans this was the kind of adventure they felt they needed to lift
them out of the mundane lifestyles they believed they were in. Enlisting in order to be part
of a great adventure and to prove their manhood, these Minnesotans who became involved
in these events, quickly discovered that their actions would not only help change their own,
but also a great many other American's impressions of their country.
After a brief period of military training in both Minnesota and California, the 13th
Minnesota was assigned to sail to the Philippines in order to help defeat the Spaniards
stationed in Manila. After a rather short battle, and one which need not have been fought,
the Americans defeated the Spanish.
Due to their bravery in battle, the 13tb Minnesota was given the duty of patrolling
Manila and its surrounding suburbs. Although not wanting this duty, and often terribly
bored, the Minnesotans did it with such professionalism that Manila was soon back to its
normal routine.
After seven months of tensions and misunderstandings between Emilio Aguinaldo's
troops and the American's, the second war in the islands began on February 4, 1899.
Although not officially involved in this battle, the Minnesotans found themselves later in
the middle of an attack on Manila only three weeks later.
With the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, which' concluded the Spanish-American
War, American officials decided to make the Philippines a possession of the United States.
This change of policy not only caused more tensions between the Americans and Filipinos,
but also forced the 13th Minnesota to become part of an offensive campaign into northern
Luzon. There they were ordered to destroy both Aguinaldo's men and his equipment,
thereby.hopefully bringing the war to a quick and successful conclusion.
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With the Filipinos beginning to rely on guerrilla warfare, and many Minnesotans
fearing death, a number of members of the 13th Minnesota began writing letters home in
which they both requested to be brought home, and began questioning why the United
States was fighting this second war. With enough pressure from the volunteers and people
at home, President McKinley began to order these citizen-soldiers home in the summer of
1898. Leaving the Philippines in August and reaching Minnesota in October, the men of
the 13th Minnesota's service to their country was over.
After being welcomed home by Governor John Lind and President William
McKinley, these soldiers, who 18 months earlier wanted nothing more than to escape the
boredom they once knew, now wanted nothing more than to return to it.
Although history has all but forgotten the 13th Minnesota and the wars in which
they fought, they did leave an impressive legacy. By both serving the nation when asked,
and later questioning both their own and their government's role in fighting the Filipinos,
the members of the 13th Minnesota can be remembered as reluctant heroes. Even though
they helped bring America into the 20th century as a burgeoning world power, they also
must never be forgotten for refusing to blindly follow their government when they felt it
was doing wrong.
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Chapter I
CRISIS AT HAND
With the 19th century coming to a close, many Americans, especially those who
were born after the Civil War, needed some catalyst to change how they looked at
themselves. This was as true for the youth of Minnesota as it was for any other group in
the United States. However, for the Minnesotans involved in these events which soon
transpired, their contributions helped change not only their own, but also a great many
other Americans impressions of their country. These actions also became a catalyst for
many Americans to question not only the wars fought in the Philippines at the tum of the
century, but also the United States' newly developed imperialistic foreign policy.
With the nation suffering from a terrible economic depression and this generation
dealing with feelings of inadequacies due to the fact that they did not have even one event,
like the Civil War, to put their names in the history books, they were desperately seeking
something to uplift them. Fortunately for them, a crisis was brewing in the world in the
last half of the 1890s, one which many hoped would not only solve the economic and
emotional depression in the country, but one that would also cure the national division still
left over from the Civil War.
Not only would this generation have to help heal the wounds from a war fought
some 30 years earlier, they would also be forced into fighting any future battles with the
same mythical patriotism and valor that the Civil War generation had. It was with this
enthusiasm that those who enlisted to fight at first took with them. In a near carnival
atmosphere this generation went off to fight their war, unfortunately for them by the time
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they returned to American soil, this excitement had all but vanished. For these men quickly
found that the war they had been sold was not the one they would end up fighting.
This changing of views happened in part because of what was taking place in their
nation's capital. Even as the 19th century was coming to an end many American politicians
did not seriously plan for America's future, often leaving many of their newly developing
foreign policies rather vague. With no serious, concise plan coming out of President
McKinley's administration, most of the plans for the United States and the government
were being formulated by low level government officials, military leaders, or an overzealous group of Americans who wanted to see America expand its territorial holdings.
With little or no direction from the top officials America's foreign policies were
often then formed as events progressed, usually with the help of one of the above
mentioned groups. This lack of direction not only caused problems for McKinley, but it
also created issues for this generation of Americans who were never quite sure what
direction their country was taking them in. In a time when a definite foreign policy needed
to be formulated, this generation of Americans never knew for sure where their government
stood. This questioning by many American citizens of what it was their government was
trying to accomplish, only further complicated things for the men who went off to serve
their nation in a time of war.
The problems facing this generation of Americans was tremendous. With a
government unsure of itself, pressure from an older generation, and the desire to finally
heal the wounds of past transgressions, they needed an enormous event through which
they could solve all the problems plaguing them. When they did get their opportunity to
act, most did so with the belief that they were going to be given the chance to "spread the
blessings of their exceptional civilization to the world." A crusade with this concept as its
backbone would not only be seen as being noble, but might also lift them and their nation
out of their current malaise. 1
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Their prayers of getting that one major event would come true, but the answers
which came from it were far from what they expected. Instead of getting what they wished
for, this generation of Americans found themselves changing forever the way the nation
looked at itself. For by 1900, America not only found itself at the beginning of a new
century, but were also able to witness the arrival of a new and more powerful nation on the
world stage.
The opportunity to solve all these problems came from the old Spanish Empire.
Since their discovery of the "New World," the Spaniards had held a vast empire in both the
Americas and in the Pacific. Unfortunately for the Spanish government of the 1890s, this
empire was beginning to crumble around it. Rebels in Spanish colonies such as Cuba and
the Philippines, who were trying to expel the Spaniards, placed Spain in a precarious
position. Having more military might than its colonies, Spain could try, over time, to
suppress these revolts and return these nations into the fold, but the more they tried to put
down these revolts the more attention they received from around the world, especially"from
the United States.
Americans had always taken a special interest in Cuban affairs, since it lay only 90
miles off the coast of Florida. Having started a number of revolts against their colonial
masters throughout the 1800s, with the start of the revolt in 1895 Cubans were aided
immensely by three different groups of sympathizers in the United States-American
businessmen, a minority of Republicans and certain East Coast newspapers.
In 1893, America had suffered from the worst economic depression in its history.
In order to get America out of this depression many business leaders began to argue that the
country needed to keep its labor force working. To do this they believed they had to
continue to make products from the surplus of goods which kept coming in from around
the nation. In order to keep these first two goals alive, many businessmen, along with a
group of politicians, argued that America needed to increase exports.
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Along with America's business world pushing for intervention, the Cubans were
also aided by the fact that America, in 1896, elected William McKinley as President,
re-establishing Republican rule in the White House. Since he and certain key members of
his party, such as Theodore Roosevelt, held both expansionistic beliefs and pro-Cuban
tendencies, McKinley and the Republicans were able to put the Cuban cause in the
forefront of American thought at the end of the 19th century.
However, the main culprit in leading America to war with Spain was the world of
print journalism. What started as a simple business competition, in the end led to an all out
war.
During the 1890s the market for newspaper supremacy in New York City was a
closely fought battle between two men, William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. In
order to grab more readers, thereby gaining more circulation and money, neither was above
over-sensationalizing an event to get more subscribers. Believing that "stark contrasts of
black and white would sell more papers than bland shadings of gray," these editors
portrayed the Spanish as "unspeakable villains, who committed murder torture, and rape
against innocent Cuban women and children." 2
This tabloid war, and the type of sensationalistic reporting called "yellow
journalism," was aided by the events unfolding in Cuba. Both Hearst and Pulitzer
believed, con:_ectly, that there was nothing like a war to capture the readers' attention, and if
the actual events were not exciting enough, they would then print their own exaggerated
versions of what may or may not have happened.
Although pro-business, McKinley still did not want to send America to war. But
with intense pressure mounting on him from newspapers, Cuban sympathizers, a small but
vocal group of politicians and a growing sentiment for action across the nation, it became
harder and harder for him to stay above the fray and try to solve things diplomatically.
'

~

Trying to maintain the peace while certain segments of the United States were lobbying for

•
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war was difficult enough, but diplomatic crises, which were beyond the control of the
President were quickly used by those clamoring for war forcing McKinley to set America
on a path for war.
During the spring of 1898, these three groups were further aided by three events
which help set the course, not only for what would take place in Cuba, but in various other
spots in the Caribbean and half way around the world. These events, making their biggest
impact in Washington, quickly developed a ripple effect which spread, first to the larger
East Coast newspapers, then subsequently throughout the rest of the United States.

.

In a day and age when local newspapers were the only way one could obtain news,
the editors became the source for all that the people knew. As it was in New York, so it
was throughout the state of Minnesota. Minnesotans, always believing they had more civic
pride than many people in other states, followed what was happening both in their state and
in the national government With the three events which transpired leading America into
war, Minnesota newspapers not only reported about them, but also had an effect on those
who later signed up to fight the war.
The first of these three incidents was the de Lome affair. Dupuy de Lome, Spain's
ambassador to the United States for three years and a well respected diplomat, had been in
this position for so long that his gaffe was even more unpardonable. In a simple personal
letter to a Spanish Minister, de Lome concluded by claiming that he felt McKinley was
"weak and catered to the rabble of his party." He further added that the President was also
11

a low politician, who desires to leave the door open to me, and to stand with the jingoes of

his party. II 3
Had it not gotten into the wrong hands, the letter would not have caused the
problem it did for the Spaniards. Sent through the letter through the regular mail system,
the letter. was stolen by a Cuban sympathizer and quickly sent to a pro-Cuban group in
New York City. Going through a series of channels (no one wanted to take responsibility
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for getting it published), it finally ended up on the desk of William Randolph Hearst, where
it made front page news with the headlines: "WORST INSULT IN AMERICA'S
HISTORY."

4

While the Hearst and Pulitzer newspapers immediately beat the drums for war,
Minnesota's took a much more watchful approach to the de Lome situation. The Moorhead
Daily News was far less excited about the event than its New York counterparts and
reported it much like the rest of the state's newspapers. Not only was the story of this
"diplomatic crisis" over the de Lome letter located on the second page, it also had to follow
a page-one story which had among its headlines, "Ole Pederson went to Fosston Monday
morning. 11 The Moorhead paper, like a number of others, focused its concern more on
whether the translation of the letter had been accurate. While the East Coast tabloids were
ready for war right then aJ;l.d there, Minnesota's newspapers originally took a much more
cautious approach to the events unfolding.

5

Not wanting war over this issue, some Minnesota newspapers, depending on their
political affiliations, even agreed with de Lorne's characterization of the President. The
St. Cloud Daily Times said in an editorial on February 11 that this letter told the "... exact
truth... " in regard to the President's character. Even in his own administration, McKinley
was being berated for his character. Then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore
Roosevelt, had himself gone on record saying; 11 ... that his chi~f had the backbone of a
chocolate eclair." 6
de Lome, being an astute diplomat, had resigned his position before any official
actions could be taken. With de Lome out of the picture and the Spanish government's
apology accepted by a war leery McKinley, the incident was all but forgotten. It was not
the spectacular event that many "yellow journalist" were hoping for. For their part,
Minnesota's newspapers remained level-headed and were able to report the de Lome story
with little sensationalism. Unfortunately for those who did not want war, stories about
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de Lome were replaced by a more horrible story--one that the pro-war yellow journalists in
America could latch on to and not let go.
With diplomatic tensions heightening, President McKinley, under the guise of
dispatching ships on regular naval visits to other countries, began to send American war
vessels to Cuba in January. The first of these ships was the U.S.S. Maine. The Spaniards
in Cuba, for their part, were not too threatened by the ship's arrival. In fact, when the

Maine arrived in Havana Harbor on January 25th "[T]he Spanish commander sent a case of
fine sherry to the Maine's Captain and officers. 11 7
Three weeks later the peace and tranquillity that the sailors of the Maine might have
enjoyed upon first arriving in the island, quickly vanished. At 9:45 p.m., on the night of
February 15th, an explosion ripped through the bow of the Mmne, killing 260 of her men
and injuring many more. Hearst's reporters were some of the first on the scene. They
immediately telegraphed the news to New York where a messenger brought the report of
the Mai.ne incident directly to Hearst He in tum called his editor to find out what the next
day's headlines would say. His editor responded

11

•••

the Maine as well as the other big

news of the day." To which Hearst replied; 11 ••• there was no other big news and instructed
the editor to fill the front page with the news of the Maine." Hearst, knowing that this was
the story he had been looking for, cryptically added: "[T]his means war."

8

The news of the Maine's sinking was quickly circulated around the nation by the
Associated Press, to which most, if not all, of Minnesota's newspapers belonged. This
service was invaluable to Minnesota editors, but it also had a tenihle flaw to its system.
The Associated Press often carried stories picked up from Hearst's New York Journal,
which was famous for its yellow journalist tradition. Consequently, Minnesota's papers
reflected this taint of yellow journalism in their stories on the Mai.ne incident
Although a great many of the early reports out of Havana stated that the explosion
was an accident, and noted the aid that the Spaniards gave in rescuing the survivors, this
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was readily overshadowed in the days to come. Other sources claimed that the mine was
planted by the Spaniards who purposely destroyed the Mairze. No matter what the truth
may have been, the yellow journalists had the sensationalistic story they were looking for
and they were going to run with it
Back in Minnesota the citizenry was following this story in their local newspapers
just as closely as anywhere else in the nation. For Minnesotans, though, the news was not
viewed as such a huge shock as in other parts of the nation. This sentiment was reflected
in an editorial in the Mankato Daily Free Press which stated that the Maine incident: "has
caused a thrill of horror to pass over the nation. 11 The editor then begged his readers not to
be swayed toward sensationalism, although he agreed it was easy to "... tum suspiciously
toward the Spanish." In the end he hoped his readers would heed the advice of the Mairze's
Captain Sigsbee when he warned people to withhold judgment "... until a thorough
investigation... " was conducted.

9

During this time Minnesotans found themselves aroused with anger, but they were
also not certain what significance the Maine affair had. Those who wanted action found an
outlet for quickened emotions in the work of Cuban relief. Around the state one could find
constant reports on Cuba in the newspapers along with lectures. at church services and
socials. Although not ready for war, Minnesotans found themselves getting emotionally
prepared for what might happen.

10

While-pro-Cuban sentiments were beginning to develop across the nation, back in
Washington McKinley and his administration had their hands full diplomatically. Although
personally wanting to claim the Maine incident as being purely accidental, McKinley knew
full well that the American press would not let it stand at that. The day after the incident
McKinley gathered his cabinet together, and they decided upon their official policy. They
agreed there would be a board of inquiry to examine the situation, which would then report
its findings to the President The official White House line until then was to be that the
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destruction of the Maine had been due to an accident. The President also promised the
"public [that they] would know the real truth as soon as he did himself, and until then he
asked [for] a suspension of judgment."

11

With many politicians and various newspapers around the nation clamoring for
war, some of the Minnesota newspapers began to agree, and started to print articles in
favor of war with Spain. The Moorhead Daily News changed its cautious view when it
stated that tl[T]he sentiment of the country is overwhelmingly in favor of prompt, decisive
and adequate action on the part of our government. ti

12

While in Duluth the News Tribune felt that ti [f]he destruction of the battleship
Maine has stirred this country from coast to coast, not so much because of the disaster
itself, ... as because of the strained condition of affairs. 11 America found itself, being led by
jingoistic politicians and journalists, heading toward a war with Spain over Cuba, a war
that neither the McKinley administration wanted, nor the Spanish government could
afford. 13
Throughout the last few weeks of the month of February and the first week of
March the debate throughout American focused on whether or not the Spaniards had sunk
the Maine and if so what the United States should do. Although the sinking of the Maine
put most Americans on the threshold of support for war, Minnesotans, due to their own
stoicism and the lack of sensationalism in their newspapers, continued to remain cautious
and level-headed. It would ironically take something far more mundane than any
diplomatic faux pas, or a naval explosion to make the citizenry of Minnesota stand up and
prepare to take arms.
On March 7, 1898, the United States Congress passed McKinley's "Fifty-MillionDollar Bill" which would be the third and final step in preparing America for war.
Ironically, McKinley hoped this bill would solve a number of his problems. First he hoped
it would calm the yellow journalists by making it look as if he had a "backbone" and would
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stand up to the Spaniards. Secondly, he was all too aware that war was quite possible, and
wanted the nation to be prepared. Finally, the bill "was designed primarily to deter Spain
from continuing intransigence." The hope was that they would see that America was
completely prepared for war, and then back down.

14

Unlike either the de Lome letter, or the Maine incident, the passing of this
legislation did much to help unite, first newspapers, then the people from across
Minnesota. With the passage of this bill, a feeling of patriotism began to surge, not only in
Minnesota, but across the United States. Suddenly there emerged a sense of unity among
all Americans not felt since the days before the Civil War. This unity was first reflected in
the House of Representatives, with its vote on McKinley's "$50 Million Dollar" bill. As
the St. Cloud Daily Times headlines exclaimed on March 9th: "AYES 311, NOES 0." The

Times, along with numerous other newspapers, was thrilled with the fact that with this
vote, "[P]arty lines were swept away.... " All Americans were finally again united over a
single cause.

15

In an article the following day, the St. Cloud Daily Times continued with its unity
theme. "The enthusiasm with which [the $50 Million Dollar Bill] was hailed everywheren, s, e, w,-is noticed to all people that, however Americans may differ as to party politics,
they will be united as one man when the nation is threatened. If war should really
come... the rush of men to arms, would surpass anything the world has ever witnessed."
For many A~ericans the memory of the Civil War still lingered in their conscience. Since
1865 many had been looking for something to finally reunite the nation under one theme
and flag. For those people this bill was it. It showed that it was time to unite against a
common enemy and forget past transgressions. With a large portion of the United States
still hol4ing on to old hatreds, for many the Civil War would be concluded with a victory
over Spain.

16
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This third event on the road to war was the one which inspired Minnesotans (or at
least their newspapers) to join in the patriotic bandwagon and call for the defeat of the
Spaniards. One of Minnesota's own Congressmen, Representative McCleary, in a speech
before the House even claimed; 11 •• .if war must come all lines of division among us will be
forgotten. There will be no North, no South, no East, no West, but one united country. 11
He then concluded by telling the rest of the House; 11 [A]nd if war shall come the North Star
State... will again be found in the forefront in the hour of danger and the sons will emulate
the glorious achievement of their sires at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. 11

17

This speech was met with a thunderous round of applause by all sections of the
House. Although this speech, wrapped tightly in patriotic zeal, not only stirred sentiments
in both the House of Representatives and in thousands of Minnesota men, it spoke more
truth than this Representative knew. For those who would go off to fight the Spaniards
would not only help conclude the Civil War in the minds of many Americans, they would
also have to live up to the tradition of the Civil War soldier, both real and mythical. These
proved to be shoes nearly impossible to fill.
It also spoke the truth about how Americans felt about themselves. At the turn of

the century "it is questionable whether a Minnesotan thought of himself primarily as an
American, or whether he identified himself as a farmer, a midwesterner, a Norwegian, a
Lutheran, of perhaps a Republican. 11 The sectionalism which had divided the nation back
in the 1860s "".as still alive and well. With few in the United States considering themselves
and those around them to be Americans, many in this post-Civil War generation believed it
was up to them to find that one national cause which would once and for all unite all
Americans.

18

While the money had been appropriated by the Congress, the final act of declaring
war would have to wait until the Board of Inquiry, established to find out the cause of the

U.S.S. Maine's explosion gave its report to McKinley, who was himself still trying to
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stave off war at all costs. By the end of March this inquiry had been completed and was on
its way to Washington D.C., for Presidential viewing. Whatever the results of the Board
of Inquiry's report, it seemed that most of Minnesota's newspapers, as well as most of
America's, had already come to a conclusion--not so much as to whether or not the Spanish
had sunk the Maine, but rather how the United States would fair in war. As the St. Cloud

Daily Times reported on March 26,

1~98;

11

[f]he time for idle speculation is past-the period

for active and energetic preparations for offensive operations is at hand.... 11
The Daily Times concluded by saying; 11 [f]here can be but one result, victory for
this nation, and yet this does not detract from the momentousness of the occasion, when it
is remembered that many lives will be lost and millions of treasure expanded. 11 Having
staved off the influences of East Coast jingoism for weeks, Minnesota's editors had
succumbed to the allure. of tantalizing articles used to inspire the masses. 19
The report reached Washington amidst an almost carnival atmosphere of reporters
all trying to get the scoop. On March 25, President McJGnley met with his cabinet to
discuss the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry. Having known for a week what the
report said, this document held no surprises for McKinley. Still hoping for a last minute
miracle, McKinley was aware that the whole nation knew he had the report and that he had
to send it to Congress. He knew this almost certainly meant war, since even though the
report did not name names, it did blame the sinking of t11e Maine on an external explosion,
and to most Americans that clearly pointed to the Spaniards.
McKinley and his cabinet decided to hold on to the report over the weekend,
thereby allowing him a couple of more days in which to conduct some last minute
negotiations with the Spanish government If that failed, he knew that the patriotic feelings
flowing throughout the Congress and the nation would surely sweep him and the nation off
to war.

20
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With no last minute miracle to stop the war, the report was made public, and the
machinery of war began to spin rapidly. On April 11th, President McKinley sent a
message to Congress asking for the authority to intervene in Cuba. This April 11th
message was received in the Senate and referred to the committee on foreign relations,
chaired by Minnesota's own, Senator Cushman K. Davis. Two days later Davis, in the
committee report, said; Spain was guilty either by an "... official act of the Spanish
authorities or was made possible by a negligence on their part so willing and gross as to be
equivalent in culpability to positive criminal action." In Senator Davis', and the
committee's view, it was now time to start the war and free the Cubans. This resolution
was adopted by the full Senate on April 16, and was accepted with few changes.

21

While Davis remained a strong imperialist throughout the war and after, he by no
means represented the entire state of Minnesota. For while Senator Davis was pushing for
war, another Minnesotan, Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, was waging a war for
peace. Having been contacted by the Pope, (who wanted to avoid the bloodshed of
Catholics from Spain, Cuba, the Philippines and the United States) to try and find a
peaceable ending for the current diplomatic deadlock, Ireland went to work.
Ireland had been chosen by the Pope because of his A~erican citizenship, his
"undoubted 19yalty to his country, and [his] friendly personal relations with the President
and members of the Cabinet." Once in Washington, Ireland was courteously received by
President McKinley and his staff. Even with all the pleasantries among all involved, the
Ireland talks with McKinley were futile. It was believed by anti-war groups that since the
Pope, many Spanish officials, and even President McKinley all desired peace, Ireland,
playing intermediary, would be able to convince all parties of the war's irrationality.
Unfortunately for the Archbishop and his cause, war fever had grabbed a hold of the nation
and neither religious nor political leaders were going to curtail it.

22
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Having failed as a diplomat, Ireland returned to Minnesota to continue his duties
with the Catholic Church. With war nearing and his peace initiatives having failed, Ireland,
being a patriotic American, began to support the war, to the point where in his church
sermons he began to talk about the righteousness of war and those who fought in it
Even with last ditch efforts to avoid conflict, McKinley knew that the majority of
Americans, having been misled-by both jingoistic politicians and newspapers, wanted war.
He also knew that if he continued to seek peace at this late date the Republican Party would
be split and his administration would suffer unpopularity and a loss of confidence. Also,
being a first term president, he had another election coming up in just two years, and he
knew if he wanted to be re-elected, his choice was a simple one, send America to war.
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Therefore, on April 25, McKinley asked the Congress to declare war, to which it
whole-heartedly complied by passing a resolution that said that war had existed since
April 21.
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It was little wonder, though, that Americans demanded war. Most Americans,

having followed the Cuban Insurrection and the developing diplomatic crisis in their local
newspapers, had had months of patriotic indoctrination by continuously hearing how evil
and treacherous the Spaniards were, and how easily they could be defeated by the superior
Americans. This belief, coupled with the concept that they would be fighting a just war,
and could bring the blessings of liberty to the Cubans, made many Minnesota youths
excited for war. So once the call went out for soldiers, they were ready.
But before these Minnesotans could join the military and head toward Cuba,
another event of major significance was unfolding half way around the world. On
May 1, Admiral Dewey, with orders from Washington, sailed from Hong Kong and
reached Manila Harbor in the Philippines. (The Philippines had been a part of the Spanish
empire since the days of Ferdinand Magellan's world voyage when he claimed the islands
for Spain.) His orders were to attack the Spaniards in these islands primarily to prevent
them from setting sail and bringing either their Pacific Navy, or their troops stationed there
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to aid in the fighting in Cuba. In what was considered one of the greatest naval victories in
American history, Dewey's ship's completely destroyed the Spanish fleet in a matter of
hours, whereas the Americans only lost one man to heat exhaustion during the entire battle.
News of this victory spread quickly to the United States where Dewey was made an
instant hero. Having no ideas about what to do next, Dewey awaited orders from his
superiors in Washington. They, too had little inkling of what to do with this situation.
Outside of defeating the Spanish navy to prevent it from sailing to Cuba to help their troops
there, American leaders were at a loss.
A plan began to slowly develop, and Dewey was first ordered to try to gain control
of the city of Manila, the capitol of the Philippines and a Spanish fortified outpost. While
wanting to accomplish this, Dewey feared that his small contingent of tro.ops could not take
and then hold the city. On May 7 he telegraphed Washington informing them that in order
for him to take Manila, he needed more troops. American political and military leaders
knew that if they listened to this request, they would completely open up another front in
the war. This in tum would force America's military strategists to completely rethink their
strategy for victory. After a hrief debate, leaders in Washington decided to go along with
Dewey's request, and began to develop plans to send troops to the islands.
Although new to the American military leaders, this war in the Pacific was anything
but new to its participants. The Filipinos, like the Cubans, had been fighting an
insurrection against their Spanish colonizers. They too were waiting for their chance to
strike a decisive blow and force the Spaniards out of the islands. Finally, again like the
Cubans, they would see their best opportunity come with the arrival of the Americans.
With Dewey's overwhelming victory in Manila Harbor, the Filipinos saw their chance and
again began to attack the Spaniards. With lightning quick military movements, the
Filipinos were able to cut off large numbers of Spanish troops, and were also able to force
a large contingent of Spaniards into Manila, where the war would stalemate for months.
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Americans, wanting, and needing the assistance of the Filipino insurgents,
contacted exiled Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo who was then living in Singapore. With
American promises of aid, friendship and Philippine independence, Aguinaldo agreed to
sail back to his homeland and begin again his war against the Spaniards. American leaders
in Washington sent orders to Dewey and others who had contact with the Filipino leader to
avoid all alliances with the revolutionaries. But they were to late, for American diplomat
E. Spencer Pratt (one of just a handful of American diplomats working in Asia at that time)
had already vaguely promised Aguinaldo independence and that America would not
colonize the Philippines, and the U.S. Navy had already brought Aguinaldo, on an
American ship, back to the Philippines, thereby giving his authority some credence.
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Lacking any serious plans for dealing with the Spanish in the Philippines, and
paying even less attention to the Filipinos, President McKinley mistakenly gave much of
America's diplomatic duties over to the military officers who were currently, or would
soon be, in the islands. This absence of direction from Washington would not only cause
serious problems during the Spanish-American War, but was also to be a serious hindrance
when more serious events arose that next spring.
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Weeks later President McKinley was to confide in a friend: "[I]f old Dewey had just
sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have s~ved
us." He did not though and America found itself fighting a war now on two fronts, and its
first overseas war. For most Americans this one-sided victory in the Philippines reaffirmed
their superiority over the Spaniards. It also meant that America would need even more
troops to fight its war, thereby giving more Americans the opportunity to show off their
patriotism and courage. Finally, by having another front in the Pacific, Americans could
have an additional opportunity to export its version of liberty and democracy to another
nation suffering under Spanish oppression.
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At this moment in time it seemed as if almost everyone was getting their wish.
Jingoistic Americans were getting their war, while the Cubans and Filipinos were hopefully
going to get their freedom. The United States set itself on a course for international
involvement and all that would come with it. But before they could dive into the world of
international relations and become one of the world's superpowers, the young men of
America would have to don military uniforms and go off and fight for the right of America
to make these claims. With patriotic fervor sweeping the nation, Minnesota's own were
also caught up in this tidal wave of emotion. Emotions and attitudes which would carry
them to the other side of the world, where they would have to fight three wars. One
against the Spanish, another against the Filipinos, and a third against the memory of a war
fought some 30 years earlier.
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Chapter II
"VALIANT SONS OF VALIANT FATHERS"
With Minnesotans, and the nation, on the edge of their seats, and ready for war, the
question turned to not who to fight, but rather who would do this fighting. With pro-war
sentiments as strong as they were that spring of 1898 it was not hard, once war had been
declared to find the necessary bodies to go and fight. In Minnesota, as across the nation,
throngs of young men rushed to their nearest recruiting offices to sign up for military
service.
Although their reasons varied for why they wanted to serve there were some
common threads for why most signed up to serve their nation. Probably the biggest factor
was that most of them had, at one time or another, sat and listened to stories about the Civil
War from either their fathers, or grandfathers. Born years after the Civil War ended in
1865, this generation which would go off to fight the Spanish, had been raised on stories
of what war was like. Throughout history, one of the most peculiar issues about war is
how veterans remember it. The Minnesota veterans of the Civil War, along with a large
portion of the state, sold warfare to this younger generation as more like a combination of
summer camp and a classic adventure, rather than recalling the horrors which often come
with it.
This younger generation, also saw how their communities and state held these
veterans, and the memories of those who had died, in high esteem. These were the bravest
of the brave, and they had sacrificed all for the glory of the Union. For many who enlisted
in 1898, it was this, attainment of personal glory and respect, which was the catalyst for
19
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them to go off and fight the Spanish. For those who desired adventure and glory, this war
would be their ultimate dream. It would allow them to attain honor for themselves, and
their country, by showing bravery in some far off battlefield.

1

The Civil War veterans, with War drawing near, proudly showed their patriotism
and stood behind their stories of the past. Few, if any were to come forward and try to
warn these boys about the possible dangers which lay ahead. For some, the persistance of
peace was not a source of national pride, but rather one of concern. A number of the
veterans from the Civil War even went so far as to say that the lack of war was detrimental
to the creation of a "praiseworthy national character." Many of these veterans felt this
younger generation was growing up without having to prove its manhood, thereby
implying that these boys had a life which was far too easy.

i

Those who turned over their civilian clothes for those of a soldier also saw this
conflict as an opportunity to travel and see the world. From the letters sent home during
the first days of camp, it is obvious that a great many of those who joined had never been
more than a few miles from their homes in their entire lives. By joining the army or navy,
many believed they would be given the one and only chance in their lives to see different
parts of the United States and the world. 3
The final reason for this generation of Minnesotans to go off to war was because of
what their newspapers and politicians had been telling them. Getting all of their
information about the outside world solely from their local newspapers, those who signed
up had for months read stories about the evil Spanish empire, and even more importantly,
stories of how weak and decrepit the Spanish soldiers were. In their minds then, America
was on an altruistic mission to save the Cubans and Filipinos from the horrid Spaniards,
not only freeing them from their oppressors, but also bringing them American liberty. By
joining the military they would not only be doing their patriotic duty, but maybe even more
importantly, they would doing the right and just thing. It was this that their politicians and
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newspaper editors had been telling them for months, and it was this notion that these
soldiers brought into the field with them months later. 4
With the questions of whom they would fight and who would do that fighting
answered, the next question the government had to ask itself was how were they going to
do this fighting. The regular army, all but dissolved in the years following the Civil War,
had in the latter half of the 19th century been made up primarily of smaller units doing their
setvice in a series of forts in the West. With war imminent, the debate then arose between
President McKinley and some on his staff over the size of the army needed in this war. In
the end, knowing that this shrunken regular army would not be adequate, McKinley and
his Secretary of War, Russell Alger, turned to the National Guard units to fill in the
necessary numbers.
Although neither Secretary Alger nor Major General Nelson A. Miles, the army's
senior officer, held the state National Guard units in high esteem, they did see them as
being somewhat useful. Both agreed that the National Guard would not make up any
fighting units, but rather could be used primarily as a police force to protect the coastal
defenses during wartime.

5

In their estimatiqn of the National Guard as being basically useless, they were
probably not too far off. Un_til 1898 the Guards had been "primarily [a] social and political
club, 11 used more for social gatherings and political patronage than anything else. Most
National Guard units also "had little equipment, an easy going type of discipline... and
scarcely any cavalry or artillery." And worst of all was the fact that few, if any, knew
anything about war, much less how to fight one.

6

By April 9, 1898, General Miles devised a plan to fight the war which consisted of
using all the Regular Anny, and asking for 40,000 to 50,000 volunteers. Knowing that the
National Guard just did not have the numbers they needed, Miles devised this plan calling ·
for volunteers to come from the states immediately following any declaration of war, much
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as they had done during the Civil War. Most of these volunteers, it was hoped, would
come from the state National Guard thereby giving the state gov~rnments the power to
organize the regiments and select their officers. 7
On April 13, Congress enacted this plan and six days later, on April 19, the same

day Congress authorized armed intervention in Cuba, a bill was brought to both the House
and Senate which asked for the creation of an all volunteer army. The government would
not only get the required number of troops they felt they needed, but they would also tap
into a vain of patriotism not know in the United States since before the Civil War.
Even before Congress passed legislation for the establishment of this all volunteer
army, and even before war had been declared, patriotism in Minnesota was running
rampant. With war fever having gotten the best of them, many wanted to do their part and
proudly display their patriotism. From March, until war was officially declared in April,
Minnesota Governor David Cloughs' office was deluged with requests from all across the
state with citizens asking that they be given their chance to do their duty.
In order to do their duty though, a great many wanted and asked for some kind of
political patronage from the Governor. Knowing that Clough was to be in charge of the
decisions of who would lead the state's regiments, many wrote to him requesting that they,
or their son, be mustered in at one rank or another. Typical was D. M.Neill's letter to the
governor of April 9, 1898 in which he informed Clough that his son, Edmund P. Neill,
had forwarded his "application for a Lieutenancy in the volunteer service.... " He went on
to explain that his son would make an excellent leader and that Edmund would do himself

and the governor credit. Although not brought in as a lieutenant, the younger Neill was
made a corporal in the Volunteers. 8
Another man seeking a position within the volunteer organizations was the
Reverend Charles A. Cressy. A veteran of the Civil War, in which he served with the 4th
Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers, this Episcopalian preacher's exciting life was far
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from over, and he wished to be part of this new adventure. After "respectfully apply[ing]
for a position as Chaplain in the State troops," the Reverend closed his letter to the
Governor's office by explaining that he desired, "most earnestly to Serve [his] country." 9
Patriotism was not monopolized in Minnesota by only those in the Twin Cities, but
it was also found in the northern part of the state. From Park Rapids came a letter to the
governor requesting that the writer, P.O. Winship, a Civil War veteran, be given command
of the troops from Hubbard county, since they were ready for war. He also informed the
Governor that due to his past experien~ he was the obvious choice as their leader.
Caught up in, and reflecting the jingoistic tendencies found in even the most patriotic
newspaper in New York, he concluded his letter to the Governor by saying that if "[W]ar
with Spain [is] inevitable [than] every American Heart Burns with Patriotism (sic) and
wants only the call to arms to spring to the front and avenge the wrongs and insults that
Spain has heaped upon the nation." Through these letters, it is obvious that the work of
newspaper editors clamoring for war had been very successful.

10

Where some Minnesotans could not hide their patriotism, others could not hide their
unigueness. Again coming from the north, this time Duluth, an overly ambitious group of
citizens reque8ted that the Governor admit them to the voluntee~units because they had a
unique talent which could help win this war. This ability which made them unique was that
they were entirely made up of a company of bicyclers. The letter stated; "I have tbe honor
to tender the services of from fifty to one hundred wheelmen for the support of the

government. ... '' To the surprise of probably few on his staff, Clough did not accept this
company into the new volunteer units.

11

But for every thousand super-patriots found across the state, there was alway.s one
who saw things in a different light. In a letter dated March 1, 1898, Hook Maglook wrote
the Governor saying; "I notice from the daily papers, that your mail of late is from men
who want to command the first company in the first regiment enlisted In order to break
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the monotony of the same I tender my service as the last private in the last company, of the

last regiment." If Hook's wish was that his sarcasm would keep him away from any
fighting it worked, for he never served in the volunteers. 12
Although Hook Maglook's letter was the one oddity in the thousands of letters sent
to the Governor that spring, most of the rest resembled those shown earlier. Groups such
as the Young Men's Democratic Club, Sons of Veterans, USA, and men who had served
in the Civil War and wanted the honor again, deluged the Governor's office with requests
for membership in the new volunteer units. Along with these specific groups of people,
Clough also received letters from cities all across the state, including Duluth, Willmar,
Worthington, Crookston, Tower, Hector, Osakis and East Grand Forks, all requesting that
their towns be represented in the upcoming fight.

13

With patriotism at an all time high across the United States, and would-be soldiers
from all walks of life preparing for war, it was just a matter of time before the government
led these men off to war. The anticipation of war peaked in those last days of April, arid
was reflected in a Minneapolis Tribune article which stated that 11 [W]ar strikes no terror to
the heart of the Minneapolis man. It rather awakens him to the fact that he is a citizen of the
greatest republic on earth and that as such he has an opportunity now of proving his loyalty
to his country. 11 It was this type of super-patriot rhetoric which not only helped recruit
Minnesota's boys for this "great adventure," but also kept the regular citizenry at a fever
pitch for war.
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On April 23, 1898, the news had finally come that answered the prayers of
volunteers across the nation, when President McKinley, under the just passed legislation,
requested that states recruit volunteers for the war against Spain. In a surprising move,
McKinley, instead of requesting the 60,000 volunteers which the War Department had
originally planned asked for 125,000 volunteers, double of what was originally intended.
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President McKinley's supporters cite three reasons why he asked for such a large
volunteer force. First, and probably most importantly, many of his advisors had warned
him not to make the same mistake which Lincoln had during the Civil War. In the first few
weeks of the Civil War, Lincoln had called up too few volunteers right away and then tried
to get more later, a delay which proved costly for the Union. Secondly, McKinley wanted

to impress Spain with America's vast military manpower, still hoping that he could frighten
the Spaniards into a diplomatic solution. Finally, the President knew that he had to jump
on the bandwagon and take advantage of the wave of patriotism sweeping across the
nation. Somebody had to take credit for this war, and with the presidential campaign
coming up, it might as well be him.
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The call from the President was met with great enthusiasm throughout Minnesota.
At the Minneapolis Armory where a number of the boys from that Minneapolis companies
had gathered, the word that they had been called was met with a "cheer that shook the
rafters of the rickety old building.... " The Minneapolis companies also received word that
one of their own, a Colonel Charles McC. Reeve would be appointed Colonel of the
regiment, which received another thunderous round of cheers.

16

Despite all of the enthusiasm for war, Minnesota troops were not ready to fight a
war. Under the new legislation, the volunteer units were to resemble their counterparts in
the Regular Army. The Minnesotans, as well as other state's units, were nowhere near
this. Whereas the Regular Army had companies of approximately 80-100 men, most
newly formed volunteer units resembled Company C of the future 13th Minnesota
Vounteers. As late as April 23, 1898, this company "had on the rolls 50 men; of these 38
immediately volunteered... " the rest had excusable reasons not to go off and fight. This
left Company C, much like the other state companies, with less than half the required
numbers to be mustered in. To fill these gaps, men from virtually right off the street to
4

fight a war were recruited to join. 17
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Even though they were accepting a wide variety of recruits, there were requirements
which had to be met before they could become volunteers. The military was looking for
men who were "between the ages of 18 and 35, of good character and habits, able-bodies,
free from disease and must be able to speak the English language." They also wanted to, if
possible, avoid married men, minors (who needed their parents consent), only surviving
parents, and non-citizens. 18
On April 25 the die was cast and America declared war on Spain. That same day

Secretary of War Alger telegraphed the state governors explaining to them exactly what
portion of the 125,000 volunteers they were to raise, and specifically what number of
regiments, companies or batteries each was to organize. He finished his telegram by
requesting that as many of these volunteers should be recruited from each state's respective
National Guard units, as Miles and Alger had discussed earlier. 19
The wire from the Secretary of War to St. Paul clearly informed Governor Clough
that "[f]he number of troops from your State under the call of the President... will be three
regiments of infantry." Clough replied that same day that Minnesota could supply the three
regiments but they would need supplies. Minnesota, as he informed Alger, had "about

..

.

half the required number of rifles, gun slings, bayonets, belts, haversacks, blanket bags,_ ~; "1
blankets, overcoats, blouses, trousers, campaign hats, caps, leggings and meat-ration
cans.... The troops however, he stated, were ready for muster at once."
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The original three regiments were not up to standards according to the Hull Army
Reorganization Bill which was passed on April 26. This bill, dealing with the new
volunteer army, specified that each regiment should consist of 12 companies each. As for
Minnesota's, both the 1st and 2nd regiment, formed two days before, had 10 companies
each, whereas the 3rd only consisted of 8. This put Minnesota eight companies short.
Meeting the required number of soldiers for the nation's cause was not to be a problem, for
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once word got out that they needed more men, recruiting offices were again thronged with

willing volunteers.
While finding men was never a problem, what was going to cause some difficulty
for many Minnesotans was that even though they were to be mustered in, and paid by the
United States Government, they still wanted to be known as a state organization. As one

Minneapolis Tribune article stated, "[f]his was the plan followed during the Civil War.
Each state filled its quota and received credit for the regiments it furnished and followed
their careers and preserved their records with pride." The shadow of the Civil War
veterans continued to cast a large and influential shadow over anything these new units ever
tried to do. This comparison to the Civil War soldiers continued in an article written in the

Minneapolis Tribune, entitled "Valiant Sons of Valiant Fathers." This report described
how this generation would serve their nation as well as their fathers had thirty years earlier.
Having enlisted for two years, or for the duration of the war, "the boys leave their homes
and employment in glorious uncertainty as to when they will return. ir 21
With the organization of the regiments decided, and how many each state should
provide to the cause, the next decision lay in the hands of each state's government The
question before them was where to set up training camps for the volunteers. State
government and military leaders decided that the best place to set up camp for these three
regiments was the State Fairgrounds. Believing there would be enough room there, they
renamed_ it Camp Ramsey, after the state's first territorial Governor who was still alive.
.

-

The next thing state officials had to do was to get the troops congregated in their new
home.
Cashing in on the patriotic sentiments, the plan was to have all three regiments meet
at the State Capitol and from there march to Camp Ramsey. This gave the people of the
Twin Cities the opportunity to cheer on their men, and also gave Clough recognition, for
he, much like McKinley, also had a political campaign coming up.
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With the orders to meet at the state capitol on the morning of April 29, 1898, some
could not help but to continue to point out the similarities between the Ci vii War and the
current war. One astuie observer noted that the 1st Minnesota Regiment was mustered in
on April 29, 1861, and exactly 37 years later, on the very same day; the three regiments for
the war with Spain were mobilized at the state capitol. 22
Upon the arrival of the other three companies from ou~ide the Twin Cities the
regiments lined up in parade formation at the capitol and headed out toward Camp Ramsey.
With Colonel Joseph Bobleter and the 2nd Regiment in the}ead, they were off. To get to
Camp Ramsey this newly formed army had to wind its way through the crowds of wellwishers which lined the city streets. As they started out they passed in review of the
Governor with bands playing and crowds cheering them on.
Even with the festive atmosphere, it was not a joyous occasion for all involved.
Due to an unseasonably warm April day in Minnesota, some of the soldiers who were not
use to the excitement, or conditioned for marching "dropped out during the march and
covered the remainder of the distance in street cars." Upon reaching the camp, soldiers
found themselves exhausted "and immediately sought the shade." 23
After the hours of parades, speeches and numerous ov~tions for their bravery, they
reached their destination and it was now time to get to work. The first order of business
was where to put everyone. Lacking the number of tents needed to accommodate all the
troops, the camp commanders decided on rather unique barracks. With enough tents for
one regiment, they had the men of the 2nd Regiment "pitch their tents ... on the grounds
occupied by the gun club, immediately east of the racetrack, and on an eminence which will
overlook the entire grounds (today know as Machinery Hill)." They were more creative in
their placement of the 1st and 3rd Regiments. They decided that the remaining two
regiments could easily fit into the state fairground's stock barns. "Each of the barns for
horses contains 54 stalls, and bunks for two men could readily be placed in each." Of
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course the two regiments would move into their luxurious new surroundings only "after the
floors had been swept [and] the buildings clean.... 11 Those cleaning out the barns
grumbled about this duty until the traditional Minnesota spring weather returned, and those
in the tents had to deal with the wind, the cold and the rain.

24

Pvt. Lewis Burlingham of Company K from Stillwater, in one of bis first letters
home to his parents (he was only 17 and too young to enlist without consent from bis
father) told them about life in the barns and the lack of creature comforts in them. "We are
in barns and sleep in the stalls, have straw to sleep on. There are four or more men in each
-

stall and when one wants to turn over he has to holler and the rest of us turn at the same
time."
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Once the soldiers were moved into their new homes the next order of business was
to start making them into an army. The first thing that the camp leaders decided the men
needed was a set of rules. Posted on the second day all around the camp was the soldiers'
first taste of army regulations. General Order I set forth what exactly a day at Camp
Ramsey would look like:
"The following daily routine will be observed.
Reveille, 6 a.m.; breakfast. 6:45 am.; fatigue, 7:30 a.m.; sickcall, 7:45 a.m.; guard
mounting, 8 a.m.; squad and company drills, 9 a.m.; first sergeants call, 11 :30 a.m.;
dinner, 12 m; officers school, 2 p.m. squad and company drills, 3 p.m.; supper, 5:45
p.m.; guard mounting, 6:45 p.m.; retreat, 7:30 p.m.; tattoo, 9 p.m.; taps, 9:30 p.m. 11
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Even though many of the volunteers had little or no training, for the most part they
were in good hands when it came to their commanders. Col. Charles Mee. Reeve,
commander of the 1st Regiment was given high marks by the Minneapolis Tribune when
they told their readers that" [H]e has an eye out for the welfare of the private as well as the
officers, and as long as they do their duty they will fare well at bis hands." This New York
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born and Yale educated soldier had been a part of the 1st Regiment since 1883, and rapidly
made his way up the ranks to colonel by 1892. 27
Even with commanders who wanted strict military control, these volunteers could
not escape the feeling that they were more at a summer camp than a military boot camp.
For their relaxation, the YMCA set up a reading room where the soldiers could go and read
the "[C]urrent magazines, the home-town newspapers, writing materials and
Testaments.... " Weekends were even more relaxing for the soldiers. On the first
weekend, much like those that followed, approximately 15,000 people showed up to see
the troops. Family, friends, girlfriends, and well-wishers from all over came to either see a
soldier or the spectacle swirling around the camp. For the soldiers these weekends were
not spent preparing for war, but rather picnicking, going on excursions to local sites (this
was the first time in the big city for a good number of these soldiers) or playing games.
The atmosphere at Camp Ramsey resembled a Fourth of July picnic, more than a military
institution. 28
After a weekend of festivities the boys woke up on Monday morning, May 3,
knowing that that day would decide the fate of a great many of them. Over the next two
days the physical examinations would begin for the soldiers. All knew that this was the cut
off, and by failing this, the first of many tests put before them, their dreams of achieving
Civil War style heroism would be destroyed before they even left the state.
A great many of the soldiers, knowing that their physical condition was no where
near what was needed to pass, tried to make up for months, and maybe even years of
inactivity, by whipping themselves into shape hours before the exams began. Some of the
soldiers trying to get ready were, "at one of the barns...jumping up and down on one foot
showing how their limbs would be tested, and at another heavy knapsacks were strapped
on their backs, just to see if they could carry weight gracefully." 29

..
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The man the soldiers most feared that day was a Major Harry who oversaw the
physical examinations for the 3,755 officers and men. To meet the War Department's
standards Minnesota had to have 81 enlisted men in each company, or a total of3,096
officers and men for all three regiments. With so many men having signed up, an added
fear was put on those trying to make the cut, for all knew that under current War
Department requests at least 659 Minnesota volunteers would be sent home, healthy or not.
As Major Harry wound up his physical examinations the commanders began to get
a better look at what they had to work with. They discovered that 13 companies "were
found to be more or less short of enough able-bodied men to make up their quotas,
sev~nteen companies

reached full strength, but apparently with none to spare; and only six

companies [were] said with certainty to have dismissed men-some sixty in all-who were
acceptable but for whom there was no place in those companies." Ironically, those who
were dismissed, but were still healthy, did not join other companies in sufficient numbers
to fill in the holes in those units.

30

As the commanders scrambled to fill in the gaps in their units a political struggle
was developing which would have an effect upon these regiments. The same Civil War
veterans who had squawked that the lack of any wars had made this generation soft, now
began to complain that they did not want their units names tied into up with these soldiers'
unknown future. Going to their state legislators, and the Governor to file their grievances,
Civil War veterans complained that these newly recruited troops had taken their regiments
numbers (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Minnesota Volunteers) and did not deserve them. The old
vets feared that this "lazy" group of kids might so badly besmirch the good name of such
regiments as the 1st Minnesota that history would forever remember it as being a failure,
and not the gallant unit it once was.
Still holding much political and sentimental clout throughout the state, the veterans
got their way. On May 4, the Governor reorganized the three regiments starting with
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number 12, after the 11 regiments that had served during the Civil War, thereby not
stepping on any toes. From that day forward the First, under Col. Reeve, became the
13th, while th~ Second, under Col. Bobletter, became the 12th and finally the Third, under
Col. Van Duzee, was renumbered the 14th. 31
For the next few days the newly organized regiments continued their drills, waited
for much needed supplies from the War Department, visited with friends and families, and
patiently awaited word that they would soon be sent to Cuba to fight the Spaniards. Along
with the monotony which followed these few days, illness was another developing
problem. Due to it being very windy and the nights getting quite chilly, many began to
suffer from colds. To coincide with the normal sickness the camp was also hit with the
more serious problems of measles, pneumonia, and meningitis. But overall, and especially
compared to other camps around the nation, the overall health of the Minnesotans was
good.

3Z

Found in almost every military camp throughout history, the rumor mill was one of
the first organizations established. Stories rapidly began to spread about which regiment
was to leave first, who would go to Cuba, who be sent to the coastal defenses, and so on.
By the end of the first week, and with news of Dewey's victory in Manila, the rumors
began to spread that one regiment was slated for duty in the Pacific. Jumping at the chance
to get involved, Col. Reeve became a one man lobbying machine by contacting his political
and military connections and by "keeping the wires hot between Camp Ramsey, New York
and Washington." All in hope's that the 13th might see some action before the war was
over.
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Before any regiment was going anywhere though, all of them had to be mu.stered
into the service of Uncle Sam. Starting on May 6, the official mustering in was to take
place. With the staff being sworn in earlier, each brought forth their companies to the camp
headquarters, where their "commander was questioned as to the character of the men
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presented.... After the commanders responded in the affirmative, Captain Swigert, the
regular army officer who mustered them in, "made a personal inspection of the line, [after
which] the roll was then called.... 11 After each individual was called forward, all of them,
as a unit took off their hats and raised their right hands and in chorus swore allegiance to
the United States, obedience to the President and of the officers appointed over them. Once
officially made volunteers of the United States Anny they were then ordered back to their
barracks or tents.
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After all were mustered in, the 13th Minnesota consisted of 50 commissioned
officers and 978 enlisted men, in the required 12 companies. These companies consisted
of five companies from Minneapolis (A, B, F, I, L), four from St. Paul (C, D, E, H), and
one each from Red Wing, Stillwater, and St. Cloud (0, K, and M, respectively).
With the momentary excitement of being made official soldiers over, the men
quickly went back to the routine of camp life and awaited their assignments. By May 7 the
rumors about the Philippines had become so frequent that m~ soldiers began to talk only
of going to Manila to fight. The Minneapolis Tribune reported that "the boys are even
digging up statistics and information as to the Philippine Islands so as to find out what they
will see if they go there, [since] they seem to think they will." 35
Before they could go anywhere though, the boys still had to learn how to be
soldiers. In o~der to do this Col. Reeve knew that his troops needed the necessary
equipment to train with. Part of Reeve's requests was met when, in the first part of May,
he received an issue of 75,000 cartridges. In cooperation with the other two regiments they
established a shooting range at Camp Ramsey where the men could improve their
marksmanship.

In addition the commanders continued to work on other training including

close order drills and all around discipline. 36
Even with the new drills, the weekends of excursions, and the rumors that they
were soon to embark upon their great adventure, camp life was becoming terribly
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monotonous for many of the men. As one soldier from Company G, told the Red Wing
newspaper, he either wanted "... to fight or go home .... " This statement expressed not
only his feelings, but probably most at Camp Ramsey. Not only was this sentiment to be
expressed while idling away the .time in Minnesota, but it was to be a constant theme of the
soldiers throughout the war.
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By May 12 all the problems they had suffered~the lack of supplies, the monotony,
and the illness-was quickly forgotten when word came from the Adjutant General of the
Army to Gov. Clough that Minnesota troops were needed. In a telegram dated May 12,
Clough read "[l]n fitting out the expedition for the Philippines, Secretary of War desires
that one infan~ regiment from your state be placed enroute for San Francisco soon as it is
able to travel." The telegram went on to state that they were not expected to be fully armed
or equipped, since most of the equipment would be at San Francisco. 38
While the telegraph told Clough what to send, it did not specify which unit was to
go. Although the 12th was actually more prepared to leave in a moments notice, it wa.S to
be the 13th Minnesota Volunteers, due to Col. Reeve's lobbying of both state and national
legislators, which gave them the Governor's final approval. Along with Reeve's
persistance, it was believed by most that the 13th was the best equipped and drilled. With
the official word being quickly handed down the chain of command, by the time it reached
the soldiers, the news was met with a raucous celebration in the barn-barracks. 39
With the assignment of the 13th to the Philippines they, more than their
counterparts, the 12th and 14th regiments, captured the attention of the press and the
public. Almost immediately citizens came out to see the honored 13th and to contribute
money to a fund set up for them. Citizens from both Minneapolis and St Paul continued
their rivalry by both trying to give more money than the other to Col. Reeve and a board of
officers from the 13th Regiment. The smaller cities of St Cloud, Red Wing and Stillwater
also sent money to help their companies. Of all the monies cities sent and the individual
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contributions given, one stood out above the rest. The Honorable James J. Hill, the
Minnesota lumber, railroad and newspaper giant donated $7 ,500 from his own personal
fortune to the 13th's fund.
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Before heading to the Philippines to fight, the government had decided to have all
the volunteers heading to Manila stop in San Francisco for further training. For the
members of the 13th, the trip to San Francisco was to be taken by trains. Besides the men,
the trains were to carry "15 horses, 47,000 pounds of public property, 3,500 pounds of
rations, 2,000 pounds of forage, etc.... " The officers were to take the "palace sleeping
cars" while the enlisted men had to travel in the "emigrant coaches." 41
Before they boarded the trains to San Francisco the boys of the 13th Regiment were
going to receive a lesson in military prepardeness. The complaint down through the ages
by the common soldier is that most of military life is made up of being told to hurry up and
then having to sit and wait. With orders being received on May 12 to be ready to go as
soon as possible, the 13th packed fervently, and then waited four days before they boarded
the train.
After four days of killing time, the 12th, 13th, and 14th Regiments all boarded
trains on May 16 for their destinations. The 12th left first, but with no ceremony, followed
by the 14th, departing from the fairgrounds depot. The 14th did receive some cheers but
most of those came from people who had gotten there early to see the 13th off. Both the
12th and 14th left in virtual anonymity and that is how their military careers would stay
throughout the war. Both were sent to Camp Thomas in Georgia, where they remained
until the. war was over, suffering terribly from the diseases, boredom and heat which
plagued these ~ps.
While the 12th and 14th faded into the distance with little recognition, the 13th's
send off was quite different, for they not only had a crowd of well wishers, but also were

•

given two large demonstrations. "One when the regiment entrained that evening at the
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camp, and another when the troops train passed through the union depot in St. Paul where

other crowds had been waiting for hours for a glimpse of the Thirteenth. 11 With the last
train carrying the 13th out of sight, Camp Ramsey, the one time thriving military camp, and
hub of excitement in the Twin Cities, was by 9:00 that night completely deserted.
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The trains which carried the 13th away from family and friends was made up of
four sections. For those who had not been farther than a few miles away from their
homes, these trains were to take them across much of the western United States to
California. Traveling across new lands their excitement was still at a fever pitch, since for
many this is what they had signed up to do. For them this was all part of the adventure,
taking them away from their mundane lives back in Minnesota.
Due to a railroad mix-up the four sections of trains were split up. On May 28,
while the first two sections were reaching San Francisco, the last two were still in Utah.
Even though met by crowds at every stop, the trip to San Francisco was a rather uneventful
one for the Minnesotans, with the exception of an incident which occured while outside a
small town in Utah. There, as John Butman, reporter from the Minneapolis Tribune
wrote, "[f]he Minnesota boys had a hot time at Wadsworth, chasing Indians. They got
after one buck who was so frightened that he jumped on top of the train to get away from
them. He was finally run down by the yelling mob, but the officers made the men release
him. 11 He then cryptically added at the end of the article, "[T]hey also captured a
Chinaman." 43
The first step of their military careers was over, and for most the adventure had
already begun with their trip across the United States. What lay ahead was another camp
and then hopefully service in the Philippines, where they hoped they could finally attain the
glory needed to get out from underneath the shadow of the Civil War veterans. Before that
could take place, however the men of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers would have to come
face to face with their racial biases and notions of superiority in a land where they for the
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first time ever would be the minority. Although the trains headed toward California had
forced them to leave behind their friends and families, it did not separate these Minnesota
boys from their own racial stereotypes and prejudices common in that day. A definite clash
of cultures was on the horizon for these Minnesotans.
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Chapter III
"... WELL EQUIPPED AND EXCELLENTLY DRILLED"
After having traveled across the western half of the United States, all of the men of
the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry had reached San Francisco and were beginning the
second leg of their journey to the Philippines. It was here, in this northern California city,
that the War Department planned to assemble its troops into the VIII Army Corps. It was
also here that the government hoped it could tum this hodge podge of volunteers into an
army, then send them halfway around the world to destroy the Spaniards.
On May 25, 1898, President McKinley made another decision which had an effect

on these volunteers and the states from which they came. On that day McKinley and the
War Department decided to increase the Army's numbers by calling up another 75,000
volunteers. The reasons for this decision were threefold. First, McKinley and the army
would have reserves, something Lincoln did not have in the early days of the Civil War.
Next, with all the patriotism flowing throughout the nation more citizens would be given
the opportunity to enlist and serve their country. Finally, being a wise politician, McKinley
knew that more regiments meant governors could commission more officers and pay off
more political debts. With the next presidential campaign always in his thoughts, the more
political debts he could collect, the better chances he felt his campaign had.
The only group upset with this plan was the Regular Army. As they pointed out,
the Act of April 22 "...forbade the acceptance of new regiments from states whose existing
units were under strength.... " In their view these new recruits should reinforce the first
regiments called which were grossly undermanned in their current condition. In the end
39
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McKinley concurred with the Regular Anny and told the governors to fill up existing units
first, then they could begin the process of mustering in new ones.

1

Once McKinley and the anny decided they should recruit more soldiers, they then
informed each state as to its new quota. Since few companies in the original three
regiments were up to the required 106 enlisted men, most of the 2,000 men, newly
recruited from the North Star State, were to be sent to those units already established.
Those who remained would be mustered into the newly recruited 15th Minnesota Volunteer
Infantry. 2
Although many politicians wanted these new recruits to be used as political gain for
the state governors many, including Clough, saw this as both irritating and embarrassing.
In a May 28 telegram to the Secretary of War Clough argued; "Minnesota acted in exact
accordance with your letter of April twenty-fifth in regard to number of men to be mustered
into each company in first call. I don't want it understood that shortage was any mistake of
mine." Clough was afraid that this new request would make him, and other governors
look incompetent. But, not wanting to ruffle any feathers in Washington, he also added;
"[H]owever, will be pleased to furnish shortage of nine hundred and ninety men.... "
When it came down to it, Clough, a crafty politician himself, knew this war was a political
windfall, and wanted to take advantage of it as much as the next politico. 3
While some of the men from the 13th were sent back to recruit soldiers to fill up
their ranks, the rest of the men were just getting into San Francisco and were setting up
camp. In the early morning hours of May 20, the 13th arrived in Oakland where they had
to march "... up hill it seemed all the way ... " carrying an excess in bags and equipment, due
to the fact that "[T]hey had not yet learned the act of getting along without things ... 0
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After marching through the city they then headed to Camp Merritt, named after the
Philippine Expeditionary Forc~s' commander, General Wesley Merritt The General, much

•

like the camp which bore his name, did not appear too friendly toward these volunteers. In
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a comment made on May 16, Menitt "complained publicly of his distaste for volunteer
troops and asked that regular units then in Florida be directed to his expedition. "5
Until Dewey's smashing victory in Manila Harbor on May 1, the government's as
well as the public's full attention was focused on the events transpiring in Cuba. Having
focused all of their attention on the island south of Florida, few if any of America's military
strategist had ever made plans for the army going anywhere else but Cuba. With the
decision to fight in the Philippines, the War Department, already gross! y unprepared to
fight, and having already sent almost all of its Regular Army to the southeastern United
States to prepare to invade Cuba, had to rely on these volunteers from the Western states to
fight the war in the Pacific.
Merritt, originally welcomed his assignment, but by the time his expedition had
assembled at San Francisco, he had seriously begun to regret it. A Civil W~ veteran and a
career military man, he did not want to face the logistical problems of moving an army this
size, especially one which was almost completely amateur. Not only would he have to try
and train a nonprofessional army, but he also had to supply 15,000 men from government
stores which were depleted when most of the equipment had already been sent to the
Regulars in Florida Finally, Merritt had to deal with the fact that this group was
embarking on America's first war to be fought overseas. Due to isolationist policy, the
army and navy had never built, nor did they owp., any troop transport ships. It would be
up to Menitt and his staff to find the necessary transportation to take this citizen army
across the Pacific.

6

If the camp's namesake was not thrilled to have the volunteers, the camp itself was
even less welcoming. According to one 13th Minnesota historian, "[T]here was not a
single natural advantage about Camp Menitt to recommend it as a place for troops. Each
regiment was quartered on a sand lot without trees or grass. The streets surrounding the
grounds were overrun with salons and disrespectable haunts of all kinds."

7
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The camp, Iocated four miles west of the main part of San Francisco, a mile from
the ocean, and just north of the Golden Gate Park... " was also unpopular because it was
situated atop of an old race track, which was filled with fine sand. Whenever the wind
blew in from the ocean, which was frequent, the men and their equipment were covered in
sand. These impromptu sand storms, combined with the "unseasonably cold weather and
frequent fog" prevented the soldiers from drilling in this area. In order to alleviate the men
of drilling in such horrible conditions, the commanders decided to send them to the Golden
Gate Park or on Presidio Hill to finish their training.

8

For the men the difficulty of a commander who was not thrilled to have them,
coupled with the foul weather, all paled in comparison to the problem of the lack of
supplies. Although there were a few modem guns, most of the recruits were given the
Army's old 1873 Springfield's, while a handful had the newest weapon the superior bolt
action Krag-Jorgenson. 9
Although this lack of supplies was irritating to the Minnesotans, it was more of a
problem for other states' units. Those volunteers not only came without uniforms, a great
many soldiers made it to camp without such essentials as shoes, hoping the government
would supply this for them once they got there. The 13th was fortunate that their state's
National Guard stores did have a fairly large supply of equipment, and that through their
fund they were able to purchase many other needed things.
The final problem the volunteers faced during their time at Camp Merritt was that of
illness. This was a problem which plagued not only Camp's Ramsey and Merritt, but
every military camp during this war, whether it be in the Unites States, Cuba, Puerto Rico,
or the Philippines. As Martin Tew, the official historian of the 13th was to point out,
Camp Merritt, "at one time 198 members of the regiment were incapacitated for duty by
reason of sickness." These illnesses passing through the camp would bring the first death
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to the 13th. On May 30 typhoid fever claimed the life of Corporal William W. Ray of

Company I, the 13th Minnesota's first casualty of war.

10

Even with all the negative things that were going on around them, the 13th, along
with all the other volunteers encamped at San Francisco was able to find one bright spot.
This morale booster came in the form of the good people of the city. Showing undying
civic pride, many citizens opened up their hearts and doors to the volunteers. Rarely did a
day go by when a San Franciscan did not either bring food and conversation to the camp,
or invite a young soldier to share a meal at their home.
A variety of stories came from their time in San Francisco, detailing how they were
treated, especially by the women. A Minneapolis Tribune article dated May 29, stated that
n...at present Minnesota has the most popular camp, and the women are rapidly finding out
their good qualities." While many of these women were of upstanding character, there
were also those who had converged on these camps to ply their trade to these boys who
were ripe "off the frum!n For as quickly as a military camp was built, houses of
prostitution quickly encircled. 11
Pvt. John Bowe, a Minneapolis man, originally from England and serving with
Co. B, also commented on how well the people of San Francisco had treated them. In a

diary which he kept throughout the war (and which he published afterward) he described
the soldiers' feelings about the out-pouring of emotions. Bowe claimed that the San
Franciscans "all tried to make us feel welcome and at home, and I think they succeeded, for
many of the boys would rather be here than at home." He was right, for after the war a
great many of the men of the 13th returned to San Francisco to either find work, or to
reunite with some of the young women they met while on their brief stint in the city. u
Like the other volunteers encamped at Camp Merritt, the Minnesotans did receive a
great deal of attention from the people of San Francisco. But the 13th did stand out
compared to the other Western volunteers for three reasons. First, all reports commented
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on the fact that the average Minnesotan was considerably taller than volunteers from other

states, boasting to have men w)lo stood as tall as six feet, six inches. Secondly, due to
their state's surplus and their regimental fund buying much of their supplies, the
Minnesotans had a more professional look than other units. Finally, even with their brief
training period in Minnesota, they did have excellent leaders who trained them well.
Therefore they stood out in comparison to units who did not have time to train.
While they stood out in California for the above reasons, many things in Camp
Merritt reminded them of life back in Camp Ramsey. Camp Merritt, like Camp Ramsey,
was more of a social setting than any kind of serious military training facility. In order to
kill the dead time between the few hours of drill and policing duties, the men had to find
other things to occupy their time. Fortunately there were plenty. One of these diversions
was sporting events, primarily the numerous baseball games which the Minnesotans rarely
shied away from. Private Bowe in his diary even commented that 'on June 10, "[O]ur
regiment played the S.F. boys a game of ball yesterday and got done up to a finish, 25 to

5."
top.

~ereas

they never backed down to a challenge, neither did they always come out on

13

Another big diversion was the town and people of San Francisco. Few if any of
the local citizenry ever complained of having the soldiers in and around the city. For the
volunteers, San Francisco had an exotic feel to it, and needed to be explored. Local
businessmen were able to sell almost anything to these soldiers who had little else to do
with their money, other than send it home or purchase things in the city. The happiest of
all these businessmen had to be the local saloon owners, for it was at these establishments
that 11 •••the men sang, drank, and celebrated in the immemorial ways of soldiers on the eve
of battle. 11
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The final group pleased with this situation was the prostitutes who converged on
the city by the hundreds. Present day numbers show that, along with these ladies, came an
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alarming increase of venereal disease found among the soldiers. In order to keep the good
name of its men and so as not to embarrass them or their families back home, not a word of
any member of the 13th being afflicted was ever printed. By looking at how hard other
regiments were hit, however, one has to assume that the Minnesotans were not all at church
during their free time, probably becoming afflicted with the same ailments as all the other
units.
Even though the 13th had departed the state weeks before, those in Minnesota did
not forget them. One group, the Custer Circle Grand Anny of the Republic (G.A.R.) of
Minneapolis sent Mrs. L.A. Runge to present the 13th with a regimental flag. Tltjs flag,
made in Minnesota, "was a superb specimen of needlework, white silk, elaborately
embroidered on both sides wi~ the Coat of Arms of the state." 15
After the flag was·handed over and unfurled, the men gave a boisterous cheer.
Then after thanking Mrs. Runge and the good people of the state, Col. Reeve pledged the
crowd gathered there that "every drop of blood in the veins of the boys of the 13th before
they would allow the flag to be dishonored." Again the men cheered. Still thrilled with the
idea of going off to fight a war it ironically would be this enthusiasm which became one of
the first casualties of war when America's policies changed that next spring. 16
On June 6, Major John Friedrichs, Captain Corristan, and Lieutenant Merrill,
accompanied by 12 enlisted men, left San Francisco and returned to St. Paul and
Minneapolis for the purpose of recruiting an additional 300 recruits. This was in
accordance with the War Department's recent requests to get all companies up to 106 men.
When these 15 men returned to Minnesota, recruitment was not a problem. By this time all
had heard that the 13th was heading to the Philippines to fight, and enlistment with them
meant almost certain action. Whereas Friedrichs' group had no problem getting the needed
300 men, the 12th and 14th Regiments had a little more difficulty since they had received
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no word as to whether or not they were to leave their camps and go to Cuba
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After gathering their recruits, these officers had them mustered in on June 14th and
sent to San Francisco on the 16th. After four days on the trains these new soldiers were
met at Camp Merritt by Col. Reeve, his staff and the regimental band. These 'rookies,' as
those with only six weeks of experience called them, were "equipped as no volunteers
entering San Francisco had yet been equipped, and so soldierly in bearing and appeanlnce
that they attracted attention on every side." In just a matter of weeks the 13th had
distinguished itself as being a unique unit in a unique army. This was something they were
very proud of, and were not going to allow the 'rookies' to do anything to hurt that.

17

By June 20, with the new recruits settled in camp, along with the 21 men who

enlisted to be part of the 13th in San Francisco, the total number of both men and officers
in the regiment was 1,349. Meeting all standards required of them by the War Department,
the only thing they had to do now was to sit and wait.

The trqops began to get tired of the monotony of the drills and the boredom of daily
camp life. As the Minneapolis Tribu11e wrote in its June 16 edition, "[T]he Minnesota boys
are growing sad. The main trouble is due to too long a camp in one place without anything
in particular to relieve the monotony. There is also the general disappointment caused by
the selection of this or that regiment to go to the Philippines, said regiments being
manifestly inferior to that sent out by Minnesota." Feeling that they were superior to their
comrades in arms from other states, sitting in Camp watching "inferior" regiments heading
out, only intensified their boredom and dislike for Camp Merritt.
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This boredom would be reprieved quickly though with a single visit from General
Merritt to the 13th on June 15. On his official visit Merritt said "many complimentary
things in regard to the regiment. .. ," but most importantly of all he told them that he had
"...asked for its special detail..., to accompany his expedition... " to the Philippines. Since
April the Minnesotans had had plenty to cheer about, but it was this news, that they were
finally going to go fight, that received the most boisterous cheer from the men. Now they
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were going to get their chance at gaining glory and honor, fighting in a war in a far off
land. The stigma of not being as worthy ~ their fathers and grandfathers, would, they
hoped, finally be washed from them in the distant islands of the Pacific.
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Although they received word on June 15 that they were slated to leave, it would
take almost a week for both the soldiers and their commanders before they were to set sail.
In the meantime the regiment continued to drill and was even asked to give an exhibition

drill for the benefit of the California Red Cross, which was attended by hundreds of
northern Californians. They put on such a fine show that one San Francisco paper would
say of them; "[V]ery fine looking men those Minnesota boys, well equipped and excellently
drilled. They are an example of what volunteers may be and are surpassed by few
regulars." It was these kinds of soldiers that Gen. Menitt, the man who gave little
credence to the ability of volunteers, wanted for his campaign in the Philippines. zo
Whereas the 13th continued to get ready by drilling, packing and writing letters
home, the camp's commanders prepared by seeking out transportation to take these troops
across the Pacific. The relatively small number of American vessels which sailed the
Pacific made this task difficult. What they were able to come up with were steamers which
were primarily passenger ships built for voyages to tropical climates. One of these, the

City ofPara, which belonged to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, was chosen to take
the 13th to the Philippines.
By June 25~ both the ships and the men were ready to depart. As the Minneapolis

Tribune reported that day, "[T]he 13th Minnesota regiment is on waiting orders.
Everything possible is loaded on the boats, and nothing remains but orders to strike tents."
By that night the orders had come down that it was time to break camp. With the exception
of the new recruits who still needed more training, the rest of the regiment headed toward
the do<;ks.
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Those leaving on the City ofPara and the other two steamers, made up the third
expedition of U.S. troops heading for the Philippines, the first two having been sent earlier
that summer. This expedition. included the Minnesota Volunteers, troops from Idaho and
Wyoming, 12 companies of regulars and the Astor Battery (a mountain artillery unit
privately equipped by John Jacob Astor and manned principally by college students). 22
In what was becoming a common occurrence, crowds lined the streets cheering the
departure of the volunteers. Marching through the streets of San Francisco, the
Minnesotans received flowers, fruit and kisses from the young ladies in attendance. Much
like their march from the state capitol to Camp Ramsey, the day turned out to be a hot one,
but with the assistance of the citizens who brought them water, this time none dropped out.
Upon embarking onto the City ofPara, the troops' excitement was at a fever pitch.
After entering the ship and seeing their new home for the next few weeks, this excitement
lost some of its luster. As the diarist, John Bowe was to write about the ship; ".. .it was
hastily fitted up for a troopship. She has three decks; the upper, having state-rooms, was
occupied by the officers; the middle by the band, hospital corps, and some choice selected
non-coms; while on the lower deck, in:-Iong rows of bunks, three tiers high, with only
width for one man to pass through, was the rank and file .... " 23
Quickly nicknamed the "Black Hole," the lower deck received instant consternation
from all who saw it. The Minneapolis Triqune reported how one man's complaints about
the soldiers' accommodations placed him in trouble with the Brass. "As Dr. [Walter]
Beck, Co. I, marched into the hold of the steamer Para yesterday afternoon he remarked
that it was an outrage to put men in such a place, and added: 'They treat cattle better than
that.' Col. Reeve was behind him and said 'steady.' Beck thought it was a private talking
and talked back very emphatically." Then to try and continue what he deemed a high
standard of discipline for bis men, "Col. Reeve... ordered him put in irons."
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While the men were slowly getting accustomed to their new home, the ship's
captain and crew pulled anchor and headed out of the harbor. This did not stop the wellwishers from trying to get in one last cheer for the departing troops, though. "Yachts,
small steamers, and boats of all kinds, chartered by groups of admirers, passed and
repassed near enough to the transport to bombard the passengers with fruit and farewell
messages." Then as they hit the last stretch before leaving the United States, the expedition
was met with whistles, cannons, bands playing and crowds cheering, with a large convoy
of boats following them. Finally, with the United States behind them, and only their
futures ahead of them, the 13th set sail for the Philippines.
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With the California coastline quickly disappearing, the boys of the 13th soon
discovered that the days of social picnics and leisurely military drilling were coming to an
end. For as Bowe recalled in his diary, "[A]s soon as we got outside the Golden Gate the
trouble ~gan. The boat commenced to rock, the boys to feed the fishes [they were
vomiting], and all our presents, pie, cake, shoes, etc., that were lying under our bunks,
were washed into the scupper. 11 z6
Ironically, those from a state whose sons often boasted of having direct lineage to
the great sea-faring Vikings of Scandinavia, could not find the~r sea legs. George W.
Kurtz, Co. I, wrote home explaining the sight
I saw dozens of poor soldier boys pale as death, looking as though they had lost
their last friend, holding their hands over their stomach, waiting for their turn to
come to deposit their last rations overboard. There must have been two or three
hundred sick the first night and the odor below must have been terrible to those
who-were not sick. Not laughing at his fellow comrades Kurtz was quick to point
out at the end of his letter that, "[A]lthough so sick myself I wanted the boat to
sink... 27
Those who fell victim to seasickness bore the brunt of the jokes of those who
initially withstood the first few hours. Besides feeling deathly ill, the sick were berated
with mock commands such as, "[L]ine up according to height!" 11 Fire by squads!" "Ah,
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Sergeant, your stripes did not save you!" But these jabs quickly abated for within 12 hours
a vast majority of the men, both enlisted and officers "had joined the grand chorus of
woe."
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Within a couple of days, although still not old sea dogs, most of the 13th were back
on their feet and able to swallow and completely digest a whole meal. As Reverend Cressy
wrote and told his wife on July 3, that "[T]he boys are all in good spirits-and hungry. One
of them said he could 'Eat a fried rat."' With that situation fixed, the boys then had other
things to complain about. Private Bowe, who was originally unhappy with the City of
Para, later wrote that in the Black Hole, "[T]here was scarcely any ventilation; the place
smelled like a rabbit warren, and it was oppressively hot."
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After a couple of days most of the men were able to get accustomed to sea-life, and
found themselves trying to keep themselves busy. In order to pass the time on board a
number of activities were set up for the men to do. One thing the commanders insisted on
was daily drill and calisthenics in order to keep the men in shape. There was also the band,
singing groups, reading rooms, educational lectures, and Bible study classes run by the
regimental chaplain, Charles Cressy.
Cressy not only oversaw the Bible classes, but also gave most of the sermons on
Sundays. Doing these tasks did not keep Cressy from his other mission while on boa.id
ship. His goal was to try and keep the boys from swearing and sinful card playing. Both,
according to letters, were prevalent during those long summer days. As the Reverend was
to tell his wife in a letter; 11 [C]ard playing-and some gambling (on a small scale) goes on
among the men. The Col. does not see fit to interfere with the latter. My impression is that
this is contrary to Army regulations and that it should be stopped." He informed his wife
that he would later have to talk to the Colonel about this. Reeve's reaction was not
recorded.
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As for profanity, Cressy believed it was "one of the most common evils among the
men. 11 While on board he charged that "the profanity with which the decks and baths
echoed from morning till night was simply shocking to sensitive ears." Profanity, he went
on to say, "is a vice that needs reforming." He tried to set up an Anti-Profanity Association
in each company but no record survived to tell us if anyone signed up. 31
The profanity issue and the boredom of the men were to be temporarily forgotten
only a few days out to sea when an event occurred which would make news not only
among the 13th, but also in Minnesota and the nation. In a book written after the war, a
story entitled "Perseverance Of A Woman," told how Col. Reeve's wife (no first name
given) "could not bear his going on the long and hazardous journey. Having done
everything in her power to gain pennission from the Government to accompany her
husband, she found that the rule was inviolable. Women were not allowed on the
transports and there could be no exception." 32
After two days stowed away, she appeared on deck and with a show of mock terror
asked if they were going to through her overboard. How she got on board Was an issue of
much debate among the soldiers and the newspapers at home. Mrs. Reeve claimed she hid
in the cargo hold until her food ran out, but most of the men argued that she was hidden
away in Col. Reeve's stateroom, until it was safe for hef to come out.
At first most of the enlisted men were shocked, then became disgusted with this
tum of events since the presence of a lady on board meant they had to put their shirts back
on and were forced to curtail their swearing. After arriving in Hawaii, some of the other
commanders told Reeve she would have to stay in the islands and find her own way home.
As Lewis Burlingham wrote home and explained the situation tp his mother, "[A]t the last
moment while the anchor was being raised Mrs. Col. Reeve started ashore in a boat with a
native during the morning. I haven't heard whether she will stay on the island or go back
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to the states." Being extremely tenacious Mrs. Reeve would actually do neither, for a few
days after the troops left Hawaii she took a ship to Hong Kong and then on to Manila. 33

It is highly unlikely that a lady like Mrs. Reeve could have got by the sentries and
lived in the cargo hold for a few days without being noticed, especially since she never
mentioned the company she would have had below decks. For in the cargo hold of the

City ofPara were three other stowaways. Not only would these additional stowaways
prove that Mrs. Reeve could not have held up in the cargo hold of the ship, but what
transpired when two of them were found once again shows the kinds of racial attitudes
these western volunteers were bringing with them to the Philippines.
Their stories unfolded in the July 19 issue of the Minneapolis Tribune. The article
first tells how the 25 "negro" cooks "have been in a panicky condition owing to the
discovery of a stowaway, a little 'coon' about 12 years of age, who was discovered the
third day out." How this boy got on board and what happened to him was not discussed in
this article, but how the second stowaway came to be part of the 13th was described in
elaborate detail. 34
The article went on to describe how one Minnesota citizen was fairing in his
journey. The story reported that "'Snowball' Mason, the mascot of the regiment and
Maj. Friedrichs orderly, [were] still with the 13th." The story of "Snowball" Mason, is
both extremely interesting and tragic at the same time, while conveying a gteat deal about
the attitudes the men of the 13th had at this time.
The regiment first had contact with 'Snowball' back in Minnesota, during their stint
at Camp Ramsey. When it caine time for the 13th to leave, just before they boarded the
train "Snowball" jumped aboard and hid in a barrel and was not discovered until they were
some 30 miles out of town. At that point he was unceremoniously kicked off the train. It
was not until Maj. Friedrichs returned to recruit more soldiers that "Snowball's" story
started again. As the newspaper reported it, '"Snowball' made such a pathetic appeal to
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that officer to be taken along that the kind-hearted major agreed to take him as his
orderly .... "
With the 13th about ready to board the City ofPara the officers agreed that they did
not want "Snowball" to be allowed on board. Having come this far, Mr. Mason was not
going to be deterred. With the same tenacity as Mrs. Reeve, he climbed aboard the night
before the ship's departure using the ropes on the side of the ship, and hid below deck. He
did not come out until he was sure they could not tum around and send him home, and
because he became too hungry. He was "allowed1' to stay only after both Companies F and
I decided to "take care of him, 11 and make him their mascot.
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Concluding this article was the very brief statement that a man from San Francisco
had stowed away also, but when he was found he was ceremoniously mustered into
service with the 13th. In a sad and ironic twist of fate "Snowball" an actual Minnesotan,
was not allowed to serve with 13th due to the color of his skin, whereas the white man
from California, who was never questioned as to how he got on board, was quickly made a
soldier, and not a "mascot." These racial attitudes that many of these Minnesota volunteers
had would manifest themselves in this foreign nation of the Philippines. There they
continued to grow and often made the Americans behave in less than altruistic ways.
After a few days of sailing, the expedition stopped at the Hawaiian Islands so that
the ships could recoal and the men could stretch their legs. Having moved into the more
tropical climate of the Pacific the soldiers on board received new uniforms to better deal
with the heat. Their new attire, to many, looked like "... brown duck uniforms ... " and
were believed to be, by most of the soldiers, "... about as ugly looking garments as the
most fevered imagination ever pictured.... " Fortunately for the soldiers though they were,
".. .loose and baggy and consequently comparatively cool," in comparison to the blue wool
ones they had been wearing 36
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From Hawaii the convoy headed to the Ladrone Islands before changing direction
for the Philippines. Day after day of doing the same thing once again became the 13th's
major gripe. The only difference in this last half of their voyage was a sight beheld by all
the Minnesotans for the first time in their lives. As one soldier put it, 11 [J]ust as it was
getting dark we passed within a quarter of a mile of what turned out to be an island, and for
the first time of my life I beheld an active volcano, spitting forth fire and smoke, and I
doubt if ever in the history of one's life anyone will witness a more beautiful sight. 11 37
With all the excitement of seeing the volcano, and knowing that they were in
striking distance of the Philippines, many of the soldiers seemed to forget that it was a war
they were heading to and not another drill exhibition for a ci vie group. With a death on
board the ship during the last days of July, many it seems were snapped back into the
reality of what they were doing, at least for a few moments. With Chaplain Cressy
conducting the service, Musician Fred Buckland of Co. E, who had died of pneumonia,
was buried at sea. As quickly as the dead soldier was swallowed by the waves, the gloom
which hung over the boys quickly dissipated, and they immediately went back to their
mundane lifestyle.
Two days after Buckland's burial, the men of the 13th ~ere awakened on the early
morning of July 29 to see the island of Luzon. Two more days of travel brought them to
the spot where history had been made just three months earlier. Hardly a soldier who was
there could resist writing to the people back home that they could see the remains of the
Spanish fleet, twisted, tangled and jutting out of the Manila Harbor. In their minds they
were there, standing on the threshold of history, where the "greatest" naval commander in
all of history had destroyed the dastardly Spanish. Most of them, as they wrote home, had
a sense that it was here, in the Philippine Islands, that they too would be able to make their
own history,just as Dewey had.
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Chapter IV
"... WITH COOLNESS, INTELLIGENCE AND COURAGE."
On July 25th, after weeks of traveling the Pacific, the City ofPara was able to

anchor off Cavite about seven miles south of Manila. Unfortunately, the Minnesotans
reached the Philippines the same time as the monsoon season, making it impossible to
undertake disembarkation until August 7, when they landed at Paranaque. Until then,
however, they had to sit on board and continue to view the war from~ distance, which was
especially irksome for the Minnesotans as they could hear the skirmishes which were
taking place between the Americans and the Spaniards. As Pvt. John Bowe wrote; 11 [W]e
heard the Americans and Spaniards fighting the whole night long and some of the boys
were afraid the war would be over before we landed. "1
Luckily for the glory-seeking members of the 13th, these minor skirmishes
amounted to very little. In the meantime the weather broke and the third expedition was
able to go ashore. In order to get all the men and their equipment on land, the Americans
had to rent small Filipino boatmen who used cascos (small Filipino boats which worked
excellently in the harbor) to land the men and their equipment. Even though they were now
"experienced" seamen, going from ship to casco to land proved to be another adventure.
As Pvt. Bowe recalled on that August 7th day, "... troops had problems timing their getting
into the cascos, had to get in on the crest of the wave. Col. Reeve stood there, cussing and
swearing at the men, and using language that would make an old Mississippi steamboat
Capt. tum green with envy." Reeve's anger did not alleviate any of the problems, and
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probably added to it. Although no group ever got the timing part down to reach the boat at
the same time the crest pushed it up, they did manage to finally get ashore. 1 2
Once the entire regiment was ashore at Paranaque they marched northward a mile
and a half and pitched their tents on the south end of a peanut field nruned Crunp Dewey.
The peanut field, far from being the most luxurious camping grounds they had yet seen,
was the best spot available due to the fact that it was the only "... solid, open ground in a
region full of rice swrunps and brunboo thickets. 11 3
After setting up camp, the 13th was given two days to rest and try to get
acclimatized to the Philippine tropical climate, which, to their consternation, they quickly
discovered was a combination of rain, intense heat, and a high humidity. All of this was
coupled with the fact that the constant rain, which plagued them the entire time they were in
the islands, made the ground stay in a constant state of mud which quickly ruined shoes,
clothes, and morale.
Lewis Burlinghrun, finding time to write his mother, told her about life in Crunp
Dewey. "We pitched our tents in a peanut field and got beds from the natives which they
made out of brunboo and slept on them because the ants there were a great deal worse than
the mosquitoes and goOdness knowes (sic) they were bad enough. 11 As the two days
slowly dragged on the oppressive heat and rain kept pounding down upon the men, making
it impossible for them to remain dry. 4
The final problem the weather caused was illness. The heat made them perspire
constantly forcing a loss of body salts and inducing chronic fatigue. In addition, the troops
also had to deal with the ever increasing problems of dysentery, malaria, cholera, and
dengere fever_ 5
Besides the weather, there were a number of other disadvantages to Crunp Dewey.
Drinking water was a problem because of the contamination occurring in unboiled water in
the tropics. Cooking was also a problem since there was an extreme scarcity of dry wood
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anywhere. Finally, all the rain which kept the men and their clothes wet made the leather in
their equipment mildew and become stiff when it dried. 6
While the soldiers had plenty to complain about-the weather, food, camp life (and
they did), General Merritt still insisted that no matter what the current conditions were like,
they still had to act like gentlemen and soldiers. On August 9th he issued a general order to
all the troops stating; 11 [I]t is not believed that any acts of pillage, rapine or violence will be
committed by soldiers or others in the employ of the United States, but should there be
persons with this command who prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts
will be considered not only as crimes against the suffers, but as direct insult to the United
States flag, and they will be punished on the spot with the maximum penalties known to
military law." These orders would stand throughout the duration of the volunteer's tour of
duty in the Philippines. 7
By August 10, a day after the ordeci were given and just three days after their
landing, the fyfinnesotans were put on guard duty in the trenches south of Manila.
Although the men of the 13th were looking for a fight, what they found was that they
would have to battle the rain and mud long before they fought the Spaniards. Guard duty
consisted of 24 hours of patrolling and standing in mud. After their duty was done they
would be relieved by another regiment and given 24 hours off. Lewis Burlingham later
explained to his family at home that on one of his patrols; 11 [l]t was a bad night as it rained
nearly all the time and when you wasn't (sic) on the lookout and wanted to sleep you
couldnt (sic) on account of there being so much mud and water and rain to contend with. 11 8
John Bowe further described the situation by writing in his diary; "[O]ur location
was opposite to and within three hundred yards of Spanish Block House No. 14, where
we put in twenty-four hours, crawling in and out of trenches. If we get into a trench, the
water would drown us out, and if we got out of it, the Spaniards would take a 'pot shot' at
us. 11 It was a dilemma they had to live with for at least a few more days.

9

59

With the third expedition under General Merritt setting up camp just south of
Manila, Emilio Aguinaldo and his soldiers began to have growing suspicions about the
American's intentions in the islands. The American leaders in the islands too, began to
have doubts about their Filipino allies. Having come half way around the world to "free"
the Filipinos from Spanish oppression, most were under the impression that they would
have to either take Manila without the help of the Filipinos or end up fighting them before it
was all done.
Unfortunately for all sides involved, the United States did not have any
professional diplomats in the islands to deal with the Filipino revolutionaries, These
relations were then left up to professional military men "who were ill-suited to play
diplomatic roles due to their training and temperaments." Used to having things done once
an order was given, the realm of international relations, with its constant give and take, was
extremely bothersome and a continual annoyance for them.
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Chief amongst these soldier/diplomats was General Merritt who came to the
Philippines to assume overall command. Merritt, known as an "imperious leader devoid of
any diplomatic inclinations," forbid any communication with Aguinaldo's headquarters.
By doing this, Merritt found himself in a dilemma, for he could not attack Manila without
getting permission from the Filipinos to use their trenches, which by this time completely
encircled the city. On the other hand he could not diplomatically deal with them since this
went against his own order of not talking to Aguinaldo. With McKinley's orders to
maintain the peace with the Filipinos at all costs, Merritt had to resort to trickery in order to
get what he wanted.
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Merritt sent General Greene to talk to Aguinaldo's staff in order to suggest a deal
with the revolutionaries. The deal was that the United States would give the Filipinos
much needed pieces of artillery for a sector of trenches immediately south of Manila.
Knowing they needed the artillery, General Noriel, a member of Aguinaldo's staff, sent an
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aide to Aguinaldo's headquarters to receive his approval. Aguinaldo said he would go
along with the deal just as long as Merritt signed the request.
Knowing that Merritt would refuse to sign anything dealing with the Filipinos,
Greene told Aguinaldo that he would forward the document as soon as the Filipinos
withdrew from the trenches. Aguinaldo, still believing that the United States and his
people were truly allies, and were completely trustworthy, conceded to the demand. Sadly,
neither the document nor the artillery were ever forwarded, but the American troops did
move into the trenches.
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These tensions between the Filipinos and the Americans were not lost on the
Minnesotans. George W. Kurtz, Co. I, wrote home on August 1 telling his family about
the presumed plans to attack Manila In it he claimed that the "[I]nsurgents don't want our
help and everybody thinks we will have to fight them as soon as Manila is captured."
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Two days later Captain Oscar Seebach, Co. G, wrote home telling his family in
Red Wing that he believed,

11

...

there is not a shadow of a doubt but that we will have to

fight tllem (the Filipinos) a great deal more than the Spaniards after Manila falls .... ". 14
Finally, Sergeant Alexander Kahlert, Co. D, spelled out the situation in his diary
when he wrote, "[W]hat preceded us have landed and are engaged in throwing up
earthworks between Coirto and the insurgents, This (sic) makes it a 3 cornered fight. The
rebels are not friendly towards & the chances are we will have the most trouble with
them.
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The most interesting thing about these commentaries, and others like them, is that
they were written either while the Minnesotans were still on the ship, or had just landed and
were setting up camp. Having not been in the islands for more than a few hours, how was
it that they were so sure that they would be fighting the Filipinos? Was this just personal
sentiments expressed by a few adventurous soldiers looking for more war, or was it an
already understood policy that they would have to take on the Filipinos before their duty
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was done? Either way it reflected America's constantly changing policies toward the
Philippjne Islands.
No matter what their personal feeling were, these men had another war to fight
before having to deal with the Filipinos. With the third expedition established in Camp
Dewey, Merritt had 8,500 men in position to attack the fortified city of Manila. These men,
along with the navy sitting and waiting in Manila Harbor, knew that the Spaniards had no
sign of relief coming to help them. With this knowledge the Americans deemed it time to
prepare for their invasion.
On August 6 both Dewey and Merritt sent a joint letter to the Captain General

[Spanish commander in the Philippines] Jaudenes, notifying him that he should remove
from the city all non-combatants within 48 hours. In a return message to his American
counterparts, Jaudenes thanked the Americans for giving the civilians the chance to leave.
This being a formal and public letter between the two warring nations, it was not to be the
only communications these two camps had with ~ch other in the days before the fighting
broke out.
The Spaniards, held up in Manila and under attack from the Filipinos since May,
were in a precarious situation. Under siege for three months, Manila was suffering from
disease, starvation, and a lack of water, to say nothing of the morale. The Spanish officials
new the situation was hopeless, but due to a "quaint code of honor, a court-martial awaited
them unless they put up a fight. So a sham battle with the U.S. forces had to be contrived
to save them from disgrace. 11 This code of honor was not to be taken lightly, for back in
July, for suggesting a surrender Governor Augustin was replaced by General Fermin
Jaudenes as Governor of the islands.
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Negotiations then began and were secretly conducted between Dewey, Merritt, and
Jaudenes through an intermediary, Edouard Andre, a member of the Belgian counsel. The
negotiated deal was laid out as follows; in order to save Spanish honor the American fleet
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would have to shell the city (preferably doing very little damage), while the land forces
were to keep the Filipinos out of the battle, since the Spaniards utter! y refused to surrender
to them. If the Americans could do these two things the Spaniards then would only lightly
defend the outer line of trenches and blockhouses and would not use their heavy guns to
attack the navy.
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If the operation succeeded after a fixed number of shots from the navy, the

Olympia, Dewey's command ship, was to steam forward and fly the international code for
surrender, "DWHB. 11 Then the Spaniards were to hoist a white flag and the battle would

be over. All of this was to take place without a single loss of life... unfortunately, even the
best made plans of mice and men go awry.
It is interesting to note that the whole "sham" battle and all the secret negotiations

which were conducted were not for the benefit of the Spaniards, the Filipinos, or even the
Americans. None of these groups involved truly wanted a fight and cared less about how '
the war was concluded but, rather, this whole battle was a show for a contingency of
foreign naval vessels harbored off the coast of Manila.
At the time of the hostilities, the German, English, and other international navies
had converged upon the Philippines, all looking for that proverbial piece of the pie.
Jaudenes, fearing word might get back to Spain from one ·of these other nations that he had
"cowardly" surrendered, insisted some kind of display of force be shown. Knowing that
the Americans would most likely defeat the Spaniards, these other nations, wanting their
chance at setting claims on the Philippines, hovered around waiting for their chance to
strike.
While all of these secret negotiations were taking place, the Minnesotans and the
rest of the VIII Army Corp prepared for a real battle. The original date set for the attack
was to be August 10, but since Merritt did not believe his troops to be fully prepared, they
re-scheduled the attack for August 13.
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In accordance with the secret negotiations with Gen. Jaudenes, Dewey, and Merritt,
who had already remov~d the Filipinos from their well-dug trenches, were now telling
them that they could not fight and help finish off the war which they had started years
before. To make it official, on the night of August 12, Merritt sent Aguinaldo a letter
which instructed the Filipino leader to keep his troops out of the battle.
Most of the volunteers knew about the deal to keep the Filipinos out and felt it to be
a good idea Lt. Col. Ames, in a letter published in the Minneapolis Tribune, told

Minnesotans; "[G]eneral Merritt and Admiral Dewey do not intend to act in conjunction
with the insurgents because it is well known fact that they intend to sack and pillage the
city, ravish the women, and murder the Spaniards if they once succeed in getting inside."
He went on to say that if Spain were to surrender it would "result in our defending the
people and the city from the bloodthirsty insurgents." During those first few days in the
Philippines it seems many of the volunteers had to be reminded that they were there to
"free" the Filipinos, and not to fight them.
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By August 12 the soldiers knew that the next day woul9- be their chance to gain the
glory which they had been dreaming about since they enlisted back in Minnesota. Angus
McDonald, Co. K, summarized these sentiments in a letter ~ome, saying that, "[T]he night
of the 12th we received the long looked for and joyful news that on the morrow we would
make a general advance while Admiral Dewey bombarded the city. No one slept much that
night."
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Carl Stone, Co. F, also took time to write home that night and told his parents that
"[T]he 13th Minn. & the 18th regulars have the post of honor & also of danger, although
the general opinion seems to be that we are going to have an easy time without much
fighting." Although the rumor mill was in full force, and ironically, fairly accurate, what
the Minnesotans were to find that next day was going to be anything but an "easy time." zo

64
The next morning, those who had joined the volunteers to see the adventurous side

of war were to get their wish, for the battle of Manila was about to commence. Describing
what took place those early morning hours was Pvt. Bowe and his diary. "Reveille at 4:30,
had a thin breakfast, then stoved away twelve hard-tacks, a canteen full of coffee, and one
hundred rounds of ammunition, and started to capture Manila." For him and countless
other soldiers this was their time to pay their "little tribute to the memory of the
Maine... " 21
Bowe and his comrades were awakened that morning by a bugle call and were also
met with a not too surprising rain. Which, by the time these soldiers were up and ready to
go, had turned the roads into ponidge. They were ordered, as Bowe recalled, to take "one
day's cooked rations, canteens filled with water, and a minimum of 100 rounds of
ammunition for the Springfield rifle and 150 for the Krag~Jorgenson. 11 22
By 6:00 a.m. the soldiers had dressed, eaten, grabbed their equipment and headed
toward their position in the trenches. Col. Reeve's later reported; "I moved with my
regiment, comprising three battalions of four companies each, from Camp Dewey... and
marched through the town of Pasai, along the direct road to Manila." At 7:45 a.m. the 13th
arrived at the general line of earthworks where they were to repJace the North Dakotan
Regiment who had been on guard duty throughout the night.
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To reach Manila from Camp Dewey, the Americans had but two choices: the Calle
Real, a road toward the city which was rarely more than a few hundred yards from Manila
Bay, or a road a half mile inland from the Calle Real parallel to it, running north through
the villages of Pasai and Cingalon, before reaching the fortified city of Manila. 24
The American plan to take Manila consisted of splitting the VIII Army Corp into
two brigades. The main attack, led by Brigadier General Francis V. Greene, was to head
up the Calle Real, whereas the second brigade, which was in support and led by General

65
Arthur Mac.Arthur, 25 was to go through Pasai and Cingalon and meet up with Greene in

Manila
Having been preparing for a real war for centuries, the Spaniards had an elaborate
defense system set up around Manila. Half way between the walled city and the camp,
sitting at right angles, were the Spanish outer defenses-a line of earthworks extending from
Fort San Antonio de Abad on the coast to Blockhouse No. 14 commanding the Pasai road.
The Minnesotans, being within a few hundred yards of the Spaniards, were split up into
battalions, each receiving different orders from Col. Reeve. The Second Battalion {Co. 's
C, H, D, E) and the Third Battalion (Co. 's I, F, B, A) were ordered to stay behind while
the First Battalion (Co. 's K, L, M, and G) were ordered to the extreme left of blockhouse
No. 14. Just as the troops got into position, the tropical sun of the Philippines broke
through the clouds and what had been a soggy, muddy terrain, quickly turned into a
steamy, humid one.
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While the troops, who knew absolutely nothing about the sham battle, got into·
positio!l to attack, the navy in the harbor began its part of the plan. At 9:30 a.m. the battle
was joined when Admiral Dewey's command ship, the Olympia, began shelling the city of
Manila At the same time the infantrymen hauled themselves out of the muddy
entrenchments and proceeded through Manila's southern suburbs toward the city.
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While Greene's second brigade headed up the Calle Real through Malate, past Fort
San Antonio de Abad and on to Manila, their support to the east was also on the move.
MacArthur's first Brigade, with the 13th Minnesota, who were ordered to take the lead,
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also consisted of the Astor Battery, and the 23rd Infantry who were also sent to the front.
In reserve MacArthur had one battalion of the 14th Infantry, two battalions of the 1st North
Dakota, two battalions of the 1st Idaho, and one battalion of the 1st Wyoming, all ready
and willing to move up if needed.
Although the entire field of operations hardly covered more than a square mile, the
terrain was horrible to contend with. The Americans had to face barb-wire fences, bamboo
jungles, paddy fields, swamps, streams, and sharpened pickets before reaching the outer
defenses. While not necessarily as big a problem for Greene's troops (who were having an
easier time of it on the left), for MacArthur and the men of the 13th it was another obstacle
to get through in what was turning out to be a rather interesting day.
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Always under the notion that this was a real battle, MacArthur's brigade had more
than just the terrain to contend with. Because of the deal with Jaudenes, Dewey's fleet
could not effectively shell the far right flank, nor did they have any intention to. With no
shells hitting the Spanish defense the Spaniards stayed in their well entrenched
fortifications, waiting for the Americans to attack. After having struggled through terrible
weather conditions and rough terrain, the 1st Brigade then had to face the 73d Spanish
Regiment, "whose favorite boast was that it had never retreated. 0
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Captain Charles Metz, Co. D, noted the problem with the Naval bombardment,
while writing home to a friend after the battle saying that the 13th had taken their "position
on the right of the American line, that position being furthest from the Bay and out of reach
of the Guns (sic) of the fleet ... " As for the landscape, Metz also noted that "the 13th was
in it [and] we fought our way for fully a mile through mud and water many times up to our
waist"
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While things were going pretty much according to the secret negotiations, an
intangible came into play that morning, one that neither the Americans nor the Spaniards
planned on. On MacArthur's right flank, and still occupying parts of the trenches which
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they built, were Filipino soldiers. Having fought the Spaniards for years, many either did
not get the word from Aguinaldo, or could not contain their excitement. Either way, early
in the morning on August 13, many began to exchange fire with the Spaniards. In order to
deal with this, MacArthur began to send detachments to various points to stop the Filipinos
from firing. This caused one of the most unprecedented situations ever found on a
battlefield. There, in the midst of a battle to free the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny, stood
American soldiers pointing their guns at and threatening to kill any Filipino who tried to
join in the battle.
Although a unique situation in and of itself, it was not the only one in which the
Minnesotans encountered that day. Not knowing about the negotiations, and unable to see
any white flags being displayed on the extreme left, MacArthur's Brigade, as well as the
Spaniards they faced, proceeded throughout the day not knowing that what was developing
was completely unnecessary.
While this bizarre situation was developing on the right, Greene's troops advanced
on Fort San Antonio Abad and occupied it around 10:25 a.m. With the situation on the left
being quickly settled, the 13th Minnesota, under orders from MacArthur, moved the 1st
and 2nd Battalions (2nd had been called up a few minutes earlier) past the earthworks and
toward the Spaniards. Because of the earlier fighting with the Filipinos, who were now
under control by the Americans, the Spaniards were now directing their fire upon the
Americans. To counter this, Colonel Reeve sent out Companies E and L to form a strong
skirmish line. While under light fire from a handful of Spaniards, Companies E and L
moved forward slowly until they discovered that the Spaniards were abandoning their
trenches.
When it appeared the Spaniards were retreating, the two companies were quickly
ordered forward. Continuing to move toward Manila these Minnesotans soon found out
that the Spaniards were not retreating, but had actually set up an ambush from within the
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dense bamboo in the area, and from another series of trenches. Slowing their advance,
Co. 's E and L were again able to push the Spaniards back with desultory firing toward the
center of the Spaniards defense, Blockhouse No. 14. These blockhouses, which encircled
Manila, were "thirty feet square, two stories high, built on raised ground... ," and built out
of heavy planks and a mixture of earth and stone, with a bottom lined with steel. 31
Col. Reeve then order the company from St. Cloud toward the Blockhouse. This
movement, by Co. M, was supported by the Astor Battery whose 3.2 inch guns began to
place some well positioned volleys into the blockhouse. Although there were intense
moments most of the fighting for Blockhouse No. 14 was over once the fusillade from the
Astor Battery ended. Company M (with Company A in support) quickly stormed the
fortification and by 11:20 a.m. the United States flag was placed upon it. For the rest of
the day's fighting these two companies were to hold their positions at the blockhouse while
the other six pressed on toward Manila. 32
As Private Bowe, who was in the thick of it, wrote; "[O]n reaching the comer near
the little stone wall, we ran into such a hail of bullets that we got orders to lie down flat
upon the road." It was here that Captain McQuade [McWa.de] was ordered to go take his
Company A, and support Company M, into a hot fight with thf'._ Spaniards. As Bowe tells
it, "[I]nstead of obeying orders, Capt. McQuade, [McWade] hugging the stone wall,
replied that he was sick and could not go ahead." At the first sign offear by a Minnesotan
during the battle, the companies' honor was saved when Lieutenant Donaldson, jumped to
the front and cried, "come on boys follow me! 11
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Pleased with their first victory over the Spaniards, the 13th did not have long to
revel in their glory for they were quickly ordered to move out again toward Manila Before
they could celebrate the capture of the Philippine capital, however, they first had to go
through the village of Cingalon.
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At 11:20 am., with Blockhouse 14 under American control, MacArthur ordered the
general advance to resume. With the 13tJ:i still in the lead and the Astor Battery supporting
them, the 2nd Brigade continued toward the front. Along their path toward Manila, the
drive was again suddenly slowed by another Spanish blockhouse. This time, instead of the
Spaniards drawing fire on them, it was the blockhouse itself which caused the problems.
Having caught fire during the battle, and with a large store of ammunition inside, the
blockhouse began to explode, sounding much like a Fourth of July fireworks display.
Fearing for the safety of his men, MacArthur ordered his troops to carefully go around the
blockhouse.
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As the 13th tried to work its way around the exploding blockhouse, MacArthur
ordered the Astor Battery to join them at the front. Due to a barrier placed by the
Spaniards, the Astor Battery was unable to move their artillery, and awaited help. With the
assistance from Lieutenant March and his Regular Army troops, the Astor Battery was
finally able to move its equipment over the gun emplacement which made up the barrier and
obstructed the road.
Once past the burning blockhouse, and with the Astor Battery able to continue, the
2nd Brigade was able to advance into the village of Cingalon. There the retreating
Spaniards again set up another ambush and began firing on the advancing Americans,
"which increased as the forward movement was pressed, and very soon the command was
committed to a fierce combat." Again the Minnesotans and their comrades found
themselves fa2ing another heavy fight from fortified Spaniards; this time from a church and
the entrenchment which surrounded it. 35
Facing the church with his six companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, and being
far ahead of the rest, Reeve "was commanded to throw out a line of skirmishers to the right
and the front, and to establish a point in the road immediately in [the] front, along which
[the Thirteenth] had been advancing." He quickly detached Company K to take up position
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on the right, and then he sent Companies C and H to the left. Leaving Lieutenant Lackore
of Company L, along with eight men and a sergeant to man the point, which was
established on the road in front of the church.
Once the two St Paul companies reached the left flank they quickly discovered that
the Astor Battery was under a hot fire from the 73d Spanish Regiment. In order to protect
their artillery pieces, Company H, under Captain Bjornstad began a rapid fire and saved the
Astor Battery from being torn to pieces. 36
Meanwhile Lieutenant Lackore and his small band of men, with little or no
protection, were finally ordered out of the thick of it by Captain Spear, of Company E.
Having been under heavy fire since entering the village, this group was ordered to act as
reinforcements for Company E, while the men from Red Wing's, Company G, were sent
forward to help strengthen the line. With Companies C and H pouring fire in from the left,
and Company K putting pressure on the church from the right, the battle was a virtual
stalemate until the Astor Battery, slowed by the Spanish obstructions, could establish
themselves in the village. With orders to move back 100 yards, the four companies
retreated to a safer position while the Astor Battery shelled the church. With the completion
of the bombardment, Company H, retaking its position on the left, again began firing at the
barricaded Spaniards until approximately 1:30 that afternoon, when the "cease-fire"
command was given.
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With two companies guarding Blockhouse 14, and four more assaulting the church
in Cingalon, soldiers from the remaining two companies were able to assist in the taking of
Blockhouse No. 20. While the rest of the regiment was fighting around the church, some
men from the 13th Minnesota and the Astor Battery, along with Captains March and
Sawtelle were ordered to take the blockhouse, not far from the church. They advanced
toward their objective while ".under [the] cover of their comrades' fire, edging their way

.
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through bamboo groves, rice paddies, and clutches of small palm-thatched huts to within
eighty yards of the blockhouse." 38
Coming out that close to the Spaniards and under such heavy fire, the Americans
believed they would have the element of surprise with them. In that regard they were
sorely mistaken for as soon as they emerged from the jungle, they ran into a hailstorm of
bullets and were driven into the center of the village of Cingalon. There, under extreme
duress, they improvised hastily erected defense works to protect themselves from the hail
of bullets.
With these 15 men in the center of town holding on to the temporary firing line for
dear life, MacArthur, who just learned what was happening, ordered the Astor Battery
placed behind the village church where they were to start shelling Blockhouse 20
immediately. He then ordered troops forward to help protect this small band trapped in the
open. The supporting infantrymen rapidly ran to their defense and began digging in behind
stone walls. With the Astor Battery finally in position, they began shelling the blockhouse
from which most of the firing was coming from. Once the guns behind them roared in
support, March and Sawtelle kept their men intact, allowing the shells to strike the
blockhouse and nearby trenches with deadly accuracy.
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Deciding they had only two choices, stay in this open position and let the Spaniards
shot at them, or charge the blockhouse, they decided that they would do what their
forefathers had done during the Civil War and they attacked the Spanish defenses. With
bayonets and revolvers, this small, but courageous band of outnumbered soldiers got up
from their positions and charged the Spaniards.
One Stillwater soldier, John T. Wheeler, who was one of the 15 men, later
described the battle by saying,

73

><
IQ

:s......
~

.....

UI

Ill

o-i

~

:s....
~

0

0
i-

Figure 2. Route of Advance of the 13th ~nne8oiaRegiment at Cingalon, The Phillipines,
August, 1898.
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[T]en minutes afier the bombardment began our whole line moved forward with a
grand charge captured the first Spanish entrenchment's and raised the American flag
amid deafening shots. When we reached them they had been driven from their
guns but they with revolvers drawn and we with bayonets fixed, charged the
Spanish line and recaptured the guns. In about five minutes the regulars came up
and the firing ceased. 40
Although the day and the glory which went with it belonged to the Minnesotans, all
could not rejoice, since due to some confusion in orders, the 3rd Battalion and the detached
companies from the 1st Battalion which had captured Blockhouse No. 14, remained in their
positions and took no part in the capture of Cingalon. By 1:30 p.m. the 2nd Brigade under
Gen. Arthur MacArthur had secured Cingalon and awaited their next orders.
While this was transpiring on the right flank, it was a completely different story on
the left. By 11:20 a.m., Admiral Dewey had spotted the white flag flying over Manila and
immediately sent his aides, Lieutenant Brumby and Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Whittier
of MerriWs staff to arrange the terms of surrender with General Jaudenes. By 2:30 p.m.
the Americans reported the surrender, and by 5:43 p.m. the American flag was gently
waving over the city of Manila Unfortunately for those who did their fighting over on the
right, they could not see the white flag being raised, nor did any of them know that this
battle was pre-arranged and need not have been fought.
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The casualty list for the days battle read that 6 Americans had died and 43 were
wounded. Of these, two of the dead were from the 13th Minnesota Volunteers, Archibald
Patterson,. bugler, Co. I, who was shot and killed while the 3rd Battalion was moving
between Blockhouse No. 14 and the Cingalon Church. Lewis Burlingham reported this
death to his mother, recalling; "Patterson, [had been] shot through the neck by a
sharpshooter in a tree who was afterward brot (sic) down from his perch by an American
bullet.... "
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The second to die was Sergeant Charles Burnson, Co. G. He was able to live for
three days after the battle, but the wounds he received were too severe. The tragedy of this
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death is that Brunson, who had probably left for war to become a hero, lost his life from
wounds suffered on August 13, the same day as his twenty-eighth birthday. 43
Despite the deaths and casualties, nothing was going to mar this day for the men of
the 13th Minnesota, for they had their chance for glory. While all the men felt good about
what they had accomplished, some no doubt to the envy of their comrades, received
additional recognition from Colonel Reeve when he issued a memorandum of exceptional
actions on the part of individual members of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers. These
included:
--Capt. A. W. Bjornstad, Co. H--Took personal command of the firing line in the
road at the church, without cover, and again formed another line in the same place
in the most exposed portion of the road partly screened by two small logs in their
front, at which point he and three members of his company were wounded.
-- Capt. Oscar Seebach, Co. G--Crossed the road under heavy fire at the head of his
company, deployed to the front, occupying the advance line about one hundred
and twenty-five yards from the Spanish earthworks: severely wounded.
--Lieut H.D. Lackore, Co. L--In command of the point, advanced up the road to
within one hundred yards of the Spanish earthworks, where he remained firing at
the enemy until warned that they guns were about to be discharged.
--Lieut. E.G. Falk, Regimental Adjutant--Constantly exposed to heavy fire, both at
the front and along the line of communications to the rear. He was at the front
during almost the entire action.
·--Battalion Sergt. Major J. H. Loye, Second Battalion--Was the first to respond to
the order of the General Commanding, to carry a log into the street to protect
\
--Capt. Bjornstad and his men.
Along with these officers nine privates were also mentioned for bravery for their
action of occupying the firing line in the street, while being protected by only two logs.
These were:
Privates W. D. Bowen, Co. H; Berndt, Co. C; Peake, Co. D; Thorsel
(wounded), Co. H; Widman, A. J. Weidle, W. J. Worthington, L. H. Wallace
(wounded), and Corporal E. 0. Cowden, all of Co. H. 44
Colonel Reeve finished his report to Major-General MacArthur by saying that due
to the "peculiar nature of the ground.. .it was impossible for me to observe the individual
conduct of the men under my command." But he wanted to assure MacArthur that even
though his men, "[E]xposed to a withering fire from an unseen enemy, all did their duty
with coolness, intelligence and courage.... " And just for good measure he added that the
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13th's heroism was,

11

••

.inspired by the example of the General Commanding, whose utter
'(

disregard of personal danger prevented what otherwise might have been a serious
disaster."

I
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.
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With the fighting halted, the Minnesotans were ordered to march through Paco into

'
I

Malate, both suburbs of Manila, where they halted at 6:00 p.m. and were quartered in
barracks. There they were told to take up outpost duty for very specific reasons. The
Filipinos, being extremely upset over not being allowed into Manila or taking part in the
fighting, immediately after the battle tried to beat both Greene and MacArthur's Brigades
into strategic positions around the city. They did this in hope that by taking possession of
the suburbs they could at least try to maintain their strategic positions. MacArthur's
Brigade, having just been in battle, was not successful in cutting off the Filipinos from
these positions. With only a few minutes rest, the Minnesotans were put on guard duty to
stop the Filipinos from advancing any further.
By 7:00 p.m. on August 13, less than two hours after the Spaniards had
surrendered, the Minnesota Volunteers found themselves facing 4,000 angry Filipinos who
had massed in Malate. To control the situation, the Minnesotans were ordered to set up
barricades in every street in the suburb to guard against the Filipinos which only further
irritated them. Tension further mounted as both sides began to taunt the other. The
Filipinos, upset ovet being excluded, threatened and yelled constant insults across the
lines, with the Americans responding in kind. The Americans blamed the Filipinos for
unnecessarily starting the day's battle, and were irritated by the unnecessary death amongst
the ranks.
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With the situation almost ready to explode in Malate, General Anderson of Merritt's
staff, contacted Aguinaldo. He told the Philippine leader in a wire, 11 [S]erious trouble
threatening between our for~. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not try to force

..
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themselves into the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate
with you."
To which Aguinaldo replied; "I have given orders to my chiefs that they preserve
strict respect to American forces and aid them if attacked by a common enemy. I do not
doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your
soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine."
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By quick and easy communication, the trouble in Malate subsided and both sides
returned to their previously held positions, avoiding the bizarre situation of two victorious
allies turning their arms against each other. Even with the situation defused, this was still a
ticking bomb.
With the Americans upset with the Filipinos over the fact that not a single soldier
had to die, the news that would reach Manila a few days later should have been even more
disheartening. Back in May, once Dewey had defeated the Spanish navy in Manila Harbor,
he cut the cable connection between Manila and Hong Kong so that the Spaniards would be
cut off from the outside world. This move not only isolated Spain's forces, but it also cut
off the Americans from what was going on, which would have had ramifications on not
only the days events, but events taking place over the next few years. For while on
August 13, when the battle of Manila was in full swing, American and Spanish leaders,
due to a peace protocol that was signed on August 12, had actually ended the war one day
before. The negotiated sham battle that took the lives of Americans, Filipinos and
Spaniards need never have been played out for the war was over.
Not knowing how things were developing internationally, the Americans concluded
the war as quickly as possible. With the fighting over, the city of Manila was deluged with
'

refugees, some who had left before the fighting started, while others were just looking for
a place to live. These hundreds of thousands of refugees compounded the cities already
monumental problems. With the city under siege for months, the food supply was

I
•·1
lj

78
exhausted, garbage collection lapsed completely as had other public utilities, business was
at a standstill, the streets were littered, and the water supply had been shut off for at least
two months.
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Although the city was a disaster, once the Americans took many businesses and
daily activities within the city attempted to start up again. By the very next day, August 14,
many Filipino shops were again open for business, as were banks, custom houses, and
newspapers. Even the cable between Manila and Hong Kong was repaired, bringing two
days later the news that the war was actually over. 49
With the cable repaired, Gen. Merritt's first order of business was to get
clarification of what his orders were. Did McKinley want a joint occupation with their
Filipino allies in Manila, or did he want them to "... submit to the authority of the United
States?" McKinley swiftly responded; "[f]he President directs that there must be no joint
occupation with the insurgents.... Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to
this end." so
The tension between these two groups, which quickly abated in Malate the night of
the 13th, manifested itself again the next day. For the men of the 13th, not knowing what
was going on with their leaders' policies, saw the Filipinos as an annoying lot. Most could
not understand why the natives were causing such a ruckus, had not the Americans just
saved them from Spanish tyranny? Pvt Kahlert described how both the American and
Filipinos felt about the situation in his diary three days later. "The natives are occupying
the trenches of the spaniards (sic). I guess we will have to whip them. They say now
Americanos & Filipino's (sic) are not friends. They are beginning to hate us ... " st
On August 18, the St. Paul Pioneer Press, reported on the relations between the
Americans and the Filipinos. In a page one story they explained that the "insurgents," on
August 14, had "entered some Spanish trenches on the outskirts of the city, but were
repulsed." Not clarifying if they had been removed militarily or not, the story went on to
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claim that, "Gen. Merritt notified them that they will not be permitted to come inside the
city. It is probable that the Americans will now deal with the insurgents unless an amicable
arrangement is arrived at soon. 11 52
An agreement was exactly what Aguinaldo and most of his men wanted, but for the
Americans this was a much more difficult task. With Washington not having completely
developed their policies toward the Philippines, America's leaders continued to send
ambiguous orders to the commanders in the field on how to handle the situations as they
arose. This left military leaders in Manila in no position to settle or to agree on anything
with the Filipinos.
One area that the Filipinos did want an agreement on and did talk to their American
counterparts about was the name that they found themselves tagged with. They asked the
Americans to refrain from calling them "insurgents," the name the Spaniards had called
them every since they began to rebel against Spain. Since they believed that the Americans
did not officially own them, they were not then rebelling against American rule. Indicative
of how relations would take place in the future most Americans refused to stop.
With Merritt's dual orders to control the city without Filipino cooperation and to
keep the peace, he needed to establish a Provost Guard (a mili~ policing unit) _within the
city to accomplish both of these tasks. For him the decision was an easy one, for not only
had he seen the 13th Minnesota Volunteers conduct drills flawlessly iil San Francisco, but
he was also aware of their role in the attack on Manila With that in mind, on August 20th,
1898, Merritt made the 13th Minnesota the Provost Guard of Manila. Col. Reeve was
made chief of police, with his staff taking up various positions in and around the city.
Within a few short days the Minnesotans took off their hats as soldiers and put on
the ones of local police. Most were aware by now that any chances they might have had
for glory had probably come and gone. Although many did not get a chance to prove their
bravery, most, knowing how other units had fared in this sham battle, felt proud about
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what they had accomplished. Finding out a few days after the battle that it was staged
never deterred a single Minnesotan from ever speaking out about it. They had come to the
Philippines to defeat the Spaniards, vanquish the ghosts of the Civil War, and to earn
honor for themselves, their unit and their state, sentiments which were not missed by the
people back home.
With news that not only had the 13th fought the Spaniards, but played a key role in
their defeat, the Minnesota newspapers were filled with excitement. Both the Pioneer Press
and the Tribune ran articles in which they exhalted the 13th for what they had
accomplished. The Pioneer Press wrote,

11

•••

the people of the state must feel a thrill of

pride that their boys have had their full measure of the glory of war." The Tribune added
thenextdayanarticleentitled "THEIR FATHERS AT GETTYSBURG,"

which

told its readers that the 11 [T]hirteenth Minnesota Volunteers at Manila Show Gallantry
Hardly Surpassed by That of the Old First Minnesota." With this the men of the 13th
Minnesota hoped the Civil War Ghosts had been exorcised and that there could no longer

be any question of the bravery and manhood of this generation. Believing there was
nothing left to do in the islands since most had accomplished what they came for, it was
now time to sit and wait for the ships to come pick them up and bring them home... or so
they thought.
1
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ChapterV
"BE COURTEOUS IN YOUR CONTACT ... "
After having viewed themselves as being heroes who had defeated Spaniards, most
of the Minnesotans were less than thrilled with their assignment as Manila's provost guard.
After seeing what Malate alone looked like and knowing how many of the Filipinos felt
about them, they knew this job would not be an exciting or easy one.
With the Spaniard's defeat, the Americans quickly took over control of Manila and
its surrounding suburbs. The first order of business was to assign each company to a
designated area. They were originally assigned accordingly; Companies E, G and K were
assigned to the Walled City; Company D to Binondo, Company A, Malate; Company I,
Quiapo; Company H, Tanduay; Companies C and M, Tondo; Company F San Miguel;
Company B, Sampolac; and Company L to Santa Cruz.
Once stationed, their next task was to set up barracks. "During the first few weeks
the men slept on the floor, but later, cots and mosquito n~ts were provided by the
Government." The cooking detail also had a hard time of it since most of the wood and
coal had been used up during the siege of the city. To fix the situation the troops began to
tear apart several old buildings for fuel which continued the soldier's popularity with the
natives in a downward spiral, even though these people were reimbursed by the United
States Govemment. 1
Next came the general orders from their overall commander, General Arthur
MacArthur, who was given charge of all Manila and its suburbs. In his second order (the
first established Minnesota as the cities police force) he listed nine rules which the 13th had
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to obey during their time in the city. While some were petty orders setting up

1

housekeeping, others told them how to treat the Spaniards and Filipinos, with the rest
telling them how, as Americans, they should represent themselves. Examples of these are
as follows:
#3. Armed native and Spanish soldiers must be disarmed before being allowed to
pass through the gates, either way.
#4. Arrest drunk and disorderly persons.
#5. Spanish officers are allowed to wear their side arms.
#8. Be courteous in your contact with both natives and Spaniards and see that all
soldiers of others commands observe this rule.
These orders, signed by Major Ed. S. Bean were to be followed to the letter. 2
Order Number 8, however, was often ignored so the soldiers could follow Order
Number 3, which usually extremely irritated the Filipinos. The situation which had
culminated in Malate with Americans and Filipinos almost shooting at each other was
alleviated but never forgotten. Most Filipinos did not trust the Americans so did not wish
to surrender their arms. Reverend Charles Cressy observed these Filipino sentiments and
explained them to his wife on August 22, 1898: "Monday (two days after the fall of
Manila) they (the Filipinos) were threatening in their looks and manners toward us. As
they passed they would say 'Americanos, Phillipino, (sic) no Amigo' (IE Americans &
Philippine are no friends) & they would draw their hands across their throats .... " This
attitude could be easily found on both sides of the trenches. 3
Even with the threat of reprisals, and the stench which rose up from the cities
uncollected garbage, the Minnesotans were able to find some good things about policing.
The first was that they received new uniforms. The new regulation uniforms consisted of
white coat and trousers, straw hat and black shoes (which in Bean's order were to be
blackened and shiny at all times). Representing the United States, these policemen were
expected to be models of neatness and cleanliness throughout their stay in the Philippines. 4
The other benefit the volunteer soldiers had during their time in the Philippines was
their pay. Although not in comparison to the officers who received $125 per month in
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gold, the lowly private received $62.40 a month. This was an extremely high wage when
converted over into the peso and allowed these poor soldiers to instantly gain a temporary
affluence with all their new found wealth. 5
Even with their new uniforms and thick wallets, most Minnesotans, along with
other states' volunteers, began to have more and more 'problems' _in the lull after the battle.
As Private Bowe put it, 11 [f]he soldiers are all more or less sick, yet the men in authority...
quench what little patriotism is left in the boys by making them do the work of horses."
The patriotic spirit the volunteers had just a few months ago~ Bowe feared had vanished.
"Now when the officers ask for vols the men put on a blank face, sidestep away, and
mutter, 'I volunteered once----. 11 6
Not uncommon to this war, the privates began to dislike and distrust many of their
superiors. From their perspective, they did all the work and the officers got all the glory.
This complaint probably was muttered around campfires again later when on September 4
Colonel Reeve was promoted to Brigadier General, thereby making Lieutenant Colonel
Ames the Regimental Colonel, and Major Friedrich's promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
This further proved to the men that those with a rank were going to get the prestige while
they got to do all the dirty work.
Although no one ever wrote in this early stage about being upset with the 13th's
staff, complaints were mentioned when it came to the VIII Anny Corps new commanding
officer Major General Ewell S. Otis. Taking the place of General Merritt who had left for
Paris to help conclude the peace treaty, Otis' attention to minute detail and his insistence
that every single decision be run by him made many field commanders and privates alike
dislike and distrust him.

7

Arriving in late August, Otis brought with him more infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
This brought the total number of troops in the Philippines to 15,559 officers and men.
Knowing that peace talks were being held in Paris and that hostilities in the islands between
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the United States and Spain had ceased days before, the arrivals of these additional troops
made the Filipinos extremely suspicious of American intentions in their homeland. 8
As for the 13th Minnesota who were by now starting to learn the ropes of policing,
these growing suspicions of the Filipinos made an already difficult job even tougher.
Along with Aguinaldo's soldiers' attitudes toward the Americans, the Minnesotans also had
to contend with a group of defeated Spaniards who, for the most part, were not helpful in
turning power over to them. They also had difficulty because they did not know the city
and had to try to deal with the wide variety of groups and languages found in and around
the capitol.
One of their first orders, along with patrolling, was to clean Manila. This turned
out to be a job of immense proportions. Having been under siege since May, the city's
"70,000 people were crowded into an area that usually housed about 10,000. Food was
scarce, and the revolutionaries had cut off the water supply." Their government was totally
disorganized, schools were closed, as was the port. 9
Along with the population and the mess there were also large problems with the
city's sewage system which ran into open drains. From there it "accumulated in the dark
privy vaults of private dwellings or, even worse, was deposited in the city streets with the
garbage." What was left was washed away by the rain and the natural decay which set in
so rapidly in the tropics. Many a Minnesotan complained in letters home about light
breezes coming up and blowing the stench in their direction.
The 13th Minnesota's first job was to clean out the sewer system and enforce
policies which required the Filipinos to dispose of their excrement in other ways. One way
to enforce these new regulations was to fix fines on people who emptied slop out of

windows or allowed garbage to accumulate outside of their homes. The rule was that each
home had to clean their sidewalks and empty their privy vaults at least once a week. One
Minnesota team was even given the unenviable job of removing the human excrement piled
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up under houses whose toilets consisted of a hole in the floor, and hauling it to the harbor
where boats tried to dispose of it 10
Along with disposing of refuse, the Minnesotans also began to rebuild. roads,
repaired street lights, renovated public water hydrants, rebuilt bridges, opened the public
water systems, set up clinics, helped with vaccinations and re-opened the schools. A
handful of Minnesotans even helped teach in these new schools. They usually either taught
a subject they knew well, or more commonly, how to speak English.

11

Of all these functions, none was probably more important then the setting up of
clinics and helping with vaccinations. In September, due to a fear of epidemic, a Board of
Health was established consisting of experts from both the United States and the
Philippines. Their duty was to go around and exam dwellings, markets, slaughterhouses,
drug stores, and other businesses connected to community health. They also strictly
monitored the port for disease, ran the city leper hospital, and purchased supplies for the
hospitals. Finally, always leery of disease spreading and having heard some of the horror
stories about camps in the States, the Board began a vaccination process through which
they tried to stamp out small pox among Filipino children.

12

After weeks of doing the back breaking work of cleaning the city, Lewis
Burlingham wrote home to his parents on September 30, telling them, [M]anila isn't such
an unhealthy place now as it has all been cleaned up pretty well and got most of the smell
out. A person can keep well and healthy here if they only take care of themselves and their
surroundings.... " Of all that they were asked to do those first few weeks, the vaccinations
proved to be the most beneficial for all involved. 13
With filth and disease virtually gone, the Minnesotans could begin to focus their
attention on their main mission of policing the city. One of the first things they were
ordered to do was to do away ~th the gambling which was rampant in the city. As the

.

13th's historian, Martin Tew later wrote, "[G]ambling devices of all kinds existed on every
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street comer, and in almost every conceivable place when the Americans entered the city."
It was the duty then of the Minnesotans to put a stop to these illegal activities, which

ironically many of them had confessed to have played at one time or another.
Believing that much of Manila's "undesirables" were involved with these games, it
was the desire of the top brass to eliminate them from the back streets. To the pride of the
13th's commanders, these gamblers and their games quickly disappeared from the streets
of Manila. It is most likely that the gambling moved from out in the open to the
underground rather than as the 13th's commanders boasted that in only one month their
men had destroyed all gambling in the city. 14
Gambling was not to be the only thing that the conservative and puritanical
American leadership looked down upon within the city though. The second of the two
major problems facing the Minnesota police force was the women of "ill-repute" who had
entered the city. While a handful of Minnesotans were swept off their feet by the local
ladies of 'respectable' backgrounds, others found themselves in the arms of women who
were members of the world's oldest profession. These ladies must have been quite a shock
for soldiers who had left conservative Minnesota just a few months previous. Whereas
women's fashion in the Gopher State showed as little of the female body as possible,
fashions in the Philippines were much more practical for the tropical climate. As one
volunteer wrote upon returning to the states, the Filipinas "wore transparent bodices,
bright-colored skirts fitted snugly from hips to knees, and red heel-less slippers. More
shocking then the fact that they were without stockings, [and] the bodices and skirts did not
meet."

15

Minnesota's own Lieutenant Carl Stone also commented in a letter home about the
Filipinas he encountered. "The women here have beautiful hair and fairly developed
shoulders & necks & chest & their arms are generally perfect. .. " But for him that was as
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far as their beauty went, because in his eyes they had a "peculiar walk" caused by the
"carrying of stuff on their heads."

16

While some had genuine feelings for "respectable" Filipina women, a great many
other volunteers spent much of their free time at the local houses of ill-repute. At first the
Army had the 13th Minnesota Volunteers try to contain this business, but with venereal
disease being the number one disease for the soldiers in the islands (approximately 25% of
all cases on sick report were of venereal origins) the high command took another approach
to solving this problem. Instead of fighting the problem and trying to close these
businesses down, they instead had every prostitute registered, segregated, and examined
weekly by an American doctor. If they were found to be afflicted with any sexually
transmitted disease, they had to be hospitalized at their own expense, treated, and visited by
social workers who tried to persuade them to find a more moral occupation. Although
never putting an end to prostitution in the islands, this policy did help significantly reduce
the problem of sexually transmitted diseases.

17

Lieutenant Stone again wrote home on September 22 explaining to his parents what
was happening in Manila. "About a week ago a lot of 'ladies' from Hong Kong came over
and started up in business in our district and as there is no city law here to prevent such
people from running houses of ill fame, we could not close them up.... " But with the new
policy toward prostitution Stone found himself helping implement it and dealing with these
"ladies." He was ordered to go to these houses of "ill fame" and check to see if their
certification was posted in the house. Not sure if he would enjoy this new position he told
his parents, "[W]ont (sic) that be a sweet job for a decent self-respecting soldier who
enlisted to gain honor & glory in his countrys defense!"

13

Even With the "perks" of having excess money, the women, and the prestige of
being the Provost Guard, many of the Minnesotans were bored with being soldiers and
began to talk about going home. Private Burlingham sent these sentiments home when he
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told his family that he was upset because Colonel Reeve had told the Regimental Auxiliary
that the members of the 13th wanted to stay in the Philippines. He concluded this letter by
saying, 11 1 just wish that the people that have anything to do with this regiment both at home
and here would have a little consideration imd get us out of here as quick as possible.

19

For Private Burlingham though and the men who agreed with him, those people
who did have some pull were not going to help them. The Red Wing Republican article
reported on September 8 that the 13th Regiment Auxiliaiy Association, 11 [R]esolved, That
we deem it unwise and impracticable, at this time, for this organization to take any action to
have the Thirteenth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, mustered out of the United States
service. 11 It would take more than just a handful of soldiers who were bored with military
service to get any real action done by the folks at home.

20

With the possibility of going home being extremely small, the men of 13th had to
focus their attention back on their policing of Manila. Even with their strict control of the
city and tensions rising outside of Manila between the Americans and the Filipinos, the
Minnesotans found themselves starting to make friends with a great many of the Filipinos
living in their district. For the average volunteer there was two distinct groups of Filipinos
those educated and well to do in the city, the other the rebellious "insurgents" who
followed Aguinaldo. As Pvt. Harry Luxton, Co. D, claimed in a letter published in the

Minneapolis Tribune, "[f]he natives here are divided into two distinct classes, the one that
looks upon our presence in the city as a blessing and the other that views our habitation on
the island more in the light Of a CUrSe.. ,. II

%l

In this same vein of Minnesotan-Filipino relations, General Reeve was to report at
the end of the war that, "[l]t was remarkable how the men adapted themselves to their new
surroundings. Not only was this the case as far as their duties went, but their pleasures
also. The sociability of the natives was met more than half way. Dinner and dances were
no uncommon occurrences.... 11

22
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Two other Minnesotans agreed with such positive views of the Filipinos and their
islands. Sergeant Edmund Neill, on September 21, writing a letter to his parents in Red
Wing told them, "... contrary to the usual run of the boys I like the Philippines and the city
of Manila especially. It is all so odd and queer and everything is so different from home."
He then added a sentiment heard through the years by soldiers found in almost all wars, "I
tell you. I know I shall never be able to be contended [sic] at home again. "23
Another soldier who felt positively about his stint in the islands was Capt. Charles
Metz. He wrote home to his friend Julius Heilbron, "[T]his will be a great place to make
money if the US. conclude to hold these Islands, there is money to be made in almost every
line of business.... " Although many Minnesotans were able to shed some of their racist
attitudes toward people of other cultures, and both they and their Filipino counterparts were
able to make friendships during this time of tensions, a great many of America's volunteers
were unable to do this. 24
Even with personal contacts being made and friendships being forged during the
hostilities, the tension between Aguinaldo's men and the Americans never completely
abated. The Minnesotans on duty were regularly met with taunts, insults, and obscenities
to which they replied in kind. The 13th also quickly learned to travel in groups of two or

more, for if one went out at night by themselves they became easy prey for angered
Filipinos and their bolo knives.

25

In order to alleviate the tensions between these two groups, General Otis demanded
that Aguinaldo's troops be withdrawn from some of the suburbs, thereby keeping contact
between the two armies at a minimum and hopefully reducing tensions. When Aguinaldo
acquiesced to these demands, the American leaders patted themselves on the back believing
they were again able to avoid war with the Filipinos.
While the commanders in the islands were avoiding a future war, American officials
in Washington and Paris were trying to end another. With the war concluded, McKinley
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sent a small American diplomatic contingent to Paris to sign the peace treaty. One of these
was the pro-imperialist Senator from Minnesota, Cushman K. Davis. In regard to the
Philippines, this commission was ordered at first to only request Luzon (the northern island
of the Philippines), Guam, and Puerto Rico. This, the administration estimated, would
give the United States the geographical possessions needed to support a global fleet,
provide communication links, and open the door for trade with China 26
Once in Paris, however, the commission found itself besieged with advice to
demand the entire Philippine archipelago from the Spaniards. Some of these groups
included American naval officers who wanted to build ports in the excellent Philippine
harbors. Others were America's business leaders desirous of war in the spring of 1898,
and now wanting all of the islands as a source of raw materials, a market for their goods,
or a base for trade with China. The final faction which wanted the archipelago were church
groups which wanted to set up missionary enterprises and bring more "sheep into the
fold." McKinley, on the other hand, was not as sure as these groups and needed a little
more political prodding before he made up his mind. With another presidential campaign
looming, he wanted to know that the people were behind him in his endeavors.
In the fall of 1898, the President went on a ten-day campaign swing through the
midwest What he saw on this tour were enthusiastic crowds who cheered wildly every
time either Dewey's name or the call for acquisition of the islands was mentioned. With
this in mind, on October 26 he sent new orders to his negotiators in Paris. He now told
them that he wanted the Philippines in their entirety. "The cession must be of the whole
archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be
required." A policy which had waffled back and forth from the first day when Dewey had
defeated the Spaniards, now had an established goal-complete control of the Philippines.
~lection votes

were not the only thing McKinley dealt with when it came time to

..

decide what to do, he also had to contend with other foreign nations. As the battle for
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Manila came and went, many of the foreign powers remained in and around the Philippines
waiting to see what the peace treaty would bring. If the United States were to free the
Filipinos and leave, other nations such as England, Germany, and Japan were patiently
waiting to make them part of their colonial empires.
If the United States stayed and worked out a joint occupation with one of these

nations, McKinley feared war could break out between them. If the United States fonned a
protectorate, any conflicts which Aguinaldo may get into, might force the hand of the
Americans to go in and protect their Filipino allies. From the standpoint of the American
leadership they did the only sensible thing they could, they took the whole of the
Philippines.
The Spaniards, for their part, argued that the United States had no claim to these
islands for, technically, the war was over before the Battle of Manila. Therefore, the city
wa8 not legally controlled by the Americans and still belonged to Spain. To escape this
loophole, the American commission was informed by President McKinley to offer Spain,
$20,000,000 for the entire archipelago. Spain, in economic straits from the· war and
desirous of quickly re-establishing U.S.-Spanish relations, accepted this request.
Although all sides were happy with this decision in Paris, the Filipinos were less thrilled.
McKinley was all too aware that by this action the United States was on the path of
becoming an imperialist power. This, though, was seen as a good thing by the President
and those who adhered to the belief of American "Manifest Destiny. 11 For America would
not be a conquering nation, but rather a more benevolent one passing on to the peoples of
this new nation their economic, political, and religious ways of life, all of which, according
to most Ameri~s. were the best in the world.
Of all those pushing for America's expansionism, none was more behind it than
President McKinley himself. As he told a gathering in the south during another campaign
tour, that since the Philippines were already in American hands,

11
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.it was the duty of the
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army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we have
come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in
their business, and in their personal or religious liberty." 28
While the Paris Peace Commission was negotiating in France and McKinley was
proclaiming the benevolence and superiority of America over the Philippines, problems
remained on the archipelago. While tensions continued to rise to staggering heights and
both sides were still trying to avoid an all-out war, it was the Americans who tried to stall
the longest For the Filipinos, most were pretty sure that the Americans outmatched them
militarily and talked of striking before more American troops arrived. The Americans,
wanted to put off fighting as long as possible, for a8 McKinley told Otis, "[T]ime given the
insurgents can not hurt us and must weaken and discourage them. They will come to see
our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can give their people good
government our sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most
essential just now. 0
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While leading officials and top brass hammered out peace treaties and tried to avoid
another war, the Minnesotans went about the monotonous duty of policing Manila As the
days and weeks since the Battle of Manila passed, the boredom level and lackadaisical
efforts had hit new highs. Making an example out of one soldier, the Minneapolis Tribune
printed a letter from an anonymous soldier on November 7, which told about the "illness"
of one of the 13th's own. In it it said; "[P]rivate Mitchell, is suffering from a disease that
so far baffles the skills of our medical dept., who are unable to find anything wrong with
him. The symptoms as they appear to the Co., are a great disinclination for work and great
promptness at mess call." 30
The only thing which did add any spice to their lives was the actual patrolling of the
city. With many of Aguinaldo's men living in Manila and with the constant ~eat of an
attack, the 13th was forced to stay on its toes. On the night of November 18, this boredom
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was replaced by sheer terror for four men of Co. E who were out on patrol. On that night
Sergeants Jay C. Price and Tracy H. Hoyt, along with Privates Harry Montgomery and
George Mahan, were attacked by an enraged Filipino wielding a bolo. It took the strength
of all four of the armed Minnesotans to arrest this man who severely wounded Price and
Montgomery, and left marks on the two privates, was subdued only after being shot
several times."
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After a few days of sitting in the regimental hospital, all four of the men were up
and around, just in time for Thanksgiving Day. Remembering how they had been treated
in San Francisco, the volunteers from Minnesota invited the 1st California for a
Thanksgiving feast Among the combination of military and island delicacies was the
menu's (they actually had them printed up) specialty: "Fricasseed Chicken a la Mauser
Bullet." After lunch the rest of the day was spent with the Minnesotans and Californians
giving speeches, singing songs, listening to the bands, and story-telling.
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The Volunteers found that, much like back in Minnesota, the weeks between
Thanksgiving and Christmas flew by. This was especially noticed by the men of the
Thirteenth, who by this time, had done their job of policing the city so well that there was
literally nothing for them to do. The cities gambling was no longer evident, prostitution
was controlled, and most Filipino agitators stayed away for fear of being shot. For most of
the men there seemed little to do but write home and wait for word that they would soon be
mustered out.
The promise that all American leaders seem to give their troops and their families
during wartime, that the boys will be home for Christmas, was again echoed in the fall of
1898. But with tensions increasing by the day in the Philippines, and the Regular army
unable to leave Cuba to relieve the Volunteers due to the lack of transports, this promise, as
it has so many times, was broken.

95
As many of those who were born and raised in Minnesota could attest to, Christmas
in the Philippines was nothing like they had experienced back home. With temperatures in
the 80s and 90s many of the men fondly wrote home about missing snow, ice-skating, hot
chocolate, and having Santa Claus come down the chimney. Knowing that not being home
would be tough on the volunteers, the Regiment Auxiliary Association had earlier adopted a
plan whose purpose was to "remember every officer and enlisted man in the 13th with a
Christmas box." Undertaking this Herculean feat, the Association was extremely
successful, for on Christmas Eve every single soldier, private up to general, all received
little tin boxes from home. 33
Thrilled with their presents, most of the soldiers wrote home thanking family and
friends, and many times showed a little homesickness in their letters. One of these was
Lieutenant Carl Stone, Co. F, who took time to write home and thank those who had sent
the gifts. "The handkerchiefs are always useful... [T]he candy and gum did not last long I
tell you. The mouth organ will last for quite a while.... " He, like a great many others,
confessed to having ''a hard time believing it was Christmas" and to missing everyone back
home.
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After the gift opening, most of the soldiers decided to dp one of two things. One
group did what George D. Montgomery, a member of the 13th's regimental band, did.
After dinner he and some friends went to church and then went to watch Minnesota and
Oregon "play ball." The Minnesotans~ having played earlier in San Francisco, kept their
illustrious sporting tradition alive by losing to the Oregonians 14 to 9. 35
The story of the other group which did not go to church was captured by Pvt. John
Lawson, Co. K, when he wrote, "... the boys are subject to drunkenism and they come in a
room and jump and raise h--1. The foremost drink here is native 'Beno' or gin and if a man
gets a few glasses in him the stuff is all off. I have seen as high as a dozen men in the
hospital stark crazy from drinking it."

36
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One of the soldiers who was a part of the latter group was Damon Runyon.
Runyon, who later gained fame as a journalist and author, was only 17 when the war broke
out. Growing up in Colorado and gaining bis father's permission to go fight he went to
join the Colorado regiments, but an officer sent him home saying he was bo~h too young
and too small.
Ignoring the Sergeants advice, Runyon, snuck back into the Colorado barracks and
hopped the train to San Francisco where he wandered around Camp Merritt until one of the
sergeants of Company L, 13th Minnesota, said bis company needed a bugler. In Company
L Runyon stood out due to his size, a caved-in chest and extreme lack of any kind of
musical ability. Company L, looking more like a circus act with Runyon, also had in its
ranks one Vern Hanson from International Falls, who at 6' 4" and 230 pounds dwarfed
Runyon who was 5' 6" and perhaps 125 pounds.
Left behind in California, Runyon had to wait for the fourth expedition to Manila to
regroup with Co. L. Once in the Philippines he spent much of his time avoiding work and
the rest of the time in a "house of ill repute," which was conveniently located adjacent to
Co. L's headquarters. There he met and fell in love with the first love of his life, a young
Filipina girl. Having joined in with the rowdies on Christmas Eve, Runyon, like the rest,
spent most of Christmas Day recovering from a severe hangover. 37
But the headaches the rowdies in the Philippines were suffering were nothing
compared to what McKinley's administration would later deal with after relaying a message
to the Philippines discussing America's policy there. With the so called "Benevolent
Assimilation" policy, McKinley informed General Otis that with the actual signing of the
peace treaty absolute control of the islands became immediately necessary and the military
government, which up to that time just controlled the city and harbor, now must extend
itself thrqughout the entire nation.

•
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He went on to add, "[I]t will be the duty of the commander of the forces of
occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as
invaders or conquerors, but as friends .... " In closing he stated,
[F]inally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration
to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by
assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and
liberties which is the heritage of free people, and by proving to them that the
mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild
sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule." 38
Upon receiving this proclamation, Otis decided to censor the parts which bluntly
informed the Filipinos that the United States intended to retain and govern the islands. Otis
had the censored version posted through Manila and the surrounding area Filipinos who
were leery of American intentions to begin with, obtained a copy of the original and saw
for themselves what America's policy was to be. Otis, trying to avoid further bloodshed,
had, by concealing information, made the distrustful Filipinos even more upset when they
felt that he was purposely trying to keep them in the dark over America's intentions. 39
With full knowledge of what the American government intended, th~re was nothing
left in the Filipinos mind but to continue their struggle for freedom. They now looked
upon the Americans as they had the Spanish, just another colonial master trying to gain
control of their nation.
With leaders in Washington slowly changing policies as the days progressed, the
volunteer soldier, usually kept out of any decision which might have affected him anyway,
was now given additional burdens to carry. With this new policy, McKinley's
administration not only expected this army to set up a colonial government, but they also
wanted the soldiers to continue to police, put down any uprisings, and become the
transmittors of Amenca's culture and values. 40
Although tensions were, growing between the United States and Filipino leaders,
most of the common foot soldiers were oblivious to what was taking place. Life in Manila
had become a monotonous routine. With no visible hope of gaining glory in war, the men

98

began to mutter out loud that they did not come all the way around the world to be
policemen. If that was all they were going to do then it was time, in their minds, to go
home.
These desires to go home were fueled not only by bad cases of home sickness and
boredom, but also because disease was beginning to take the life of a great number of the
volunteers in the islands. The complaint became that if they were not going to die in glory
on the battlefield, then they wanted to get out of the Philippines, since most felt it was not
worth dying for otherwise.
Ralph Morgan, a 19-year-old Private in Company I, wrote home on December 29,
1898, describing this situation: "The deadly diseases and fevers which are thinning out our
ranks daily is what causes the clamor of voices amongst the soldiers all saying '[W]hen are

we going home?' Morgan concluded with the statement that, "[W]e do not care to do
garrison duty in a hot and foreign land, it being the peace work of the regulars." 41
Private John Bowe later observed in his diary how many of the soldiers were
possibly being afflicted by these diseases. He wrote; "Sgt. (Clarence) Carleton (Co. A)
first 'Protestant allowed to be buried in Manila. Some boys from the Kansas Reg't came
down and took some skulls away for souvenirs and contracted smallpox, so now a guard is
placed at the cemetery." He ended by adding sarcastically' II [C]ompany A, guarding
graveyards; Company B, guarding prostitutes. One the grave, the other the way to it. "42
Monotony was again briefly alleviated with the New Years' Eve Day celebration
held for the volunteers. Although the band played, people gave speeches and the crowds
sang, everyone really came to see were the sporting events being held on the Luneta at
Manila. At the games the boys of Company A made quite an impressive showing. Private
George Riebeth took first at the 100-yard dash, Private Byron Elliot took first in the
running broad jump and Privates Walter Lafans and E.R Smith captured first place with
the shot put.
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To top the day off there was even a football game held between the 10th
Pennsylvanians and the 13th Minnesota. Unfortunately no one recorded the final score,
but the 13th's official historian Martin Tew reassured future generations that the
Minnesotans did have a "strong football team." 43
With the holiday season finally over, the Minnesotans were all too aware that there
would be no more breaks from their tedious job. After that rumor mill started up again,
spreading word that they were to either go home soon or begin fighting the Filipinos. On
January 3, 1899, Corporal August Anderson, a 32-year-old Swedish born immigrant wrote
home to his brother explaining the situation at hand. "We shall be able to come home in
March, but tonight's newspaper says we won't be home until we have corrected what the
Spaniards have done."

44

Since the day they left the City ofPara, a great many of the Minnesotans held the
belief that before they were to go home they would have to fight Aguinaldo and his people.
At this point of their soldiering most of the volunteers did not mind which path their
government took just as long as they were able to do something.
They had done their duty as policemen with such skill and precis~on that crime all
but came to an end in that spring of 1899. By 7:00 p.m. all natives were safe and secure in
their homes knowing that the saloons, houses of ill reput~, and gambling had either been
eliminated or held in check. For the Minnesotans who had served as police, this was not
the heroic and glorified duty which they had wanted. Instead of charging up a hill or
defending a position until its last, like their forefathers in the Civil War had, the 13th found
itself breaking up fights, handing out fines, defending prostitutes, and trying to kill time in
a far off land. At this juncture, their choice was clear: either let them go home, or let them
fight. Either way, the 13th was ready for the change which was soon to come.
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HAVEATLASTOPENEDTHEBALL'.'

With boredom and open hostilities rising between the Filipinos and the Americans,
attitudes on both sides began to take an ugly tum. Filipinos, knowing what American
intentions were in their homeland, began to prepare for another long drawn out battle with a
foreign aggressor. As for the American Volunteers, they found themselves somewhere
between longing to leave the islands for home and fighting another quick battle with the
natives in order to kill their boredom and gain more glory.
During the first month of 1899, these tensions rose to new heights. With both
sides facing each other with weapons drawn, and with an ignorance of each others'
cultures and motivations, high anxiety was the nonn of the day. The Filipinos complained
about how they were treated by American soldiers. Many told about the practice of the
Americans knocking down natives with the butt of their-Springfield rifles merely for
"seeming disrespectful. 111
Both sides required passes to go through their lines. Many Americans and
Filipinos began to complain that they were not searched as they entered each other's lines,
but rather robbed. Both sides also used any pretext to shoot at each other. After the war
one story even suggested that one member of the 13th Minnesota, who was out on sentry
duty, killed a civilian just for "looking suspicious. 112
The crisis which was developing between these two camps was not missed by the
common foot soldiers, for on February 3, 1899, Second Lieutenant Carl Stone wrote home
complaining about this very situation with the Filipinos. "It has got so now that they hold
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up our people whenever they have a chance. The condition of affairs is becoming
intolerable generally, and there is soon going to be a fight."

3

Stone was not the only one who noticed that tensions were brewing in late January
and early February. On the same day that Lt. Stone was writing to his family in Rochester,
General Otis was writing to Admiral Dewey, who was still in the islands, concerning the
problems occurring just outside of Manila. "There has been a great deal of friction along
the lines the ~t two days, and we will be unable to tamely submit to the insulting conduct
and threatening demonstrations of these insurgents much longer." Everyone from the
generals down to the lowliest private knew they were sitting on a tinderbox which was just
waiting to explode.

4

On February 4, 1899 that tinderbox finally found its fuse. A few weeks earlier,
General Otis had moved a Nebraska unit further forward into an established neutral area
between the Americans and the Filipinos. During the night of the fourth Private William
Grayson and Orville Miller were sent out on a routine patrol. When they reached a bridge
spanning the San Juan River they were met by a patrol of four Filipinos. Grayson yelled
"Halt" to the four who yelled back "Alto!" to the two Americans. After a brief verbal
bantering Grayson raised his gun and fired and killed one of the Filipinos. Immediately
Grayson and Miller ran back to their lines yelling about an imminent Filipino attack. Along
a ten-mile front the Americans and Filipinos met each other in what became the first battle
of the Philippine-American War.
Since neither side had prepared for an attack, both found this battle to be a confused
and haphazard event Many of the American units fanned out from the city in witd charges
unorchestrated by their commanders. Often they attacked without orders from their
superiors. Having been bridled for too long, most of these volunteers wanted a chance to
get into the fray.

5
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With most of the action taking place to the north of Manila, the Minnesotans, held
up in the city and its suburbs, still were not completely out of the action. The St. Cloud
men of Co. M, the night of February 4 were held up in an old church. The "[M]en
stationed themselves in the belfry and in advantageous positions in the old church and kept
a close watch [on the Filipinos]. Although not suffering an all out attack Co. M was able to
save the church "... from the black devils who had evidently planned to bum the church and
the Americans within it." 6
Most of the rest of the 13th Volunteers who were patrolling the streets in their
respective districts did have some excitement that evening. It was discovered that some of
the Filipinos within the city were signaling those outside of it with lights from rooftops.
The Minnesotans took it upon themselves to shoot down this make shift signal corps before
any real damage could be done in the city.
By 4:00 a.m. the morning of Febnuuy 5, the navy opened fire on the Filipinos•
lines with devastating accuracy. To the chagrin of the volunteers this bombardment did
such an excellent job that the Filipinos fled to re-organize, not giving many of the
Minnesotans a chance to fight Aguinaldo and his men, or so they thought

7

Three hours after the bombardment, patrols from Company C found themselves
engaged with about 150 Filipinos carrying bolos and machetes. With blades not being
much of a match for the Americans' Springfields from a ,@stance, Company C was able to
disperse their attackers. Killing 6, capturing 31, and being unable to count the number
wounded, Company C considered this "the only serious trouble encountered by our
regiment to date." After Captain Noyes Robinson's men of Company C pushed the
·'

Filipinos back, the only other official maneuver conducted by the 13th in this fight was to
put Company Min another church in the Tondo district, just outside of Manila. 8
Although a handful of Americans got their chance at some limited skirmishing,
those stuck on patrol were too far away from the action and were extremely upset over

106
having to stay put. Not being strict regular anny, many of these volunteers still went to the
front by taking what they called, "French leave." With gun and ammunition belts these
soldiers wanted to fight, but knew all too well that they had to be back at camp for both roll
call and retreat, or suffer the consequences.
As Martin Tew would later write about this incident, on February 5, "... Minnesota
men were in every regiment and participated in every charge that was made. Some
companies found it necessary to place guards at the doors to prevent members from making
their escape." This was not all that effective since many of the men still escaped through
windows and passage-ways to join in the fighting.

9

Having been informed that Minnesotans were shirking their duty to go to the front,
Colonel Ames issued an order instructing the arrest of all Minnesota men found on the
firing line. Those who were found were to be arrested, court-martialed, and fined.

10

Once the order came down it was up to men such as St. Cloud's 1st Sergeant Iver
'!.,.

lngebretson to go out and get his men. In a letter home he explained, "[l]n the Kansas
lines I picked up about 40 Minnesota men who were out there without permission-the
majority of them from Company M .... 11 Instead of scolding them and marching them back
to camp, however, lngebretson, with orders from a Kansas Captain, formed these men into
a company and marched them into the line. With the Kansans leading the charge, this
rogue bunch of warriors joined in. This impromptu action by the men from Co. M came
with the penalty of two of their own receiving wounds in the battle.

11

Behavior like this, to the consternation of the officers, won cheers from the other
enlisted men. As John Bowe wrote, "[T]hese soldiers... when they fought without their
officers and without orders they were court-martialed. The better the company, the more
men in disgrace. One day Co. H had thirty-five lined up in column of fours, and marched
up to the summary court to be dealt with by the officers."

12
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Ingebretson, who escaped charges, wrote that Col. Ames brought charges on those
who were AWOL. Of these "[N]ineteen of the boys from the St. Cloud company went
through the ordeal. Another company in the regiment had forty-six cases. 11 In all, some
150 men were tried for leaving their posts. Fortunately for those who were tried, the judge
was extremely lenient since they showed more courage than disobedience to orc!.ers.

13

In the battle on February 4 and 5, the Filipinos suffered anywhere from 500 to
5,000 casualties, while the Americans only lost 59 killed and 278 wounded. While both
sides were caught unprepared for this battle, it would be the Filipinos who found
themselves reeling over the loss. They quickly understood that they had terribly
underestimated the fighting qualities of the Americans.

14

What the volunteers had hoped for had finally happened, they were going to get
their war with the Pilipinos. As Carl Stone said in a letter written three days after the battle;
11

[A]s you must kn9w by this time the ins[urgents] have at last opened the ball. Last

Saturday they began firing on our out posts ~d for the next twenty four hours there was a
steady roll of musketry punctuated by an occasional shot from the ships .... " He went on to
say that he hoped they could get out and fight too, but General Hughes told them that they
were too valuable as Provost Guard. Hughes argued that if any other regiment took their
place there would be civil unrest in Manila. Stone concluded that neither he nor most of the
men believed what the General said "but we have to stay just the same. 11

15

Sergeant Ingebretson, who had escaped the court-martial process, saw this fighting
from a different angle. As he put it in a letter published in the St. Cloud Times, "I suppose
that this trouble will delay our coming home.... " The only way this fighting was not going
to delay his homecoming to St. Cloud would have been if the commanders of both armies
could have worked something out. The initiative to do this fell into the hands of
Aguinaldo.

16
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Sending Judge Aorentino Torres of Manila to make peace overtures to the
Americans, Aguinaldo hoped to put an end to the fighting, especially since he had seen the
carnage left by the Americans. On Sunday evening February 5, Torres was received by
General Otis at his Headquarters. Torres tried to explain to Otis and his staff that the
fighting had started accidentally and that Aguinaldo was willing to end it The Filipinos
believed an annistice, along with the establishment of a neutral zone between the two
annies while peace negotiations were being negotiated, would be beneficial.
Among General Otis' staff that day was Minnesota's General Reeve, who was
given the duty of replying to the questions placed before the Americans. To these
questions General Reeve, "sternly replied that the fighting having once begun must go on
to the grim end." Tired of the constant verbal and physical fighting going on between the
Filipinos and Americans on the front lines, and being assured that they could easily defeat
their adversaries, Otis decided to push on with this war until its bitter end This decision
had ramifications not only for the soldiers who were in the islands then, but also for the
thousands who would have to come later.

17

While bloody fighting was raging in the Philippines, thousands of miles away
another fight was ensuing, but this time instead of bullets, rhetoric was used to make their
point. In the _halls of Congress, Senators were debating the controversial Peace Treaty that
Senator Davis and the commission brought with them from Paris. The controversy swirled
around the issue of what to do with the Philippines. A great many Americans began to
argue that not only did they want the volunteers to be brought home, but that the United
States should get out of the islands all together. McKinley and his administration had
swung a deal with the Spaniards in which they paid $20 million to gain possession of the
archipelago. Not wanting to look weak internationally, and trying to appease those in his
party with imperialistic notions, under no circumstances was the President going to give up
the Philippines.
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As the debate heated up in the Senate early that February, it was not clear to anyone
which way the voting would go until the battle between the Americami and the Filipinos
broke out. Many Senators, refusing to look as if they were not backing up their soldiers,
decided to vote with the President, thereby making America an official colonial power.
With a vote of 57 to 27 the treaty attained its necessary two-thirds majority vote, but only
18

by one vote.

Back in the islands, news of the ratification had not yet arrived, but for those
fighting the war it did not matter. When news leaked that a Kansas Regiment was about to
make an ordered advance and drive the Filipinos back it found itself overrun with would be
Minnesota mercenaries who wanted a piece of the action. Private Bowe later recalled;
"[A]bout twenty of the Minnesota boys had heard of'the contemplated movement, so when
Co. C. [Kansas unit] lined up it was one of the largest companies in the Eighth Anny
Corp." Obviously the light fines that these soldiers were receiving were not enough to
dissuade them from future actions.

19

After three more days of fighting the 13th's leadership found itself continually
trying to round up its men. As Charles Flannigan, Co. I Musician, calculated in a letter
dated February 8, 1899; 11 [A]bout 750 of our boys are waiting court-martial [sic] for
running to the front and leaving their company but they won't do anything because they
would have to court-martial [sic] the whole regiment. 11 These men were safe as long as
nothing happened in the city of Manila while they were out on their little adventures. 20
~

On February 9 this fear was given more credibility when a document from General

Antonio Luna, of Aguinaldo's staff, was discovered and brought to the attention of the
Provost Marshal of Manila This document described how those Filipinos in Manila, who
supported Aguinaldo and his cause against the Americans (known as the Sandatahan), were
to help in overthrowing the Americans.
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The plan was that once an attack commenced from outside the city, those loyal
Filipinos inside Manila were to start an uprising. More specifically they were to ".. .liberate
all prisoners, arming them in the most practical manner. 11 Also, "Filipino servants were to
bum American masters' homes." Those loyal to the cause were also instructed to spare all
Filipinos, "with the exception of those who have been pointed out as traitors." Anyone
who was not of Filipino descent was to be exterminated.

21

This specific information helped the American military prepare for this attack, even
though not knowing its exact date. Having literally stumbled across this document on
February 9, the volunteers did not have too long to wait until the Filipinos acted upon these
orders.
At 8:00 p.m. on the night of February 22, a fire was spotted in the Santa Cruz
district of Manila. Prepared for just such an emergency, the Manila fire department and
members of Company L went immediately to help put it out. Once there they quickly
discovered two things. The first was that considering the materials the Filipi!los used to
build their homes, such as bamboo, these houses went up in flames quickly and the fire
could spread with the slightest breeze. Unfortunately for those trying to put out the fires
that night there was a hefty wind to help push the fire onward..
The second thing that these firefighters discovered was that these fires were the
work of Filipino arsonist. What the Minnesotans could not figure out was why they would
want to torch-their own homes? Thre~ hours after the fire broke out, the fire department
and the men of the 13th had it well under control with no help from the local Filipinos who
were either getting in the way of the Americans, or were actually trying to cut the water
hoses. The latter scenario usually earned the Filipino an arrest, or a cracked skull from the
butt of a rifle.
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Why the Filipinos had set their homes on fire was becoming painfully clear to the
rest of the 13th, for they quickly discovered that Manila was under attack. When taps was
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played that night Tondo, Manila's most northern suburb, was as quiet as a country village,
but shortly after midnight, much like Santa Cruz, fire sprang up in at least a dozen different
places. The fire department was again called upon to put out the fires, but this time
Filipinos began to shoot at the Americans.
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Major Francisco Roman, his Philippine troops numbering 500, had made their way
around MacArthur's lines in the north, through the swampy waters and mudflats, and then
infiltrated into the city and barricaded themselves in Tondo. When the fires began,
Roman's troops sprang up from the barricades and began attacking the American soldiers.
Unfortunately for Companies C and M it, was their post in Tondo which met the brunt of
this attack. When the word came that the city was under siege Captain Noyes Robinson of
Company C ordered First Lieutenant John Snow to keep 19 men to protect the barracks,
while the rest went into the dark streets of Tonda to meet their adversaries. Ordering his
men out the front gate in double time Robinson attempted to rush these men to the hot spots
and repulse the Filipinos. For Company C, though, the hot spot would be right in front of
them, for as soon as a handful of men stepped outside the gate they were met with a hot fire
from Filipinos waiting in ambush.
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With a Remington bullet tearing his upper lip, Captain Robinson was still able to
order his men to take a defensive position. After a few more minutes of firing at each
other, Company C was finally able to push their enemy away from their barracks, giving
them time to regroup before they headed toward the fires. Although no one was killed, the
St. Paul men did suffer a handful of wounded in this engagement, some lightly while
others were more serious.
With their first goal of capturing the Tondo police ~tion a failure the Filipinos next
turned their attention to their next objective, the Tonda Cathedral, which was also used as a
police station. With the Minnesotans out fighting fires Aguinaldo's men captured the
church without any incident. Here, using better protection, they were able to hold their
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ground against the Minnesotans inside until the early hours of February 23, then help from
the Kansas Regiment arrived. The Minnesotans and Kansans then began chasing the
Filipinos down the Caloocan Road. After fleeing for a few minutes the Filipinos finally
stopped and made a gallant last stand until the were finally overcome by the volunteers.
The entire battle cost the Filipinos dearly, for over one hundred surrendered and 70 more
were found dead.
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With one police station saved, another under attack and the city in flames, the
Americans decided to culminate their effort and drive those Filipinos who still remained in
the city. With two companies from the 1st Oregon in assistance, Captain Robinson, still
smarting from his earlier wound, and Captain James McKelvy of Company M, formed a
skirmish line with their left flank ending on the beach. In this long line, the Americans
slowly advanced toward the northern suburbs, shooting at any flash from the Filipinos
Mauser or Remington rifles which they encountered. Once fired upon the units held up,
poured a deadly accurate fire into the Filipino~ lines, by now divided into small bands, then
continued to move forward. To add to the excitement, both sides had to fight each other
while the city of Tondo was burning around them. Slowly advancing and hiding behind
stone barricades Companies C and M, along with the men from the 1st Oregon, were able
to flush the Filipinos out of their positions, thereby making easy targets of those running
·away.
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While the general push against the Filipinos was taking place, the 19 men of
Company C under Lieutenant Snow found their barracks again under siege. With only a
handful of men, Lieutenant Snow was still able to repulse the attack of over 100 Filipinos.
After a hot fire fight, the 19 men of Company C went into the courtyard and discovered
their action had inflicted much damage on their attackers.

27

Still trying to defend lhe city against invasion, the 13th Minnesota Volunteers were
unable to assist in putting out the fires which had engulfed much of Tondo. Now knowing
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the Filipino's strategy and why they had cut the hoses in Santa Cruz, the Americans
quickly changed from just trying to disperse those who bothered them, to shooting anyone
interfering with the work of the fire department. With this new tactic at least this problem
the volunteers were having quickly disappeared.
With the fires almost out in Santa Cruz and the battle still raging in Tondo, the rest
of the 13th found themselves on edge waiting to see what would happen next. By
2:30 a.m. on February 23, that mystery was solved. Company D, stationed in the district
of Binondo, Manila's principal business district, soon found their area under attack from
Aguinaldo's men.
Binondo, not only being a primary business area, also had large numbers of army
supplies stored there, therefore making it a more strategic place to defend. With word of
the new fires, those who had been working in Santa Cruz quickly dropped their rescue
effort and moved to the more important site of Binondo. Again, the Americans found
themselves fighting both a fire and the Filipinos, who were shooting.at them from rooftops
and alleyways. By 7:00 a.m. on the morning of February 23, the Americru1s, had the fire
and Filipinos both under control.
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With the efforts of Roman's forces to advance into Binondo thwarted all of the 13th
was given a quick rest before six companies were sent to drive what was left of his forces
out of the northern suburbs of Manila. Having had the whole night to prepare, most
Filipinos were well dug in. With time to prepare Aguinaldo's troops built line after line of
barricades early in the morning of February 23. It took the Americans all day to clear the
Filipinos out of their positions. Sadly, most Filipinos who stayed and fought were caught
in a hopeless situation and were killed because they refused to surrender.
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With the battle in Santa Cruz completely under control and mopping up t:altiQg place

in Tondo and Binondo, the six Minnesota companies which had earlier formed a line to
push the Filipinos out ofTondo now had the Filipinos on the outskirts of the city at the
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Tonda bridge. Knowing that their attack was completely falling apart, the Filipinos
decided to stiffen their resolve and make a stand. Two hundred and fifty of Aguinaldo's
army had built five trenches across the road and taken possession of the bridge during the
night (thereby cutting the line of communication with MacArthur's forces in the front) and
were now ready to meet the Americans head on.
When the two forces met they both encountered some of the heaviest fighting this
war had seen. Having dug in and making one last effort to halt the Americans, the
Filipinos put up a stubborn resistance, but in the end had to give up their positions to larger
numbers and superior shooting ability. Much like the rest of the previous two day's battle,
the engagement was costly for the Filipinos who lost another 20 men killed and wounded,
whereas the Americans had only seven wounded-six privates and again Minnesota's
Captain Noyes Robinson.
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Although in the end not as fierce of a battle as the volunteers would later recall it did
help conclude the most serious battle that the Americans and Filipinos had ~o date. It was
with that desire to be remembered for their heroism that caused a number of Minnesotans to
write home letters often exaggerating how many of the battles were often fought.
With the Filipinos finally expelled from the northern suburbs, and Manila safe
again, it was time for the Americans to look around and see what was left. While much of
Santa Cruz has been saved, both Binondo and Tondo were different stories. Binondo lost
approximately six to seven hundred residential homes and businesses to the fire. Hundreds
.
of homeless natives amassed in the streets, making patrolling the city that much harder. In
Tondo for Lieutenant Snow and his small band of defenders saving both Company C's

barracks and the massive Tonda Church, but little else survived. With much of Manila's
northern suburbs laid to waste, the plans of the Filipinos also rested in ashes. Aguinaldo
hoped for a larger uprising and less American accuracy with their guns, but within 24
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hours his plans to expel the Ameri,cans from the islands, much like the city of Tondo, lay in
ruins.
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General Antonio Luna's plan to take a group of 500 Filipino soldiers and push the
Americans out to sea failed, but his message that he and his people would fight to the end
for their freedom was a point well made to the Americans. It was for this reason and this
reason alone that Luna chose February 22, Washington's Birthday, as the day to launch his
attack. He wanted the Americans to know that just like their hero George Washington, his
people too were fighting for the freedom from a new and oppressive colonial power. 32
With 150 Filipinos dead and many more captured, the battle was a rout. Especially
when compared to the casualty list of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers who were in the heat
of the battle. Having only 12 wounded in the regiment which saw the most fighting, the
Americans viewed this battle as not only a complete victory, but they also felt it was a telltale sign of what future battles with the Filipinos would be like.
While military commanders were calling it an out and out victory, many in the
media saw it in a completely different light. In an article a day after the fighting had
occurred, the St. Paul 1:ioneer Press, referring to one of St. Paul's units, argued that the
"Thirteenth Minnesota fared badly yesterday and the preceding day at the hands of the
insurgent sharpshooters in the suburbs of Tondo and Binondo.... 11 Going on to give the
names of the wounded, the Pioneer Press did not paint a rosy picture of what was
happening in the Philippines. Articles like this one began to persuade the people back in
Minnesota that it was time to bring the 13th home, before any more unnecessary deaths or
injuries occurred in what many viewed as a senseless war. 33
Newspaper reports like this one, the frequent stories of deaths from tropical
illnesses, and soldiers requesting to come home led the Minnesota Volunteer Auxiliary
Association in March to insist that the Thirteenth Regiment be brought home from Manila at
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once. They foiwarded their request to Senator Davis who personally brought it to the War
Department.
Even though the folks at home wanted the 13th Minnesota brought back, this was
not necessarily the attitude of those doing the fighting. Having spent months doing
nothing. they were now finally where they wanted to be, right in the thick of things. They
were also beginning to feel that they could easily beat the Filipinos, since the Minnesotans
had not been so far impressed with their fighting or shooting ability.
In an article in the Minneapolis Tribune dated March 12, 1899, these sentiments
were spelled out. "As a matter of fact, there are a large number of the Minnesota men who
want to stay in the Philippines until a great victory is won and Aguinaldo either surrenders
or is captured. Letters from Major Bean, Colonel Ames and others... say that it is the wish
of the Thirteenth regiment to stay with Otis and Dewey until the Philippine Campaign
ends. 11 This, of course, was based on the preconceived notion that it would be a rather
quick war.

34

Two other members of the 13th Minnesota wrote home about this same time
expressing similar feelings. Chaplain Cressy, knowing the war was far from over, wrote
his wife saying, "[f]he hardest part of the fighting with these Insurgents is to come yet-but
there can be only one issue: they will be routed, defeated, and the U.S. will be on top." 35
This belief that it would just take a matter of time before Aguinaldo and his men
were defeated was backed up by Red Wing's Ed Neill. In a letter home discussing how
boredom had once again found the 13th Volunteers after the attack on Tondo, he told his
parents that in the distance he and the rest of Company G could hear the distant sounds of
battle. With memories of Civil War stories running through his head Neill explained to his
parents that whenever any disturbance like that arises, the "boys came out [of their tents]
hoping that something has occurred to give them their longed for chance to distinguish
themselves. 11 36
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Even with the battle of Manila and the recent attacks on the northern suburbs, not
every soldier from Minnesota felt that they had completely vanquished the memories of the
Civil War veterans and attained the necessary amounts of glory for themselves or their
units. Believing that the Filipinos were naturally inferior to them both physically and
militarily, most of the Minnesotans, having spent months in the islands, still wanted to stay
and gain unquestionable glory before going back to their simple lives.
With a war which broke out as a result of built up tensions on both sides, and a
powder keg exploding over what was actually a minor incident, those Minnesotans who
longed for glory still had a chance to obtain some before they left for home. Although they
felt ready to begin fighting again, they soon discovered that this second war in the islands
would be drastically different than the one they signed up for a year earlier. The patriotic
feelings they had felt back in Minnesota in the spring of 1898 were.now changing as
rapidly as the policies which were coming out of Washington. The same policies which
took them from an army of liberation were now slowly beginning to change them into an
army of conquest.
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Chapter VII
"...THE REBELLION IS ANYWHERE NEAR PUT DOWN"

American military strategists of the day viewed warfare differently than many of
their European counterparts, especially the Spanish. Building a series of trenches and
blockhouses, surrounding Manila, Spanish military leaders believed defensive measures
were a much safer and wiser tactic to fight the Filipinos, than offensive maneuvers. Since
many of America's military leaders had fought in the Civil War and Cavalry-Indian Wars,
they argued that only an offensive campaign would end the current war with the Filipinos.
While sitting in Manila watching the Filipinos attack his complacent troops, General
Otis decided that they would not stay on the defensive as had the Spaniards, but rather he
wanted to take the war to the "Insurgents," destroying what he believed to be a weak and
small band of Filipinos hiding out in the countryside. To do this the General had once
again to call on his volunteers since the Regular army had yet arrived to replace these
citizen-soldiers.
Nearly four weeks had gone by since the Minnesotans found themselves defending
the city of Manila from General Luna's attack. By that time, their monotonous routine
redeveloped, compounded with the knowledge that units from other states were fighting at
the front. For the 13th, just like back at Camp Merritt, they believed that less worthy units
were again ~ning the glory which they felt belonged to them and them alone.
Just as morale was hitting an all time low, the Minnesotans were saved for on
March 17, 1899, word came down from the brass that they were to be ordered out of the
city and into the field. As Pvt. John Bowe wrote in his diary on that same day, this news
119
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was cause for an additional celebration. "Today we had a double celebration. The boys
were celebrating the 17th of Ireland when Maj. Diggles crune along and said we had been
relieved from police duty and were to go to the front." Bowe went on to say that
"pandemonium broke loose" and all the boys, the Irish contingent and "all the rest of the
Norwegians, Swedes, and Dutchmen" celebrated in one boisterous party. For many who
had not been in serious action before, it would be now or never for them to do something
gallant-to prove their bravery-to themselves, their regiment, and their state.

1

Before they left on this great adventure, General Otis reorganized his divisions.
This revamping of the VIII Anny Corp put the 13th again under the command of General
MacArthur and moved new units away from the city to protect other strategic interests.
There they were suppose to keep the enemy occupied, not allowing them to either rest or
mount an attack on Manila 2
On March 18, the 13th was relieved of its policing duty by the 20th Regulars and
ordered to camp out on the Luneta With their role as Provost Guard over, and after having
spent the last seven months in and around Manila, the 13th found they had made a good
many friends. When it came time to leave 11 [S]hops, and windows in private residences
were closed as an evidence of the people's grief at the departure of the volunteers
who ... had protected their persons and their homes. 11

3

After two days of camping on the Luneta, the Regiment was finally ordered to
march due East toward the water pumping station. This was considered a strategic position
since the Filipinos had cut off the water supply here during their siege of Manila. The
Americans, afraid that they might try it again, sent the 13th to protect it. Although picket
duty around the pumping station was by no means a pleasure, for most Minnesotans it was
still better than policing the city.
Otis' plan to leave Manila and press the fighting toward the Filipinos led many to
believe that the war would soon end. In his letter of March 21, Lewis Burlingham
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commented that, "I don't think this war will last very long as the Americans are pushing the
nigers 4 further back all the time and are capturing them by the hundreds and they are also
surrendering themselves quietly for want of food." Since the fighting had commenced on
February 4, the Americans had only seen the Filipinos defeated in battle after battle.
Although the war was only in its earliest stages, it would have been easy to see why many
of the volunteers felt they could quickly end this war and go home.

5

Not only a commentary on how Burlingham perceived the situation, this letter also
shows how many Minnesotans also had started to view the Filipinos. With a complete lack
of understanding of the local culture, and with life inside the city dragging on, many
members of the 13th showed sotne signs of disrespect toward certain Filipinos. Once the
Minnesotans got out into the field, however, and had to face the Filipinos continuously in
battle, this disrespect slowly turned into a pure hatred of, Aguinaldo's men at first, and
then the population at large.
The 3rd Battalion was stationed directly at the reservoir, the 2nd was posted along
the M~quina road which ran from the city to the pumping station, and the 1st Battalion
was to take the Santalan road between the reservoir and the pumping station. After
suffering through numerous Filipino-American skirmishes along these lines, the American
leadership decided to follow Otis' orders and take the war to the Filipinos.

6

At 3:00 a.m. on the morning of March 25 the entire regiment was ordered to move
into positions along the Mariquina road. With reports that Aguinaldo's troops being
nearby, the 13th received orders to "execute a flank movement on the extreme right of
General MacArthur's division." The 13th had planned on a long day's fight for as reported
by Ed Neill in the Red Wing Republican, "[O]nce in line, forty additional rounds were
issued and a day's ration of corned beef and hard tack, making 150 rounds we carried into
battle." Neill went on to explain what transpired between then and the firing of the first
shot:
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Figure 4. Manila Bay and Region of Fighting.
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"For an hour we marched down toward the mountains, in column of squads,
sometimes halting and often stopping for a few seconds only. After advancing for several
hundred yards through the cane brakes and rice fields and crossing a rocky and torturous
stream suddenly there was the sharp spit of a Mauser and through the bamboo brake came
a ball tearing everything in its way. Then all along the front spurted the little tongues of fire
and battle was on."
At 5: 15 after only proceeding approximately 300 yards the entire regiment
encountered heavy fire from entrenched Filipinos. 7
In the darkness of early morning, the Minnesotans could only locate where the
Filipinos were hiding once they fired, for the Mausers that they were using showed
"lightning-sparks" that gave away their positions. By 5:30 am., while still marching
through the jungle in a nearly straight line, the Americans closed in on the Filipinos. With
firing from the invisible Filipinos increasing, the Minnesotans began to advance more
rapidly. In order to try and overcome their enemy, the Volunteers, at every 150-200 yards,
would stop, drop to the ground on their bellies, fire three quick rounds, get up and again
rush forward toward their objective. 8
After a few minutes the Americans were able to deduce that most of the Filipinos
were on a ridge firing down from this advantageous position. Rapidly advancing, the 13th
was able to finally reach the base of the ridge. Still intact and suffering from serious
fatigue from their jungle sprint, the 13th Volunteers mustered the last of their strength and
rushed up the hill. Surprised by such a rapid attack, the Filipinos withdrew from their
positions. They then found themselves shot at by the volunteers who did not give up the
chase until every entrenchment was deserted.

9

With the main attack clearing out the protected ridge, the Minnesotans pursued the
Filipinos for another mile or two toward the north. Unable to catch up to Aguinaldo's men
who could run through the jungle easier than the Americans, they halted and awaited
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orders. That night, while camping where they had stopped, the 1st Battalion was attacked
by a regrouped and even larger force of Filipinos, who were determined to tum the right of
the American line, anchored by the 13th. This battle was waged for a little more than a half
an hour and was hotly contested on both sides, but with the Minnesotans having been
entrenched and refusing to give any ground, resulted in the Filipinos again being
repelled.

10

Having pushed Aquinaldo's troops farther into the interior, the Americans left their
conquered ground to re-establish themselves at the posts they had held before the battle at
Mariquina road. The 13th, without the services of 12 members who were wounded during
the battle, were again back doing the all too familiar guard duty.
With little or no fear of another attack against the pumping station, the 13th
Minnesota was ordered on March 28 to march back from their positions into the city of
Manila. From there they were to head north toward the town of Caloocan. This march
was torturous for the volunteers.
What made this journey so brutal was the fact that the Americans were not prepared
for what they had to encounter. First, it was to tum out to be a 15-mile hike made in heavy
marching order between seven and eleven at night. Secondly, these soldiers from the North
Star State were to quickly discover that just because a Filipino map said a road existed, it
did not necessarily mean it was the same kind of road which they might find back in
Minnesota. Most of the march north out of Manila was to follow a Philippine "road"
covered with thickets of tropical growth, and which barely could have permitted Filipinos
to move carts hauled by water buffalo, let alone a full division of American troops.

11

After a long and tiresome trip the men set up camp in the church plaza of Caloocan.
Since the commissary stores had not yet arrived, many members of the individual
companies were given the duty to forage for fqod. For the next two days the Minnesotan's
would dine "... on chicken and such other provisions as the country yielded."

12
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With barely any rest, the 13th was again ordered north, but this time they were
given a break. With a railroad line running from Caloocan to their final destination of
Marilao, the Minnesotans were given the opportunity to hop onto flatcars headed that way.
Once in Marilao, the 13th was to join up with Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton's 3rd
Brigade, of the 1st Division.

13

MacArthur's troops were removed from east of Manila to the north to capture the

city of Malalos. Malalos was seen as a key objective because it had been reported to be
Aguinaldo's new capital. Besides the symbolism of destroying the Filipinos' capital,
Malalos also had become a war depot and contained a large quantity of rifles and
ammunition. Having sent out scouting parties and interrogating Filipino soldiers captured
in earlier battles, America's leadership was almost positive they were on to something.

14

Otis believed "that with the capture of the enemy capital and the scattering of its
political functionaries, Aguinaldo would see the hopelessness of opposition and the
rebellion would be over." Otis, still fighting the Civil War, believed that with one mighty
swoop this war would be over and the Americans could go home. Although this strategy
had worked in America's past, it was not in the plans for Aguinaldo or his followers.

15

These elaborate plans to ~ncircle Aguinaldo and bring the war to a rapid conclusion,
quickly fell apart. With three brigades marching on Malalos, the victory was expected to be
swift. Unfortunately for the Americans, their pincers movement failed due to Philippine
geography. General Hale's brigade on the left had to tr;ivel, much like the 13th, on a road
which was supposed to be there but was covered with tropical growth. This drastically
slow advance left an escape route through which the Filipinos fled.

16

With their advance into Malalos uninterrupted, and the Filipinos fleeing before
them, the Americans were able to capture the city with few incidents or injuries. Although
it did not conclude the war, Otis counted it as an American victory. As the rest of the
American's columns advanced on the city, other troops, including the 13th Minnesota,
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were called upon to return to their picket duty and guard both the conquered territory and
the railroad line which traveled through that area.
Constantly on the run from a very large contingency of American soldiers, the
Filipinos were also running into the problem of running low on ammunition and disorder
within the ranks. Fearing that things might only get worse, Aguinaldo, in early April,
requested a truce from General Otis. This he hoped would give him and his men the
necessary time to reorganize and to re-stock the supplies so desperately needed. Not
wanting to deal with the Filipinos, especially since he had them on the run, Otis refused
this armistice and pushed the war on.

17

Meanwhile the 13th was ordered to guard the railroad track and bridges for a
distance of nearly 10 miles and patrol the countryside from one to three miles on either side
of the tracks. The companies were dispersed as follows. Company D, first bridge just
past Marilao; Company C, Santa Maria and railroad bridge; Company E, Bigaa and railroad
bridge; Companies K, G, Land M, village of Bigaa and Companies A, B, F, I, and H, the
vicinity. of Guiguinto.

18

With their troops taking the war to the Filipinos, the sentiment of many Americans
continued to believe that the war would soon be over. As reported in the Minneapolis

Tribune, 11 [M]ost of the Americans are becoming convinced that the backbone of the
insurgent opposition is broken. There are numerous rumors pointing to an early collapse
of the insurrection. 11 With the Filipino's unable to mount a serious attack, and always
looking as if they were running from the Americans, it was believed that they did not have
the military might needed to defeat the United States.

19

For all the Americans' wishful thinking, many Spaniards who had for years fought
the Filipinos, saw the war in a different light. Another article from the Minneapolis

Tribune said:
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"[f]he Spaniards, reasoning from their experience of the natives, refused to believe

that the rebellion is anywhere near put down. On the contrary, the Spaniards predicted that
the insurgents would hover near the American lines, bothering them as much as possible,
and when attacked in force dissolve, only to reappear at other points.
This sort of tactic--the Spaniards say--will be followed until the wet season compels
the Americans to be housed in barracks and then the Filipinos will return and re-occupy
such towns as the United States troops did not garrison."

20

The author of this article laughed at this, since the Spaniards, who could never beat
the Filipinos, did not have the military might of United States, therefore, he believed, the
Americans would not make the same mistakes the Spaniards had. Before long, however, it
would be the Spaniards who were laughing, for the Americans would make the exact same
mistakes Spain had.
While newspapers back home were debating when the war would be over, the men
of the 13th did not have the time to join in such arguments. With a large force of
Americans encamped in Malalos, the role of the 13th became vital to their survival. The
only way to get supplies to this expedition, and for it to retreat back to Manila if necessary,
was to follow this narrow corridor the Americans had blazed with their advance toward the
north. The same stretch of land given to the 13th to guard. Aquinaldo and his men also
recognized that this was an extremely important stretch of land. Feeling they could quickly
turn the tables on the Americans, on April 10 Aguinaldo attacked.
With the 13th Regiment spread thinly over a 10-mile stretch, their outpost duty
became perilous. In order to keep contact with the other companies, and to keep an eye out
for Filipinos, every night four privates and a Corporal from each company would leave
camp. Traveling between 500 to 1000 yards toward the enemy, they would then take up a
position for the night in the underbrush, where they remained until daybreak. If trouble

•
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were to start, this small group would be trapped, for they could not escape, nor could
anyone get to them in time to ward off an attack.
The St. Paul Pioneer Press was able to capture the significance of the 13th's duty
in an article discussing their situation along these railroad tracks. The article explained that
the men of the 13th die their guard duty "[W]ith the knowledge that the loss of the railroad
meant the stranding of the whole army in and about Malalos, cutting it off from the base of
supplies.... n

21

In an attempt to both severe the expedition from its base of supplies in Manila, and

to surround the Americans at Malalos, a large group of Filipinos, personally led by
Aguinaldo, decided to attack the railroad lines. Starting at 11:30 p.m., the primary object
of the Filipinos was to destroy the bridge at Bocaue. Company C found itself in some of
the heaviest fighting of the war, since the duty of guarding this bridge was theirs.
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With a concerted attack all along the Minnesota's line, Company C, being only 12
miles from the Filipino army's headquarters, were the first to be assaulted. With Filipinos
swarming toward them in the pitch black night, the Minnesotans were able tO protect
themselves by entrenching themselves behind the railroad. They soon discovered that they
needed this excellent position since they were under a heavy fire for several hours.
Knowing they themselves could not thwart the Filipinos advance, Lieutenant Snow,
Company c. called for reinforcements from the Oregon men stationed not far off. 23
The Oregonians showed up with 40 men under a lieutenant, which helped, but did
not immediately change the flow of this battle. Shooting from "an old white house" which
had an excellent view of the camp, the Filipinos were able to pour a hot fire into
Company C.

~Being

pinned down by the stonn of bullets, Lieutenant Snow ordered his

men to slowly retreat back to their base camp, where they could wait until more help

arrived

24
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The help so desperately needed finally came in the form of Company E, which had
been stationed just to the north of Company C on the tracks. Captain Spear, along with 25
men, was able to save the day. With their arrival the two Minnesota companies along with
the two from Oregon were able to protect the bridge from being destroyed and to drive the
Filipinos back.

25

While the attack on Company C was still raging, a half mile down the track another
fight was developing. Company D, stationed the farthest away from the rest of the
regiment, and in an area not clearly visible by the rest, also found itself under heavy attack
from a large force of Filipinos. Caught completely off guard, Company D was not able to
defend its position on the tracks and had to retreat.
With the city of Malalos under attack and Company C also besieged, Company D,
the furthest down the tracks, could not rely on anyone to come and save them as Company
C had. Captain Metz's men had to try to withhold an onslaught of Filipinos who attacked
them "shooting, yelling, blowing blood-curdling bugles and sending rockets into the air,"
as they assaulted Company D's position.
Knowing he was outnumbered, Captain Metz began to rotate his company in a way
which he hoped would make the invaders think they were going up against a much larger
battalion. Not completely falling for this trick, many of the Filipinos actually made it
directly into Company D's camp where they quickly began to scavenge through the
Americans' equipment trying to find usable materiel. Believing that the situation was
desperate, Lieutenant Charles N. Clark, and 15 men from Company F, the only troops able
to come to Company D's aid in one of those moments reminiscent of the Civil War days,
made a gallant charge back into the camp, killing or chasing off the Filipinos. 26
With Company F's help, Company D pushed the Filipinos out and regained its lost
territory. Upon re-entering their entrenchments, Company D was forced to hold on and
continue to fight the Filipinos through the night. Having fought all night, the exhausted
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men were not given the chance to rest, for as soon as the sun broke over the Philippine
jungle, both Companies C and D took the offensive and began to push the Filipinos back.
While Companies D and C were fighting for their lives early that morning of
April 11, they sent word to General Wheaton asking for assistance in driving the Filipinos
back. Knowing the situation was a desperate one, at 3:45 a.m., General Wheaton, on foot,
left his command post and started toward the fight. He took with him a detachment of 25
men of the 4th Cavalry (dismounted) under the command of Lt Charles Boyd. Realizing
this would not be enough to decide the battle, Wheaton stopped along his way to gather
more help.

27

When he neared Malalos around 4:00 a.m., Wheaton took immediate command of
the situation. While hiking down the railroad line he first encountered Companies A, B, H,
and I of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers. He ordered this battalion to take up Company C's
position down the railroad. He then told Companies F and B to head as fast as humanly
possible, not in the direction of Company D, but instead toward the village of Guiguinto.
Although what must have seemed as an odd order to the men was actually a brilliant tactical
move by the General. For Wheaton knew that what was in Guiguinto would give the
advantage back to the Americans faster than just sending these troops to the aid of
Companies C and D. 28
Surviving an ambush just outside the village the men of Company F and B got into
the village and quickly found what Wheaton valued so much. There on the railroad tracks
was a train with an armored car which had mounted gatling guns hooked on to it. Finding
the train, the ~ompany commanders gave the engineer Wheaton's orders to head down the
tracks. Both companies helped fire up the engines as fast as possible, for having fought
most of the night, they knew that the Filipinos, although pushed back, had not completely
lost the initiative early that April 11 morning and were not about to break off this important
fight.
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The train, with its Minnesota escort riding on the cars, began heading south on the
tracks. Afier a few tense moments it finally pulled into full view of the Filipinos. The
Filipinos, having attacked numerous other supply trains, believed it was a hannless
ammunition car and decided to leave their positions and attack the train. Aguinaldo's men
felt that by destroying the Americans' supplies they could regain the momentum of the
battle. Shooting as they approached, the Filipinos noticed that the men on top of the train
cars were not firing back. The reason for this was that the Minnesotans were under strict
orders to wait until the Filipinos were at an extremely close range before the Gatling guns
would be given a chance to start shooting.
Once the Americans felt they were close enough, the order came for them to open
fire. The rifle fire of the Minnesotans was probably not necessary as the Gatlings on the
armored car opened up, shooting Filipinos at close range with deadly accuracy. Retreating
helter-skelter into the woods with what was left of their unit, the Filipinos tried to
recuperate and regroup before deciding their next move.

29

While an extreme! y deadly battle for Aguinaldo and his men, the Americans~ too,
for the first time, also lost enough men for them to take notice. For the 13th they were to
lose 2 killed with 12 wounded, some severely. In his end of the month report, Major Bean
also reported that the Minnesotans had killed at lea8t 40 "rebels." Many more had been
killed and wounded but not counted in this total because the Filipinos usually tried to carry
off most of their fallen comrades. 30
Though having the tactical advantages of surprise, knowing the tenitory, and vastly
outnumbering the Americans, the Filipinos continued to lose battle after battle and had
devastatingly.large losses of men and supplies. For Aguinaldo's anny this would have to
continue to be the story, not because the Filipino was less of a soldier, but more for
technical reasons.
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One reason the Filipinos lost so many battles was that they believed that the rear
sights on their guns got in the way of their concentration on the front sight and, therefore,
many of Aguinaldo's men mistakenly took them off. This helps explain why so many
Minnesotans in their letters home mentioned bullets "whizzing" over their heads. Without
back sights, many of the Filipinos' shots always went high.

31

Secondly, the Filipinos had neither the guns, nor the ammunition, nor the time for
target practice. Target shooting would have been an extreme waste of bullets, especially
since many Filipinos went into battle with few bullets, and some even without a rifle.
These rifleless warriors were ordered to carry their bolo knives into battle until a comrade
was shot down, then pick up their gun and continue the fight.

32

With the Filipinos disorganized, defeated, and on the run, American commanders
decided to again press on with the war and try to end it. Knowing the Filipinos were
retreating toward the city of Santa Maria, General Wheaton ordered the 13th Minnesota and
two Battalions of the Oregon Regiment, to attack. At 6:30 am. on April 12 this unit
marched on Santa Maria Tired and disorganized, the Filipinos knew that this was not the
time to make a stand and fight so, instead, they retreated to the north and east with the
Minnesotans hot on their heels for the next two miles.
With Aguinaldo's army routed out of this area, the Oregonians and Minnesotans
began marching back through Santa Maria. When they reached the outskirts of this town
they noticed it was in flames. It is still unknown whether the advancing Americans, the
departing Filipinos, or just an accident of war started this blaze. 33
What was for certain, however, was the attitudes both sides started to formulate
about each other. While Filipinos began to blame the Americans for bwning villages and
terrorizing inriocent citizens, the Americans began to accuse all Filipinos of being
treacherous. This belief was to be found in the ranks of the 13th Minnesota, due primarily

•

to one incident
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A day after the battles for the railroad took place, Private Jesse Cole, Company F,
went looking for food by himself. He was ordered to go and barter with the locals to get
food, but not to steal it since that was against army regulations. When Cole did not return
after a while, a handful of men were sent to look for him. After a few minµtes of searching
they came across Cole just 500 yards from the camp. As the Pioneer Press reported it, he
was found, "... mutilated and dead, evidently murdered by the niggers."

34

The article went on the describe the situation from the soldiers' standpoint. "[W]e
all knew him as a faithful, good, hard-working man. His condition is too horrible to
describe, but suffice it to say that his throat was cut and a bloody hatchet found near him.
The news brought forth some unpublishable remarks concerning the rebels, the 'amigos'
and the island in general." 35
Cole's company mate, Corporal Myron Hingeley, an 18-year-old from
Minneapolis, sent a letter home which was published in the Minneapolis Tribune. In it he
recalled Cole's death this way.

11

Co. F and the whole 13th regiment was completely upset

April 10 by the finding of the horribly mutilated body of Private Jesse Cole: .. " His
discovered body was described as having had his skull "... crushed in by an ax, which lay
partially under him, the jugular vein was severed and a number of knife wounds were
found in the back." He went on to conclude that "[C]o. Fis all wrought up over the affair,
and will show no mercy to Filipinos who may come in contact with them." In a letter
published the very next day Hingeley ominous!y wrote "[Y]ou ought to see the change in
the company now."

36

With the death of Private Cole and the knowledge that they too could easily die in
this far away land, many volunteers became frightened. Many, from this point on, began
to tum their fears into outright hatred of all Filipinos. Rarely, after this incident, was there
ever a distinction between a good Filipino and a bad one. In the eyes of the members of the
13th Minnesota they were all becoming "niggers."
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This sentiment was heard for the first time back in Minnesota by Private John N.
Roberts, who had returned earlier from the Philippines. Speaking to a crowd anxious to
hear any stories about what was happening in the Pacific, Roberts laid it all on the line and
boldly told his audience: "[O]ur boys are fighting more for revenge now than anything
else. They want to get back at the niggers who have killed their friends and companions."
Displaying the anger that many of the volunteers felt that spring, Roberts, in a plea which
might have satisfied many of his comrades back in the jungle, stated that, [E]very member
of the regiment wants to get home as soon as possible."

37

Even though the men at the front were beginning to complain about their situation,
for many, especially those left behind, the real glory was to be found at the front. After a
few weeks of policing Manila, the 13th's sick list hit a high of 133 enlisted men and 4
officers by the end of December. This stayed about the same until February when the
fighting with the Filipinos began; then many found themselves well enough to fight. When
the men were ordered to the front, this number dropped severely to a low of only 10
enlisted men and 3 officers. With the knowledge that there might be glory found in
mounting an attack against the Filipinos, many of those who were "deathly ill" during
policing, miraculously found a cure to what ailed them. 38
In a related item the Stillwater Gazette published a letter written home by
Company C's Private Arthur Rank. Knowing about the debate going on back in Minnesota
over whether the 13th should be returned or not, Rank. believed that "... the men were
discontented ... but it was not because they wanted to sail for home and leave their comrades
to put down the insurrection; it was because they wanted to go out where they could do
some fighting and share the glory of victory." (italics added) 39

By the end of April many of Aguinaldo's men wanted to have a truce with General
Otis and the Americans. Fearing that they were just stalling in order to regroup and
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reorganize, Otis refused this peace initiative and decided to continue to press the war on,
hoping to crush the Filipinos before the rainy season.
Members of Minnesota's 13th had mixed emotions about what was transpiring.
Having fought a couple of battles since the attack on the railroad, they, along with the other
state volunteers, knew that they could defeat the Filipinos, simply because they were
routing them in every battle. On the other hand, their lives were becoming miserable
because of the constant fear of being ambushed, the jungle being miserably hot and hard to
travel through, disease becoming rampant, food not always being plentiful and worst of all,
they were beginning to see some men die.
Still, no matter what adversities they may have had to face, in the back of their
minds many believed they had to stay and fight, if not for their country then just for the
simple fact that they did not want to be seen as being cowards by the people back home.
Many feared that leaving just as the war was getting started would label them as cowards
and prove to many that the Civil War generation was actually a braver lot.
With this in mind, few, if any, were desirous of being returned home. For most
were still looking for or wanted that elusive glory which might possibly be just around the
comer in one great charge against the Filipinos. With Wheaton's campaign over, the 13th
Minnesota was assigned to another campaign against the Filipinos. It was to be here, they
assured themselves, that they would be able to prove themselves in battle and then go home
as guaranteed heros. Or so they thought.
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Chapter VIII
"...THEY WERE A ROUGH LOOKING CROWD... "
What had started out as a great adventure for the Minnesotans slowly began to turn
into an all-out war. Still wanting to gain the prestige of having fought gallantly in battle,
the soldiers of the 13th were thrilled with the idea of pursuing the Filipinos into northern
Luzon. After holding off the Filipinos charge against the railroad and doing their part in
Wheaton's campaign, one would have thought that all their desires for glory would be
quenched While for a handful it was, a great majority were still looking for that one
decisive battle which would both end the war, and put their names in the history books. At
the end of April, 1899, they were to be given that chance, but what was to develop in a
Luzon jungle was not what any of them expected.
After their tour of duty with Wheaton, the 13th Minnesota Volunteers were
assigned to General Henry W. Lawton's "flying column." Of the entire regiment, only the
2nd Battalion; consisting of Companies K, L, M, and Gunder Captain Masterman; and the
3rd Battalion; made up of Companies C, D, E, and H under Captain C.T. Spear, was
called into service. The First Battalion, made up of Companies A, B, F, and I were again
assigned to guarding another railroad just outside Manila·
On April 22, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, under the command of Major Arthur

Piggies, were ordered to assemble at the Bocaue Bridge. Their orders would tell them
which way they were to go, their objectives, and when they were to hook up with General
Lawton.

.

•
137

138

LAWTON~

NORTHERN
EXPEDITION

GU L F

0 F
0

7 MILES

""'-=='

~J~
~

,.....,,~,,

¥

~ ~··

)

.

0

a:

:;\:.
~'
•SAN MIGUEL

~·
~-,

l
BAY

Figure 5. Lawton's Northern Expedition.

139
Not only were the men excited about heading out with this column, but they

1

would also be led by General Lawton. By this time most of the men had heard about
Lawton, who at the age of 56 was seen as a bold, and sometimes reckless figure. Striking,
at six feet tall, and with a commanding presence and field record, he was revered by almost
every man who ever served under him. He had won the Congressional Medal of Honor in
the Civil War, fought in the Indian Wars, and helped capture the legendary Geronimo.
Finally, and most recently was his record in Cuba, where his victories there made him a
hero.

2

Otis' plati to take the war to the Filipinos was to begin during the last week in April,
1899. Knowing that most of the rebellious Filipinos were concentrated north of Manila, he
devised a plan to trap them where they lived. Planning a pincers moyement he ordered
General MacArthur and his division to move toward the Filipinos from the left, taking a
northwest route to the city of San Isidro. Lawton and his division were given a northeast
route to take and were supposed to meet with MacArthur a few days later and crush the
Filipino army between them.
This campaign, the most serious American military movement in the islands, was
supposed to accomplish two objectives. The first was to crush the main body of the
Filipino army under the command of General Luna. In order to do this, the Americans
would find themselves having to recapture the city of Malalos, since it was Otis' policy to
not occupy captured territory. Secondly, they were to locate and destroy any supplies used
by the "insurgents" in fighting the war.

3

Entering enemy territory, Lawton's "flying column" was to consist of lightly
supplied units, which could easily move out at a moment's notice. Along with the 13th
Minnesota, Lawton's Division also consisted of the 22nd Infantry, 1st North Dakota, one
squadron of the 4th Cavalry (dismounted), two battalions of the 3rd Infantry, six mountain
and two field guns from Battery D of the 6th Artillery, two battalions of the 2nd Oregon
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Volunteers, and troops of the 4th Cavalry. All were to meet at the La Loma church just
outside Manila, and from there head to the city of Bocaue on April 23. 4
Lawton's "flying columns," whose objective was to move fast, "was equipped in
the lightest possible marching order campatible with an expedition of the duration
contemplated for this. Ten days' field rations were taken in carts drawn by carabao or
water buffalo, as was also a reserve of 100 rounds per man of ammunition." While the
supply train packed field rations for ten days, for the men, it was quite different. As Martin
Tew later recalled; "[E]ach man carried 150 rounds of ammunition, a blanket, poncho, and
a change of underclothing besides haversack, canteen, belt and rifle." 5
This division of motley units now had a strength of 116 officers and 4,473 men.
The brigade which the Minnesotans found themselves attached to was under the direct
command of Colonel Summers of the 1st Oregon Volunteers. Not only did they take
orders from an Oregonian, but they also found themselves doing much of their fighting
along side these men from the west coast, just as they had at Tondo and the attack on the
railroad.

6

Even though Lawton knew he was taking the war to the Filipinos, he still fought
under the belief that even war had rules which needed to be followed. Before his division
departed he sent orders to the men regarding their behavior while under his command. He
explained that in order to pacify the Philippines, "we should impress the inhabitants with
the idea of our good intentions and destroy the idea that we are barbarians or anything of
that sort." The men's conduct was not to impede what the U.S. policymakers were trying
to accomplish, and these rules were enforced with infractions punished swiftly. 7
At 5: 15 a.m. on April 23, the command was started on road leading to the city of
Norazagaray. Barely had they taken off on their march into the "unknown," and an
extremely hot Philippine jungle when trouble arose. Less than five hours of traveling
toward their first destination, the city of Norazgaray, they were encountered by armed
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Filipinos. Coming under fire, Colonel Summers ordered the two Minnesota Battalions
forward to assault and capture the village. Meeting little resistance from the fleeing
Filipinos, Captain Masterman and his men occupied the city in a few hours.

8

Camping there for the night the men of the 13th awoke the next morning to orders
telling them that, under the command of Captain Spear, that afternoon the 3rd Battalion was
to make a reconnaissance of the next village on the map, Angat. Nearing the village, Spear
and the 3rd Battalion found themselves being fired upon by Aguinaldo's troops. With
orders not to engage, Spear and his men broke off their reconnaissance mission and
returned toward Norazagaray.

9

With Spear and the 3rd Battalion on scouting duty, the 2nd Battalion found itself,
while still encamped at Norazagaray, under attack from Filipinos. Having used the jungle
to avoid discovery, the Filipinos, using a river as a buffer zone, began to rain a fire down
upon the American's encampment. Company's K, L, and M were quickly deployed along
the bank of the river to disburse the attackers. Because the Filipinos were well entrenched,
this battle took the greater part of the day before it finally ended when the Minnesotans
pushed their enemy back away from their base. While inflicting injury and death upon their
attackers, no Minnesotans were hurt in this fight.

10

With the return of the reconnaissance party later that afternoon, Spear immediately
went to his commanders and reported his findings. Spear's reconnaissance report and the
futile attack by the Filipinos that afternoon, led the Americans to believe they had a good
idea of what the military situation would be like at Angat The order to advance toward

-

Angat on the morning of April 25 was given.
The 3rd Battalion, Minnesota Volunteers, and one Battalion of the Oregon
Volunteers were ordered at 5:50 am. on the morning of April 25, to take a fieldpiece and
move southwest over a plateau that overlooked the village of Angat. There they were to be
the eyes of the division which was on its way to the village. Once in position though, the
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commanders of these yolunteers, not seeing any opposition, decided to march on Angat
themselves.
Their observation was correct, for upon entering the village, the Americans
encountered no opposition. With no sign of danger, they traveled all the way through
Angat, where on the other side of the village lay a river. Within a few yards of this river
the Americans were surprised, for the Filipinos were hiding on the other side in ambush.
From the rather steep banks of the river's opposite side, the Filipinos had found an
excellent natural fortification, and began firing at the advancing Americans. The soldiers,
having no protection, knelt and began to shot at the white puffs of smoke left by the
Filipinos' weapons.

11

After an intense 40-minute fight, the Americans were able to force the Filipinos to
retreat. With only one Minnesotan injured, the soldiers turned around and began heading
back toward Angat. With these two battalions approaching from the east and the rest of the
division heading west, both groups noticed that dense smoke was rising in the valley where
Angat lay. The rest of the division who had just arrived, discovered that Angat had already
been captured, occupied, and was already burning. This left the Minnesotans to wonder if
the fire was started by their comrades, by accident, or fleeing Filipinos.

12

After their victory in Angat, the Minnesotans and Oregonians were ordered back to
camp at Norazagaray. Since Lawton would not arrive until the next day, these orders crune
straight from Otis who insisted that every decision (even those that occurred after Lawton's
arrival) be approved by him. This proved to be the worst mistake of this campaign and
probably the war for the Americans. Otis' ego refused to allow even minute decisions to be
made without his signature. His style of leadership clashed with the romantic and bold
Lawton whose vigor and dynamism were a complete contrast to his precise, austere, and
aloof superior officer.
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Although tension was always present between these two, Otis was in charge and he
constantly let Lawton know it. Otis, insisting that he also be kept aware of what his troops
were doing in the field, stayed in touch with them by using a telegraph system. Although
beneficial to Otis, this system became a nuisance to Lawton and his men since the
advancing soldiers were forced to continuously build or repair the telegraphs as they
traveled through the jungle. No matter what problems this caused for the men, this was
Otis' way of keeping complete control of his men and the situation, and it was through this
system that he passed on his next orders. He sent Lawton's division toward the village of
Baliuag, where it was estimated a strong force of3,000 Filipinos had assembled.
On April 27 the division headed in the direction of Baliuag but found obstacles

along their way, the first being after a very brief skirmish the entire division moved in and
occupied the village of Marunco. Lawton ordered his troops to set up camp for the night
and prepare for the next day's march. Camping in Marunco for the night actually proved a
more difficult task than fighting the Filipinos for control of it. The Minnesotans spent the
night trying to ignore the intense heat and humidity which refused to disappear. Their
tents, which were pitched in an open field, offered little she1ter from the intense Philippine

heat.

14

With orders to stay in camp until April 29, the Minnesotans did what they could to
keep themselves busy. Toward evening the Minnesotans thought their ordeal was over
when rain clouds began to hover over them. When the rain started to fall, most had to feel
a sense of relief, that is until they discovered that they had been spared from one torturous
weather problem only to be in another. In a matter of minutes the tents, supply carts,
trenches, and the men were soaked while the camp was flooded with water. This left the
-

men to scramble to the vacant huts in the village, which were too few, nor provided
complete protection from the violent rainstorm.
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Awaking on the morning of April 29 soaking wet and with little sleep for two days,
the men were ordered to ford a river and make "a most wearisome march... along winding
footpaths, over ravines and gulleys, through woods and jungles, until San Rafael was
sighted." Only a few days into their campaign, the men of the 13th, hungry, wet, and
tired of chasing an army of soldiers who refused to stand up and fight as the Minnesotans
had been trained to do. In a matter of hours the men's morale began to sink into depths
never before seen by their leaders, or themselves.

16

The objective of San Rafael was captured without resistance since the Filipinos had
already deserted the city. Having made some decisions without Otis' approval since he had
moved ahead of the telegraphic communication system, Lawton was reeled in by his
superior. Arguing that he was moving too fast for his supplies, on April 29, Otis ordered
Lawton to return all the way to Angat until he could be resupplied. Having too few men to
spare to defend what they gained, Lawton was forced to withdraw his troops from San
Rafael and return to Angat where they camped for three days awaiting Otis' supplies.

17

After resupplying and resting, Lawton was again ordered to take the village of
Baliuag. Starting out from Angat, the division retraced its steps down the Quinqua River.
This time though the Minnesotans brought with them the supply train, ambulance, and all
necessary equipment. While the Minnesotans and Oregonians forded the river and proceed
down the east bank, the rest of the column continued along the west side.
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When the Americans approached within a few hundred yards of San Rafael,
opposition was offered by some 1,000 Filipinos who had occupied the town after
Lawton's withdrawal. With a group of scouts engaging the Filipinos just one and one half
miles north of the village, the Minnesotans and Oregonians began to drive their enemy
through the city where they retreated across another river to make another stand. When
other members of Lawton's Division carried out a flanking maneuver, the Filipinos were
flushed from their positions and quickly fled from the battlefield.
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The Minnesotans lost four wounded and one killed in a short lived battle. With all
else that was going wrong, the realization of their own mortality and what could happen
while on this campaign started to hit a great many of the men of the 13th.
To add insult to injury many of the Minnesotans believed the death of Private
Frank C. Lewis of Company F was senseless since they had already captured the village
once and, in essence, were just retaking what they already owned. It was at this point that
many of the men began to question not only the military decision-making, but also what
they, and their country, were doing in the Philippines.
That night they buried Private Lewis "at the foot of the tower of a great stone
church .... 11 This was done very carefully in order to conceal the grave because many of the
soldiers had seen or heard that, "the insurgents had made it their practice to mutilate the
bodies they found .... "

20

Once San Rafael was captured, the next objective for these weary soldiers was the
city of Baliuag. At about noon the division was deployed to start marching toward its
destination. Having his division still split by the river, the commands on both sides of the
river left their bivouacs of the night before and continued down the river. Nearing Baliuag,
the expedition came across ci~zens deserting the city in great confusion along the road to
the north. Since a vast majority of the fleeing people were women, children, and wounded

canied on litters, no shooting was done by the Americans, and a flag of truce was sent out
"hoping we might assure them of their safety. "21
By the time the Americans reached Baliuag, almost the entire population of 30,000
inhabitants had fled. But by nightfall several hundred had returned looking for food.
Having discovered 30,000 bushels of rice stored in the city, the Americans, instead of
destroying iras orders had told them to do, distributed it to the refugees, allowing them to

carry as much as they could.

22

Sergeant Ed Neill later summarized the actions of that day.
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As we were about to eat our dinner, orders crune to march and extended as
skirmishers we made our way to the front and moved along the line to the extreme
front one and a half miles away where we were moved up the skirmish line. The
American line was then over five miles long, surrounding the city in a semicircle.
Just before we were placed the insurgents had raised a white flag but when Gen.
Lawton sent out a party to treat with them they were treacherously fired upon ....
So at command we began to close on the city.
After what Neill tenned a "muddy fight", they were able to capture the city along with a
number of Filipino's.
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With a couple of days of rest, Neill again found time to jot down a few lines to send

!'
I

to the Red Wing Republican. Describing what life had been like out in the jungle, Neill
said; "[I]f it were not for such rests as we are enjoying now, it would be impossible to
stand this crunpaign, in sun and heat and always wet through either from rain or
perspiration, sleeping in damp clothes in all sorts of places and with the heavy load which
must be carried on every march and in every skirmish." He further noted that soldiers had

'I
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been dropping out everyday and going to the supply carts to rest. After a day or two of
rejuvenating themselves they would then reappear. 24
After two days of resting the entire division, General Lawton ordered them to move
out again. This time they were to head toward San Miguel, through the thick jungle and
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small villages, both held by Aguinaldo's men. The first of the~r obstacles was the town of
Maasin. Departing at 7:00 a.m., the Minnesotans again were ordered to take the lead, with

~:

the 22nd Infantry and the North Dakotans, Oregonians, and an artillery unit following close
behind.

25

Within about seven miles of Baliuag, on the road to San Miguel and situated on
both banks of a small river, lay the village of Maasin. About three-fourths of a mile outside

the village, the American scouts were suddenly and fiercely attacked by Filipinos. In
response to this, the 13th's 2nd Battalion, under Acting Major Masterman, "was quickly
deployed, and made a rapid advance toward the enemy, while the 3rd Battalion, under
Acting Major Spear followed close! y in reserve."

26
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Finding unusually heavy enemy fire from the 400 hundred entrenched Filipinos, the
Minnesotans of Companies Hand E, who were placed on the firing line, decided to
advance rapidly toward them. Taking a page out of their Civil War history books, the
Minnesotans decided to charge wildly into the jungle while keeping up a spirited yell. With
the help of the Utah field piece, the charge by the Miruiesotans was able to dislodge the
Filipinos who were routed in about 40 minutes.

27

While another military success, the heavy firing from Aguinaldo's soldiers did
cause some problems on the Americans. The 13th had one wounded, Private James
Barrett, Company H, slightly in the right shoulder. Another casualty was Private Fred
Buckendorf, Company L, who was "fatally wounded in the abdomen" and died a couple
of days later in the hospital.
Although a relatively easy battle for the 13th, Sergeant Neill, told his readers how
this battle could have turned out a great deal worse for the Americans. As he claimed
"[H]ad the insurgents awaited our troops and allowed them to come up within 500 yards
before firing our loss would have been heavy, but they preferred to fight at long range and
run.... " Knowing they neither had the manpower nor the supplies to defeat the Americans
in a traditional battle, from here on out the Filipinos resorted to continue to fight the war
with the guerrilla tactics of hit and run which they had been using for the past few
weeks.

28

With Lawton's army rolling through the Luzon countryside, Otis, always the jittery
leader, again halted this campaign. With rumors floating that there was a Filipino army as
large as 5,000 waiting to attack Lawton from the rear, the ever cautious Otis decided to
consolidate his forces. Lawton, annoyed with his orders and wanting to finish the
Filipinos off, began to send out reconnoitering parties to locate the enemy.
One of these reconnoitering parties was sent in the direction of the village of San
Ildefonso. The men from Stillwater were ordered to accompany this brigade. Major
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Diggles, probably bored with sitting around camp, decided to go along and observe.
Ordered to find the enemy so that they could get an accurate idea as to where their positions
were, these scouts found themselves coming out of the jungle within 800-900 yards of the
entrenched Filipinos.
While the scouts jumped out almost on top of the Filipinos, Major Diggles was
standing on a hill overlooking the entire area. Surprised by the Americans, the Filipinos
began firing at the Americans and, in typical Filipino fashion, they were shooting too high.
One of these random Mauser bullets flew over the heads of the scouts and struck Major
Diggles. The bullet,

11
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pierced the upper part of his forehead and made its exit near the

crown of the head." Holding on to life for a few days, Diggles finally passed away in his
sleep on May 26.

29

Of all the events which took place, for the men of the 13th this was one of the few
which made a big impact not only on those in the field, but also for those back home.
Few, if any, newspapers, soldiers' letters home, official reports, or even the histories
written about the regiment after the war failed to mention the death of MajoiDiggles. Much
like the death of Private Lewis, this single event helped change how people viewed the
war. For the soldier in the field, the loss of such a popular commander helped keep their
morale spiraling down, while for those at home this death proved that none were safe in
this new war in the Philippines.
General Otis' decision to consolidate forces meant that Lawton's expedition could
rest and reconnoiter from May 6 until May 12. With time to reflect on what was transpiring
around him, Private Gerald G. Groves, Company I, wrote home explaining what he felt

"'•·

was going to happen in the islands. "These natives are indeed a strange people.. .! do not
believe they will ever come in a body and surrender. They will carry on a sort of guerrilla
warfare for, say, two or three years... " he then wishfully added, "... but the 'Regulars' can
easily take care of that."

30
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These sentiments were also captured in a letter from Co. K's, Capt. James
McKelvy to his friend John P. Bernich.
We are having a hard old time of it here and we all wish we were back home. With
our hard times, hard fighting, hard matches and worse food we are a sorry looking
lot. Fighting is of a daily occurrence with us and of course loose (sic) a good many
men which makes us ugly and we pay it back, with interest.
A soldiers life is like a game of cards you are lucky one game and unlucky the next
and so it goes if I am lucky in this game of cards and get home again to those that
are dear to me I will never leave them again. You are a lucky man that you did not
come along for there is only turmoil, toil and strife. War is h--- and no mistake, my
company has been in fourteen engagements and have seen enough....
He concluded by asking the question that many of the volunteers had on the tips of
their tongues but dared not speak of it. He told Bemich, "... the country is no good and I
don't see what our Uncle Samuel is fighting for."

31

This sentiment was reinforced by Corporal James P. Koll, Co. A, whose letter
home was published in the Minneapolis Tribune . In it he told the people at home, "[G]en.
Lawton's expeditionary force has seen much hard work, fighting and long marches, and
the men have suffered terribly in the intense heat. Not a day passes that an ambulance
wagon train does not bring in scores of men from the front, suffering from sunstroke, heat
exhaustion, dysentery, fever, sore and blistered feet, etc." Then after long and trying
days, he reported that the men lie down to rest on the ground and are completely soaked by
the night dews or heavy rains.

3
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As Lawton's expedition progressed, the newspapers in Minnesota closely followed
what was happening. On almost every front page would be the "official" story sent out
over the wires and passed on by the military leaders. Then, a few pages further back, there
would almost inevitably be a letter from one of the soldiers describing the horrors of life on
the campaign. These letters, combined with the section on the front page which gave the
daily death/injury reports, began to make a great many in Minnesota, and around the
nation, question why the volunteers were still fighting in the Philippines. Had not the
Spanish-American War ended months ago? What was the United States trying to
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accomplish by conquering the Filipinos, the very people they had gone to bring liberty to in
the first place? Questions like these began to turn some Americans against this war.
While the rest of the company was still resting, on May 12, the city of San
Ildefonso was captured by, Company D, headed by Capt. Metz, and one company of the
2nd Oregon, which were sent on a reconnoitering mission toward San Ildefonso.
Attacking Aguinaldo's men in the city, these two companies were to push them through the
town. The Filipinos gave an excellent defense, forcing the pursuing Americans to fight
from hut to hut before taking the town.
Once pushed out of the city limits, the Filipinos began to flee toward the city of San
Miguel, Lawton's next objective. Knowing Lawton's expedition was heading there
anyway, Metz and Summers ordered their troops to continue on the heels of Aguinaldo's
men. Following them in hot pursuit, the Americans did not stop until they were within
three miles of that city. Covering 12 miles that day, the small band of Americans held up
and awaited the rest of the column, which soon arrived.

33

With the objective of San Miguel only three miles away, and believing the Filipinos
had to be tired after having been chased by the scouting party, Lawton decided to move on
the city the next day. Used to being in the front, the Minnesotans were surprised to find
out that seven of their companies, now under the command of Captain J. P. Masterman,
were ordered to form to the rear of the column and wait as a reserve. One unit, Company
H, was given yet other instructions.
Under the command of Captain Bjornstad, Company H, along with one company
of the 2nd Oregon, was sent northward toward San Miguel and ordered to support a small
group of scouts who were already in that area. Repeating their successful flanking tactics,
these scouts routed the Filipinos from their trenches into the open where Company H
chased them beyond the city limits. 34
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By 12:30 p.m. the town of San Miguel was taken, and by all official reports, an

army of almost 500 Filipinos were routed by fewer than 100 Americans. Suffering only
one seriously wowided man, the 13th moved into the city by 5:00 p.m. and set up camp.
Again ordered by General Otis to take a two days, Lawton and the men in his
command were getting extremely tired of how this war was being fought In their
estimation, the war would come to a quick and successful ending if Otis would let Lawton
run the war they way he wanted to, it . Tired of the delays, Lawton asked, and received
permission to move his men, on May 15. Leaving one battalion to garrison Baliuag,
Lawton moved the rest toward the important objective of San Isidro. Now designated as
Aguinaldo's "national capital." Otis believed that not only would this be a great symbolic
victory, but with rumors that there was an ammunition factory there, he also hoped it
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would be the battle that would bring this war to a close. 35
By 3:00 p.m. on May 15, Colonel Summers with the 2nd Oregon and the 13th
Minnesota, accompanied by a section of artillery, moved out of San Miguel and proceeded
north toward San Isidro. Only three miles out on their march, they were met with heavy

'.

fire from a s~rongly entrenched group of Filipinos. Forcing Aguinaldo's men from their
dugouts, the Americans drove them across a stream about a mHe and a half closer to their

..
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objective. 36
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When the Filipinos made a stand on the other side of the stream, the 13th Minnesota
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quickly deployed Company K to the front, with Companies G and M taking the right and
Company L sent to the left. With the rest of the division in reserve, the Minnesotans were
forced to take action. While having little or no cover, Captain Masterman decided to make
a headlong attack into the Filipino's defenses. With the Minnesotans shooting and
screaming their way toward them, Aguinaldo's men held their ground until the last possible
moment. Under increasing pressure the Filipinos finally broke and ran, only to have many
of their comrades shot down by the pursuing Minnesotans.
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Making such a bold charge, the Minnesotans fortunately had only one injured
among their ranks. While the Filipinos, as far as the Minnesotans could tell, had lost 11 as
prisoners of war, 19 killed, and several wounded.
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While all of these smaller battles were taking place along the expedition, there was
still the bigger picture of the overall objectives of both Lawton's and MacArthur's
campaigns. While running into similar circumstances with his men to the west of Lawton,
MacArthur was also gaining on the town of San Miguel, where the two were to meet and
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destroy Aguinaldo's resistance once and for all.
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Lawton, outraged with ptis' lack of military skills, requested a rapid move by his
men on San Isidro. Knowing that MacArthur was struggling with the Filipinos not far
from the city, Lawton hoped that a quick movement on his part might yield victory. The
General argued that he could turn west and trap those Filipinos who were facing
MacArthur's advance, but only if Otis soon gave him the order. Giving in to the field
commander's request, Otis finally ordered Lawton to make his move. 39
After two minor skirmishes with Filipinos at Baluarte and San Rogue on May 16,
Lawton's expedition finally stood in front of the city of San Isidro, where most felt the war
would be brought to its conclusion.
With the North Dakotans, Oregonians; and the 22nd Infantry taking the lead, the
Minnesotans, to their chagrin, were ordered into reserve, but to be ready to fill in any gap
that might open up in the lines. Upon advancing on the city the Americans again received
another hot fire from the entrenched Filipinos. But now the basic outline of battles was the
same. The Filipinos fled and the "important" city of San Isidro was taken, after only a few
minutes. For the men of the 13th Minnesota, or for American military leaders for that
matter, San Isidro was neither the major objective that they had been sent after, nor a
source of the glory they had hoped for.
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With hopes again raised high, the 3rd Battalion, 13th Minnesota, along with one
battalion of the 1st Oregon, were sent to the village of Gapan, to which it was believed the
Filipinos had fled, and huge supply stores were located.
Organizing rapidly, the Americans headed out the afternoon of May 17, toward
Gapan and, hopefully, destiny. In their minds, it was all too fitting that the 13th Minnesota
Volunteers be the ones to bring this war to its successful conclusion. Quickly traveling
over three miles up the river they soon sighted their objective. Charging into the village the
men were not surprised at what they saw. Typical of this campaign and the war, itself,
they found that the was deserted. Their hopes and dreams of being the unit to end this war
I

were quickly abashed when they looked around at all the empty huts surrounding them.
Realizing that this war was not going to change or be over any time soon, the men set up
camp for the night 41
On May 18 they reunited with the rest of the expedition in San Isidro. That
afternoon, with their' mission accomplished, the division was ordered back to Manila. Of
all their orders since joining the army, this was by far the best one any of tlie Minnesotans
had heard. This march consisted of traveling through the dense jungle, fording rivers, and
occasionally scrapping with Aguinaldo's troops, did not seem as trying for the men. They
knew that they had survived this expedition, and if they and the people back at home began
to push hard, they might soon be returned to Minnesota. It was at this point that many of
the soldiers,-who earlier wrote letters to their hometown newspapers glorifying the war and
themselves, began to write letters telling of the horrors of war and why they wanted to
leave the Philippines.
After retracing their steps back through the jungle, on May 21 Lawton's expedition
reached the city of Candaba and there, instead of Manila, it was disbanded. On May 23,
while relieving them of duty from the expedition, Lawton thanked the men of the 13th by
stating in his report, "[T]he commanding general in relieving this regiment, desires to
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express his appreciation of the efficien~y, courage, and uncomplaining endurance

I.

Ii·
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constantly shown by its officers and men while on this expedition.''. With that, their
front-line duty was over. 42
Having survived 33 days of almost daily battles with Filipinos, covering 120 miles,
capturing 28 towns, traveling through a dense jungle, dealing with uncooperative weather
and a variety of diseases, the Minnesotans were happy to be sent back to the mundane jobs
of policing. In order to reunite the entire regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were sent to
rejoin the 1st Battalion which guarded the railroad between Caloocan and Guigunto. 43
When they took their pl~ along the railroad line, the appearance of the men
indicated the severity of what they had just been through. "Thin, hardened, ragged,
! ~·

bearded, they were a rough-looking crowd, and it took many weeks for them to get back to
their fonner condition. Only the strongest constitution could stand it, and quite a number
of the men were sent home before final orders for the regiment came." 44
With the expedition over, and with less success than the Americans had hoped for,
the Otis-Lawton feud continued. With the rainy season about to begin, and the volunteers
clamoring to be sent back to the states, Lawton was ordered back to Manila and his forces
brought with him. From Lawton's standpoint, and many of his men's, this was a huge
mistake. They believed that their expedition was a complete waste unless they fortified
these captured towns with American troops, for the Filipinos could come back in and
recapture theµi later. These words surely had to resonate through Lawton's tnind when a
few months later he was sent to fight his way back into San Isidro. 45
:Sack on guard duty, the mert again bad time to write letters home and could let their
friends and families know what they felt was happening in the islands. In a lengthy and
bitter letter home, the recovering Private Burlingham summed up to his parents what his,
and a great many of the Minnesotans' views on this war:
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"From letters and newspaper talk it appears to me as if our people thought we had
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an inferior class of people to fight against.... " After chasing them through the Luzon

I,

jungles Burlingham knew better than that and he wanted the people back home to
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understand it also. "If you people think there is glory in [chasing after the Filipinos] please
send one of your worst enemies to take my place and I will willingly exchange with him."
"Why did the U.S. go into war with.spain (sic) why did she take this white
elephant on her hands and pay $20,000,000 to get it. Then she turns around and does
what Spain was doing when we entered. All done for greed, greed that will cause
insanity.... "
"This war here is nothing,niore than a damn political and religious affair and has
j

caused the lives of 2,000 good American men to be laid away forever or else crippled for
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life ... , II
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He concluded by discussing the men's desires to gain glory during the war, the one

- ,.11

thing all the soldiers wanted.

"It was all right to talk about the glory your sons were getting fighting with spain
(sic) but now it is different we are now forced to fight and kept here against our will
because Gen. Otis (the ----) cables home that all volunteers want to stay here.''
"Father and Mother and the people of the U.S. you are all in the dark, you are
blindfolded, you think you know all that is going on here, you think your sons are fighting
for a good cause-but no you are wrong you know nothing, absolutely nothing." 46
Although only 17, Burlingham's anger was indicative of how the rest of the
volunteers felt about what was happening in the Philippines. Realizing that this war was
not as much fun as the stories they bad heard about the Civil War the men wanted to once
again return to the safe confines of their home state.
With bitterness fennenting among the volunteers as well as among many people in
the States, McKinley realized he had to bring the soldiers home as soon as possible.

,,,
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Caught between the popular opposition to this war and the need for the volunteers in the

islands, McKinley, surprised at this war's unpopularity, began to recall the troops that
summer. The Minnesotans would have to wait until they completed their current
assignment before they too sailed for America. 47
Knowing their fighting days were behind them, many of the men began to reflect
on what their legacy would be from this war. Summing up what probably most of the
soldiers felt, Private George W. Kurtz, Co. I, wrote, "[W]e have been through a hard
battle and seen some soldiering. We got what we have been praying for along time and we
found that it was not as much fun as we expected. 11 48
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Chapter IX
"... EACH ONE DROPPED FROM THE RANKS ... "
Those who survived Lawton's expedition into the jungle never complained about
their new assignment of guard duty around Manila. After spending months of grumbling

'

;

l

about having to be either policemen or doing guard duty, the experience in the front lines
made them painfully aware that war was a dangerous thing and picket duty was usually a
lot safer. They also were aware that just doing guard duty would give them the opportunity

I

j

!•

to write letters home, pleading ~ith the people of Minnesota and their leaders to get them

out of the Philippines. ·
The entire regiment was assigned again to the Manila and Dagupan railroad lines,
the same area where they had fought the Filipinos just a few weeks earlier. Outpost duty
was quite an unpleasant task once the rainy season had begun. The tremendous rains,
which could sometimes last four or five days, forced the men to often stand in water up to
their knees. The rain ruined their clothes by either beating them apart or forcing rapid
deterioration and mildewing. The rains also helped destroy the men's morale, which after
Lawton's expedition, was not hard to do.
With the state volunteers clamoring to be sent home, General Otis found himself in
a precarious position. Up to half of his forces in the islands were made up of state
volunteers, who under their original agreement to join were to serve until the Spanish·
American War ended. That feat having been accomplished and all the treaties having been
signed, the volunteers felt it was time· to go home. The departure of the volunteers would
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have left Otis terribly short of the soldiers needed to conclude this war. Without
replacements for these volunteers, he feared this war would tum into a long drug out
affair.

1

Back in Minnesota, responding to stories of how horrible the war was becoming,
many people began to push for the return of the 13th. Those wanting this found an ally in
the Minnesota governor's chair. John Lind, a Swedish immigrant, beat out the Republican
candidate William E. Eustis in that fall's campaign. The current governor, Clough, who
had been a fairly popular leader(was barred from running because he had already held the
position for two consecutive terms, after which Minnesota law did not allow a third. With
the Republicans having to put up a candidate which some considered less desirable than
Clough, parties such as the Democrats, Populists, and Silverites were able to join forces
and ilnseat the Republicans from the Governor's office for the first time since 1858. 2
Although both sides felt they had serious issues to bring forth in this campaign,
what they had to say was often overshadowed in the newspapers by the Spanish-American
War. Therefore Lind's strategy was to focus his attention on state issues and leave national
events alone. Because of Lind and Eustis being very close friends, and with national
events stealing the headlines many came to consider this to be one of Minnesota's most
"dull and boring elections." 3
While Lind had at first vowed to stay out of national affairs, on one issue he could
not help himself. When it came to the topic of imperialism, Lind was often quite
outspoken. Adamantly against President McKinley's new foreign policies, Lind, in a

..

handful of political speeches given in the fall of 1898, spoke against America's retention of
either the Philippines of Puerto Rico. Ironically, Lind could not be considered either a

.•
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pacifist or anti-military, for he himself had signed and served as a volunteer Quartermaster
for the 12th Minnesota Volunteers. Many people would actually equate his victory in the
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fall due to the fact that not only had he served, but also because he was immensely popular
with the men of both the 12th and 14th Minnesota Volunteers.

4

Lind was inaugurated on January 3, 1899. Although he had brought up the issue
of imperialism for the most part he stuck to his plans of putting Minnesota first. This
worked throughout the first few weeks of his administration, then events out of his control
slowly began to force him back into the debate over America's imperialistic policies.
When the United States Senate ratified the treaty between America and Spain, some
/

people became irate. One Minnesota State Senator who disliked the treaty's ratification

'!
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even went so far as to bring a bill before the Minnesota Senate opposing annexation of the
Philippines. Although easily defeated, those who believed in this idea found an ally in
Governor Lind.

5

Along with the political leaders trying to either stop the war or get the 13th home,
were many Minnesota citizens. With newspapers publishing the casualty list, and no end
in sight for this war with the Filipinos, many quickly turned against the war. Although no
polls existed, it would have been interesting to see how many of these same people who
were now adamantly opposed to the war, had been the one1s cheering as the men went off
to war a few months earlier?6
The 13th Auxiliary, the official voice of the 13th Minnesota in the state, also worried
about getting the men home. They took it upon themselves to literally bombard the War
Department and the President with letters pleading for the return of the 13th Minnesota
Regiment. When even this failed to grab government leaders attention the people of
Minnesota turned to Governor Lind.

7

Lind, still trying to hold on to his campaign pledge of not wanting to get involved
with national affairs, finally was prompted into action after he received a cablegram from
the officers of the 13th Minnesota (including General Reeve). The cablegram simply read;

'
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"[T]he regiment must be ordered home and mustered out of service immediately."

"I I
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With this, along with th~ pressure from people across the state, Lind finally got
deeply involved in helping bring back the men of the 13th. Now without delay, along with
other states Governors who agreed with him, Lind began to petition McKinley for the
return of all the states volunteers, even going to the extreme of actually going to
Washington to meet with the President and to discuss the issue.
The Governor, who himself lived in the camps during the war, wanted the War
Department to call back both those lingering in camps in the south as well as those doing
service in the Philippines. With this much pressure coming from the states, McKinley and
his staff slowly began to change their policy and began calling the volunteers home.

8

Lind's actions did not nfeet with universal approval. He especially initated his
Republican counterparts, still smarting from losing the Governorship. Some Republicans
accused Lind of being "spineless" of "playing godmother to a few weakling officers." He,
and those who agreed with him, also received a reprimand from former Governor Clough.
In a St. Paul Pioneer Press article, Clough explained that he was

11
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not at all pleased with

the conduct of the Thirteenth Minnesota Auxiliary and others who were demanding that the
Thirteenth regiment be mustered out" As he said, he felt the President and the War
Department were "entirely competent to determine these matters... " and those who were
less qualified should stay out.

9

Not everyone who wanted the 13th brought home though could be considered an
anti-imperialist. Many wanted their fellow Minnesotans brought home, but still wanted the
United States to control the Philippines. Instead of using the volunteers though these
people wanted the Regular Army to do the work. The desire to bring the 13th home but to
also quickly end the war was summarized in an editorial in the Red Wing Republican on
June 29, 1899. This editorial believed that the United States was involved in a war that
must end soon. But, they added, "... do not let this insurrection drag on, with all its
intended hardships, and all the incidents of prolonged fighting that are hostile to the whole
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American idea. We believe in fighting like demons when we have to, and then stopping as
quickly as possible. Clean out the hornets' nest whatever it may cost, and let us have
peace." io
Still holding onto some of that excitement that swept the state months before, the

Red Wing Republican, played the dual role of asking for the 13th's return, but remaiqed

~
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staunchly behind McKinley and his foreign policies by saying the 13th should be brought
home only after the job over there was finished. As for newspapers across the state the

'.
I

Republican was the lone voice when it came to this belief, for the rest of the state's
I

newspapers either demanded,an immediate return of the 13th, and end to the war, or both.
This belief was actually a reflection of most Minnesotans who wanted to bring the
13th home, end the war, and then go on with thi:r;igs as though the Philippine-American
War had never happened. Many Americans wanted to put this war behind them as quickly
as possible for it was not the kind of war they had wanted back in the spring of 1898. This
fight with the Filipinos was neither going to be a clear and easy victory, nor did it put the
Americans in the light of gallant saviors bringing democracy to an oppressed people.
Rather, for a great many who agreed with Governor Lind, the war made the United
States look more like an imperialistic oppressor. For many Americans they began to
question their nation's role in a war where it was not completely clear that they were on the
morally right side.
With the dream of bringing their heroes home to Minnesota, many people began to
raise money to accomplish that goal. To all Minnesotans, no matter what they felt about the
war, their soldiers were heroes and deserved a heroes welcome.
One official who took the initiative to bring the troops home was Minneapolis

J

I

Mayor James Gray. It was his idea to sell pins made of little red, white, and blue ribbon,

j

upon which were printed the words, 'I Have, Have You?' The ribbon was evidence that

l
I

the wearer had paid a dollar--the price for which it was sold--toward bringing the 13th

I
I

163
Regiment home. Not to be outdone the Minneapolis Times donated $1,000, while many
11

private donors gave liberally. The money raised from the sale of these ribbons was more
than enough to bring the soldiers home to Minnesota.

11

Desiring to have the 13th mustered out in their respective hometowns, the five cities
that had offered companies were able to raise over $25,000 for the soldiers' return. The
rest of the $31,000 was to be picked up by the Governor.

12

Ironically, while the people were preparing to bring the troops home to one of the
biggest celebrations the state hrui' ever seen, the men in the Philippines had quite different
plans. In an almost unanimous vote, the members of the 13th decided that they preferred to
be mustered out in San Francisco. The reason for this was not to snub their fellow
Minnesotans, but for purely economic reasons. "The choice was determined by the fact
that the Federal Government allowed each soldier travel pay from San Francisco to his
place of enlistmen~. besides two months' pay. 11 If they were mustered out in Minneapolis
they would lose out on all this pay.

13

Irritated with news from home about the mustering out plans, Lewis Burlingham
wrote his parents, telling them, "[L]et the boys have their say, it was them that did the
work and risked their lives for the sake of the country and not those cold footed ducks that
are doing so much talking back there. 11 Caught in the middle of national and state politics,
and now with the only wish of being returned to the states, many of the volunteers were
getting irritated with the whole system.

14

With all the other political wrangling going on at this time, it came as no surprise
that a compromise would have to be made before this issue was settled. The final deal was
that the money raised by the people of Minnesota would be used to buy every soldier a
ticket back to the state. That way the soldiers could pocket the money from the government
and not have to use it to travel back home. For the men of the 13th this was an excellent

•

164
idea; they would still be mustered out in San Francisco, plus they could keep their travel
pay and be welcomed back home as returning soldiers.
Before any of these plans could be acted upon, though, the 13th had to receive
official orders to be sent home. Having watched other states' volunteers leaving since the
completion of Lawton's expedition, the Minnesotans felt that they would soon be sent
home too. Until then they had to continue their policing of the railroads, bridges,
telegraphic communications and the local citizenry. The return to this monotonous duty,
now far away from the fighting, was generally accepted.
This new assignment, although better than chasing after Filipinos, still had a
physical and mental affect on the men. As John Bowe remembered tn his diary,
11
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sneaking through blind alleys after crooked googoos, double-timing across country
I

under tropical skies, going hungry several days at a stretch, lying in trenches soaked to the
skin, and pushing buffalo carts across country had reduced the companies until there are
only from one-fourth io one-half the men doing duty."
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With the morale of the Americans in the islands at a record low, the Minnesotans
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received news that brought their spirits back to a level probably not seen since being

f.l

mustered in at Camp Ramsey. They were told to prepare to pack their belongings and head
for home. With the heartiest voices they could muster, the regiment let forth the exuberant
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yell only known to men who have served, fought, and died together.
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By July 31, Companies G, E, D, M, L, and K were relieved by six companies of
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the 16th U.S. Infantry and took the train which they had been guarding for the past few
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weeks into Manila. There they waited for four days until Companies I, A, F, B, H, and C

'!I

were also relieved of duty and joined them in their scramble to pack and head for home.
In their haste to leave the Philippines the men did decide to take time out of their
schedule to remember those who they were to leave behind. On August 8 the "regiment
foimed in columns and marched to the cemetery at Paco, southeast of the Walled City. 11
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There, with a service conducted by Reverend Cressy, the 13th "... paid its tribute to those

.."

of its number who were now on that journey over seas uncharted-a tribute not alone to

'I

those who rested at Paco, but as well to the ones who slept near the little church at San
Rafael, at Baliuag, at Honolulu, in the depths of the Pacific, and back in the homeland."

16

With the memorial services over, the men of the 13th somberly returned to their
barracks to continue to prepare for their homeward voyage. Whereas a great many could
not wait to once again see American shores, 60 members in all decided, for various
reasons, to remain in the islandland join new regiments. Whether it was for patriotic

..
, I

reasons, the need to find more glory, just a love of military life, or the islands, these former
members of the 13th joined either the 36th, 37th or 11th Calvaries to help finish what they
had started in the Pacific.

17
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With bags packed and emotions running high, the 13th Minnesota Regiment was
ordered on board the Sheridan for its return trip to the United States. After two days of
getting settled on board the ship set sail on August 12, while the band played "Home Sweet

'

I
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Home." After spending a little over one year in the islands, these Minnesotans were able to
finally leave with what they had come for. The desire to be seen as heroes and win their

, I
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glory in battle was, in their minds, accomplished. Their hopes and dreams were to be

\I

verified by tjie receptions which awaited them back in the United States, and especially

·I

Minnesota.
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The Minnesotcms had to share the ship with the troops from South Dakota. The

~

'

South Dakotans were given the after part of the vessel while the Minnesotans took the
forward. Being larger and better outfitted than the City ofPara, the Sheridan, due to the
regimental fund, also had the benefit of having better food, causing little sea-sickness for
the men, and best of all it was taking them home.

18

The return voyage also reflected changes in the volunteers' attitudes toward military
life. Knowing that they were just weeks away from being mustered out of the anny

t
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forever, most no longer took their commanders seriously. While on board ship, John
Bowe recalled in his diary that "orders cmne down that from that point on they were to drill
twice a day and inspection twice a day and had to wear a certain unifonn on drill." These
orders which would have been obeyed a year earlier, now were virtually disregarded for
"the boys turned loose and hollered 'rotten' and bawled the officers out to their faces."

19
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While never having the military discipline that they hoped for, the commanders of
the state's volunteers seemed to lose even more of this meager control once the Philippine-

J

American War started. With the feelings toward the Philippines, the war and their
commanders out in the open by the time they board the ship home, although not formally
mustered out of United States service, mentally many had left weeks earlier.
Not only was military discipline to be different on this return trip, but so was the
ship's route. On August 16, instead of passing the Ladrones, the Sheridan went to Japan
where it stopped for several days to re-coal. Landing in Nagasaki, many of the
Minnesotans received shore leave and became tourists, traveling around the city in
riksha1s, taking pictures and observing local customs which all seemed quite bizarre to the
Minnesotans.
Setting sail two days later the soldiers patiently waited tp see the United States
again. Knowing they would soon reach the states and would probably beat any letters
home, most decided to discontinue letter writing or keeping of diaries until on dry land.
The only report of anything oµ this portion of the trip again comes from John Bowe who in
a diary entry entitled "Aug. 32, 1899" explaine~, "[f]his is the place where we lose a day.
Went to bed last night (Thurs. Night) and woke up Thurs. morning .... " zo

I
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With the exception of the fascination of crossing the International Dateline, the only
thing these men were looking forward to was landing in San Francisco, which took place
on September 8. Remaining on board for a few days prior to disembarking, the
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Minnesotans found themselves wrapped up in two controversies which had been

.'

developing in the states, as well as in Minnesota, for weeks.
Both controversies dealt with two commanders and how they had behaved while in
the Philippines. The first one dealt with how General Otis was prosecuting the war. Many

.
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Americans felt that this war, in a more capable commander's hands, would have been over
in a few weeks. It seemed obvious that every battle was a lop·sided victory for the

'
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Americans, leaving to blame Otis' seek·and·destroy methodology as the reason why the
war continued. By chasing after the Filipinos, then, not fortifying the villages which

.

American troops captured, allowed Aguinaldo's men to easily recaptured these objectives.

'
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This forced American military leaders to turn around and expend more American lives to

:\
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recapture those villages again. This strategy quickly exasperated both the soldiers in the
field and the folks back home.
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It was reported by many newspapers that in polls conducted of the volunteers

~
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disembarking in San Francisco, that nearly to a man, they were all against General Otis.

.
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Even some of Minnesota's highest leaders faulted the general's conduct. As he left the
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Sheridan that bright September day, General Reeve told reporters that he faulted Otis for

i

treating the Filipino leaders "as half civilized savages" on some occasions, while on others

'l!
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he "ignored them completely." Reeve, eager to shed light on how he felt Otis had
mishandled the war with the Filipinos, held an impromptu press conference on the dock
while his men were still disembarking. Reeve went on to criticize Otis for "not adopting
the tactics used against the Indians in the West." In essence, Reeve thought that Otis was
too tough on the Filipinos during peace and too lenient with them in war.

21

A more local and personal issue for the men of the 13th Minnesota was the
controversy dealing with Colonel Ames and his conduct during the war. While serving as
part of Wheaton's expedition, Colonel Ames, during the heat of battle told his men that he
was suffering from an illness and left the regiment for Manila, passing the command to
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Major Friedrichs. In Manila, some of the men reported having seen the Colonel out and

''

I
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I

about and not looking the least bit ill. This immediately brought on charges of cowardice
by some of the other leaders in the 13th, and soon after by almost all of the print media
back in Minnesota.
Due to the dual way in which newspapers received information from the
Philippines, it is easy to see how this one sided view of Ames developed. With the
telegraphic services repaired the August before, any official news coming from the
American leadership, was quickly sent across the Pacific and then picked up by the
newspapers through the Associated Press. Either not liking him personally, or his easy
/

going command style, some of his fellow commanders began to send back word about
Ames' supposed "cowardice" in battle.
While these reports got back almost immediately to the states, letters written by the
common soldiers took anywhere from four to six weeks just to get back home. Then if the
recipient decided to have it published in the lo~ paper it would take additional time. With
Ames' supporters not given a chance to express their views until June or July, few
newspapers back in Minnesota heard their side of the story. Therefore Ames' backers
would not get their say until they were back home.
The controversy peaked just as the Minnesotans were landing in California.
Anxious to hear the men's view of this issue, most newspapers sent reporters to welcome
the soldiers and to sift through what they could find out about the Ames controversy. The
first to respond was the Stillwater Gazette, which noted that "[O]ne of the officers of the
regiment is credited with saying that not a commissioned officer would shake hands with
Col. Ames and another with remarking that he had better not show his face to the
regiment." 22
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After another day, and-having
a chance to talk to more of the soldiers, the
..

Minneapolis Tribune wrote a more cautious story about how the soldiers felt. The
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newspaper reported that while "all of the officers and a great majority of the enlisted men
are anti-Ames," most of the common soldiers, "are not as bitter, though, as the officers
are." Many common men in the regiment held "the theory that the colonel was troubled
with dementia while at Manila and was not responsible for anything that he did out of the
way."

23

To reinforce the Tribune's story, John Bowe later recalled what he and the rest of
the volunteers observed as they left the ship: "When the boys anived in camp, they all
flocked to the Colonel's tent and cheered for Colonel Ames." For the average soldier there
/

,

was no real controversy here. In a ploy to sell more copies of their individual papers,
many of the state's editors, seemed to play up this controversy. By the time they reached
Minnesota this issue had disappeared.

24
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One reason the Colonel Ames controversy quietly died was because the men were
home and anxious to be mustered out of service. Military squabbles seemed to be part of

' f
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their past life, and part of the military they wanted to forget. As Private Bowe remembered
later in his journal, for the men it was now just a matter of reuniting with family and friends
and not concerning themselves with military matters.
Although Bowe mentioned how most of these reunions were happy, some did not
tum out this way. "Some of the boys inquired for were in the hospital, others were

disabled for life, and here the meeting was a mixture of sorrow and gladness combined.
Other folks who had friends and kindred of boys planted in Luzon, came to hear the boys'
friends tell them of how the poor fellow died."
For the family and friends left behind, the war was finally brought home, and they
were forced to realize its terrible cost 25
While the rest of the 13th was greeting family and friends or unpacking the ship,
General Reeve continued with his press conference, continuing to berate General Otis and
the war. When asked by a reporter if the bloodshed could have been averted by an
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intelligent policy of conciliation, Reeve, in an answer that summed up not only the war but
how most of the 13th felt about it, said:
Conciliatory methods would have prevented the war. Now, w~ all agree to the
proposition that the insurrection must by suppressed, but in the beginning a
conciliatory course was not adopted. General Otis' unfortunate proclamation of
January 4 (the changing of the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation) rendered
conciliation almost impossible. He adopted the policy of ignoring the natives by
treating them as half-civilized savages. No indication was given to the Filipinos as
to the future intentions of the government. 26
Reeve, much like the men of the 13th, felt all along that the war was unnecessary,
and that if the United States would have been more sure of its policies in the Philippines
from the very start many of the problems that later developed might have been solved

,.
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through diplomatic means. But instead of any solid policies coming out of Washington,
governmental leaders continued to allow small groups dictate America's new foreign
policies. In the Philippines that meant letting military leaders, who are not trained in the art
of diplomatic dealings, conduct America's foreign policy without consent from political
leaders. Being used to giving orders and having them followed, men like General Otis
were not adept at dealing with the Filipinos, a group of people that they considered inferior.
When the men disembarked from the Sheridan and had once again set foot on
American soil, they were met by crowds from San Francisco, who threw flowers and
cheered the men as they reached their camp. But compared to what they had witnessed
when they left, the crowds were definitely smaller and less enthusiastic. As noted in the

Minneapolis Tribune, "[T]he people of San Francisco are tiring of enthusiasm over soldiers
and that may have been the reason for the rather quiet time the returning volunteers had
along the line of march.... " Unable to keep their enthusiasm at a fevered pitch for so many
months, many Californians, much like many across the nation, were tired of this war. Not
knowing why their government was fighting there still, and having heard thousands of
volunteers complain about their role in that war, for many the excitement they shmyed
months earlier had by the spring of 1899 waned.

27
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A week after they landed, the Regiment was honored with a banquet held by
Governor Lind and other state dignitaries who traveled to San Francisco to show their
respects to the men. After the formal dinner of September 15, the men had to sit and wait
until they were mustered out and sent back to their home states. As was the case when they
were in San Francisco before, the men found themselves bored with the monotonous camp
life. With military discipline being quite lax now, most of the men decided to go into town
and stay at hotels, rather than in the dusty tents at the Presidio.
Lewis Burlingham, writing home to his father on September 19, explained what life
was like in those final weeks of soldiering. "Peddlers of all kinds and descriptions and of
both sexes come here all looking for the soldiers money.... " After he received his pay, he
;

tried to put the harshness of soldiering behind him. Immediately he went to town and
bought, "... a good suit... underwear and a couple of pairs of socks and then went and got a
haircut, shave and a gbod hot water bath and when I came out I felt like a new man I tell
you." zs
Finding various ways to keep themselves occupied, the men were finally excused
from military service on October 3. As had previously been planned, the Federal
Government gave each soldier railroad fare back to their origin~ place of origin, along with
two months' extra pay. Overjoyed with this plan which the people back in Minnesota gave
them, the members of the 13th pocketed this rail fare and prepared to leave.
Their final journey home began when three trains pulled out of San Francisco on
October 5, loaded with a cargo of exuberant soldiers. Heading north, the Minnesotans
passed through Portland, Tacoma, Seattle, Spokane, and all across Idaho, Montana, and
North Dakota. They received huge celebrations, parades, speeches and dinners at nearly
every stop, no matter what time of day they arrived. Then, passing the Red River from
Fargo into Moorhead, the men of the 13th finally found themselves back in their home
state.
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Early in the morning of October 11, after being told they were back on the North

Star state's soil, "[E]very passenger shouted himself hoarse and many fired off their army
rifles, which, by a special dispensation of the War Department, they had been allowed to

cany home for use during the parades in St. Paul and Minneapolis. 11 29
With the men knowing they were just a matter of hours away from home, their

I

minds turned to what they were going to do after re.turning to civilian life. This was

'

something that many back in Minnesota had also thought about. While the troops were still
traveling across the Pacific to the United States, the Minneapolis Journal established an
employment bureau as an interm~diary between "the disarming veterans from the
Philippines, 11 and a "grateful and patriotic public. 1130

I

When the soldiers began to disembark in San Francisco, a representative from the

JolU'llOl passed out employment blanks to the men. While approximately 100 needed

.•

employment and were taken care of by this system, most of the rest either had jobs to
return to, or were attending the University of Minnesota. 31
These plans of re-entering civilian life would have to wait for one more day though,

I.

I

for the grandest of all the celebrations which they had witnessed, was awaiting them in the
Twin Cities. Reaching St. Paul early on the morning of October 12, the 13th Regiment

l

formed a parade at 8:00 a.m. near the Union Depot in St. Paul, where they began marching

.1

through the c!ty streets to the auditorium; there they were served an elaborate breakfast.
From there they boarded trains to go into Minneapolis where the main parade
formed at noon. The celebration was considered "the most elaborate affair of the kind ever
seen in the northwest" starting on twenty-ninth street, then headed down Park Avenue.
The parade wound its way through Minneapolis until it came out at Nicollet A venue where
it proceeded toward the Exposition Building. 32
Being the largest crowd ever gathered that anyone could remember, the spectators
were standing: "from curb to curb, and even filling the vacant lots and yards outside the
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street lines, the people crowded until it seemed that another one could not find room; and
off to the left and right of the platform as far as the human voice could be heard, there was
the same scene of upturned faces."

33

Joining in the parade, which due to the sea of humanity took an hour to pass any
given point, were representatives of the state and national military organizations, University
cadets, Zouaves and Boys' Brigades, a handful of fraternal

organizatio~s.

and probably

most significantly for the men of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers, the thousand or more
Civil War veterans. Showing tli~ir support, they symbolically followed the 13th Minnesota
Volunteers in the parade. In the minds of the veterans of the Philippine wars, the Ci vii War
soldiers now walked in their shadows.
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On Nicollet Avenue all members of the parade passed by a reviewing stand which
added a special touch to the day's events. With the election approaching, President
McKinley had decided to make an appearance in Minneapolis to help welcome back the
13th Minnesota. On the same stand as the president was Secretary of the Navy Long,
Mayor Gray, Bishop Joyce, and Governor Lind.
Having arrived in Minnesota earlier, McKinley was neither greeted with a formal
reception, nor met by Lind. Lind, who had fought with the President both in bringing the
troops home and his imperialistic policies, was not speaking to McKinley that cool October
day. The first lady, suffering from a headache, even had to stay at a McKinley supporter's
house, since nothing had been set up by state officials.
On the reviewing stand stood President Northrup of the State University, the master
of ceremonies. After introducing Bishop Joyce, who gave a benediction, Northrup then
asked Mayor Gray to the podium to give a few brief comments welcoming the men home
and thanking President McKinley for attending. Gray, in turn, asked Governor Lind to
come forward and give a few comments. Lind stood and boldly walked toward the center
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of the stage, preceding to give both a welcome home address to the men, as well as a
scathing attack on President McKinley's foreign policy.
In his speech he welcomed home the soldiers of the 13th Minnesota and rejoiced
over all the happy reunions he had witnessed and thanked the men for the glory and honor
they had brought themselves and the state. He then went on to describe how this was also
a solemn event because he hoped that this would bring an end forever of the use of the
volunteer soldier from the sphere of national activity. He concluded his speech by stating:
By our growth and development the mission of the American volunteer soldier has
come to an end. For p\lfPOses of conquest and subjugation he is unfit, for he
carries a conscience as well as a gun. The volunteer soldier has always stood for
self-government, liberty, and justice. With your generation he will pass from the
stage of our national life. His fame and his example will continue the heritage of
our people-the theme of story and song. May the spirit which has actuated him ever
guide our people, and temper the strength of the nation which has outgrown him,
with the eternal principles for which he has fought and died. 35
Depending on what newspapers one read the following day, the reaction to this
speech was varied. Whereas those supporting the Governor and his comments all talked
about the applause which followed, others like the Minneapolis Tribune reported that
11

[T]here was not a whisper of approval ... 11 and that "... no one hardly clapped.... 11
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Those few newspapers that heard cheers after Lind's speech were showing their
own political bias. President McKinley had stopped in Red Wing earlier that morning and
after a brief speech it was reported that the people cheered excitedly. Also with campaign
swings through the Midwest and the South just weeks earlier the President was met with
huge crowds cheering wildly every time he mentioned the war. One has to assume then
that the majority of Minnesotans, excited with both the return of the 13th and the presence
of the President, were also at a fever pitch that day.
How loudly people cheered for Lind was actually somewhat overshadowed by

I
'

what happened next, which only had to compound the tension felt on that stage. Having
pre-arranged the speaking order, the last one to talk was to introduce the next. With no
foresight as to what might happen between the President and Governor, organizers slated
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McKinley to follow Lind. Lind, aware of this, and the fact that McKinley would not be
pleased with what he said, refused to introduce the President. Rather, he turned from the
podium and briskly walked back to his chair and sat down. With an uneasy silence on
stage as well as in the crowd, President Northrup sprang to his feet and quickly introduced
the nation's leader.
McKinley, probably prepared for Lind's remarks, got up and gave a rousing speech
on American patriotism and imperialism. In it he said;
[T]he century has blessed us as a nation. We have had wars with foreign powers,
and the unhappy one at l}ome-but all terminated in no loss of prestige or honor or
territory, but a gain in a.11. The increase of our territory has added vastly to our
strength and prosperity without changing our republican character.... I sometimes
think we do not realize what we have, and the might trust we have committed to our
keeping.
No matter what political ideology the state's newspapers adhered to, it was obvious
that McKinley's speech did hit a responsive chord, for when he was done a loud and
boisterous cheer went up from all in the crowd.
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Not knowing it at the time, the Minnesotans in the crowd were first hand witnesses
to a debate which would over the next few years slowly encompass most of the nation.
With one side totally against the war and the thought of America becoming an imperialist
power, the other, just as adamant in their beliefs, desired nothing more than to expand
America's influence around the world. In the end it would be the group of expansionist
that would win this political debate, but not without a serious fight from the anti-imperialist
who would hang on for years.
With the same kind of receptions occurring in St. Cloud, Stillwater, and Red Wing
for companies M, K, and G, respectively, every soldier received their moment in the sun.
Thus all the men of the 13th, who had gone away in order to gain the honor and prestige
which they saw given to the Civil War veterans, finally received theirs. With the speeches
and parades over, the men found their families and friends and went back to their everyday
lives.
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Having left the state a year and a half earlier, the volunteers had returned with
everything they sought, and now it was time to return to the nonnal,.mundane lives which
they wanted to escape back in the spring of 1898. Only now, the mundane seemed
I_

exciting. As Private, now plain citizen, John Bowe commented in his diary for the last
time, that after the celebration, "each one dropped from the ranks and assumed the
interrupted duties of a private citizen." With that, the journey of the 13th Minnesota
Volunteers came to an end. 38
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ChapterX
"WILL LIVE IN HISTORY"
As the sun rose on the morning of October 13, 1899, the men of the 13th
Minnesota Volunteer Infantry found that they had returned to the normal, seemingly boring
lives which they had tried to es~pe only a year and a half earlier. After 18 months of
service in the United States military and fighting two wars for their government, these
mundane lives looked pretty good to them again.
Waking up that morning, many of them probably reflected on what they had gone
through since the day they enlisted to fight in the war against the Spaniards. For most, that
spring of 1898 held so much promise for them. With their government and the newspapers
telling them for weeks that a war with Spain wo~d be a relatively quick and easy affair,
many signed up so they could do their patriotic duty, prove their manhood and join in what
was suppose to be the United States' last great adventure.
Reflecting on what they had gone through since first enlisting, some undoubtedly
had to be amazed at how much their feelings about the fighting in the Philippines, their own
countries foreign policies, and themselves had changed in the last 18 months.
Enlisting in a frenzy of patriotic fervor, these soldiers, along with most of the
nation, found themselves heading into a war which most did not understand. Believing
they were going to go and save the Cubans and Filipinos from the Spaniards, the members
of the 13th Minnesota went to the Philippines with the understanding that they were off to
fight a just and righteous war.
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But a year and a half after signing up for this great cause, most soldiers
remembered something quite different from their adventure in the Pacific. With political
leaders in Washington and military commanders in Manila either waffling or constantly
changing their policies toward the Philippines, those who were asked to fight these wars
,•

were made to enforce policies that many, by the time they left the Philippines, did not care
for. The men of the 13th Minnesota believed they had signed up for a war which was to
I

free the Filipinos by defeating their colonial masters, the Spanish. After a relatively easy

I

victory over the Spanish and the signing of a peace treaty which demanded that the
Philippines become American tenitory, those who volunteered to fight found themselves

t

forced to implement new policies.

1
l

Minnesota's volunteer soldiers originally went along with this transformation of
going from an army of liberation to one of conquest, not because they agreed with what
was happening, but because it was their duty and would give them the opportunity to
further prove themselves. After listening to the Civil War generation question their
patriotism and manhood for years, these men were not going to leave in the middle of a
fight, thereby proving the older generation correct.
Reflecting on what they had accomplished in the Philippines, the veterans of the
13th Minnesota believed they had not only earned their manhood, but also had gained
enoughTecognition to finally overshadow the Civil War veterans. They believed that after
all they had gone through they too could put their names in the history books alongside
those Minnesota units which fought in the Civil War.
Agreeing with this notion, the editor of the Red Wing Republican wrote an article
entitled "WILL LIVE IN HISTORY," published on October 12, the same day as the 13th's
return to the Twin Cities. The Republican told its readers that Minnesota was just as proud

''
'

of the 13th as they were of the most famous of all Civil War units: the 1st Minnesota. The
editor claimed that, "Minnesota's name has again been carried to the front of battle and

...
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another regiment bearing the name of the state shares the people's pride." Writing what the
returning soldiers all wanted to hear, the Republican concluded by stating; " ... they
acquitted themselves with honor and glory and added new luster to the honored name of
the state.... " For those who volunteered 18 months before, this was not only, a

".

vindication of their manhood, but a thank you for the glory and honor which they brought
themselves and their state through their actions in the Philippines.

1

The stirring words of the Red Wing Republican proved unprophetic, though. For
the men of the 13th, the memory of what they did had all but vanished from the historical
landscape by the end of that October. Once the volunteer returned to their everyday lives,
Minnesota and the nation at large quickly forgot about them and what they had done.
The fading recognition was due in part to the war in the Philippines which was still
raging on. With the removal of the Volunteers, the Regular Army remained in the islands
trying to conclude the war whlch had started in February, 1899. This war, which officially
continued until July 4, 1902 (when President Theodore Roosevelt finally declared it over),
quickly turned into a cruel and brutal war waged between two sides who shared common
misunderstandings and growing hatreds. 2 While the Minnesotans left at a time when
animosities were still at a relatively low level, the conflict which continued between the
United States and the Filipinos only turned more violent as the years passed.
With soldiers returning home, supplemented with newspapers recalling the war's
events, the stories of the brutality which was qeveloping in the Philippines were now being
heard by all. With knowledge of the brutal acts committed by both sides, and with this war
seeming to have no end, many Americans began to question why the United States was so
set on the subjugation of the Filipinos.
The birth of groups such as the Anti-Imperialist League, coupled with a national
election coming up in 1900, intensified these questions around the nation. After much soul
searching, many Americans could not find any reason for America to be in the Philippines
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except for the notion that the United States was trying to become an imperialist power. If
this were true, was America not then just as guilty of being an oppressive nation as the
'

Spaniards had been? This belief was intensified when reports came back from the
Philippines that American soldiers were now fighting the Filipinos. The same Filipinos
that Americans had been told only a few months earlier that they had to go free so that they
too could enjoy the same kind of democracy that Americans enjoyed.
Remembering the war from their own unique vantage point, the Minnesota
volunteers had mixed emotions about what was transpiring in the Philippines. On the one
I

I
II
!
~
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hand, many believed the fighting against the Filipinos was wrong. They agreed with
General Charles McC Reeve that it need not have been fought had it not been for the
mistakes made by both American military and political leaders. On the other hand they had
gone off and served their country valiantly, had defeated the Spaniards, and when asked
took up arms against the Filipinos. Although these soldiers may have questioned their role
in the wars in the Philippines, none ever lost their sincere patriotism.
The men of the 13th also never lost many of the beliefs that they brought with them.
Entering the islands with stereotypes and prejudices, many of the Minnesotans sincerely
believed that people who did not look or act like them were natµrally inferior. These beliefs
were intensified with the brutal killing of Private Jesse Cole. In the minds of many this
was justification that the natives were not only inferior, but also treacherous. Which, for
many volunteers, gave them and the United States the right to control these islands.
With all the controversy swirling around what should have, or should not have
taken place in the Philippines, many Americans chose to forget completely what had
transpired. While the Spanish-American War was always remembered as a "splendid little
war," the Philippine-American War would all but disappear from American history books.
The Spanish-American War itself only became remembered by slogans which would have

!

''

'

.I

I

182
made the most ardent jingoist proud. "Remember the Maine," Teddy Roosevelt's Rough
Riders, and the Battle of San Juan Hill was all that was recalled by many Americans.
Twenty years after the wars in the Philippines, with the conclusion of World War I,
the memory of the War of 1898 and its aftermath was almost completely wiped from
America's conscience. With dreams of forever being remembered as brave and gallant
soldiers fading, veterans of the Spanish-American War realized their campaign had lost its
luster. For now, not only was their war sandwiched in the history books between the Civil
I

War and World War I, but those two wars, in the minds of most Americans, were seen as
righteous and justifiable wars, while the war against Spain and the Filipinos was of
questionable motivation. Unlike the "glorious causes" of freeing slaves, or making the
world safe for democracy, the fighting in 1898 and 1899 was seen by many as the United
States forcing its will upon weaker nations such as the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.
Fearful of how he felt people would remember those Minnesotans who served
during this time, General Charles Reeve later wrote that "[H]istory will record Minnesota's
part in the struggle with Spain, whatever of praise or blame should attach to her sons in
southern camps and on tropical field, posterity shall judge." 3
Reeve understood that the controversies which followed the wars in the Philippines
might besmirch the good name of the volunteers who had fought in the far off islands.
What Reeve and his men wanted to be remembered for was not that they had served in an
unpopular war, but that when their country called on them they were ready to serve.
Doing their duty by enlisting to fight for their country, they later again believed they
were doing their duty when they began to question America's policies toward the
Philippines. As Governor Lind had stated in his speech of October 12, 1899, the volunteer
soldier not only carried a gun, but a conscience also.
By questioning Washington's policies, these Minnesotans, along with other state's
volunteers, were able to force many American citizens, as well as military and political
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leaders, to look at what was going on in the Philippines. Putting the spotlight on
America's new imperialistic policies, these volunteers forced the United States to take a
serious look at itself before it completely entered the arena of international affairs.
By questioning their own and their country's role in the Philippines, these
Minnesotans can be given the title of 'reluctant heroes.' Their unquestionable service to
their country and bravery on the battlefields helped many to find the necessary emotions to
make themselves feel proud of who they were. For others, it was their open questioning of
America's imperialistic polfoies w'hich they felt truly gave them the title of heroes. In the
end it was a combination of the two which made the members of the 13th Minnesota
Volunteers heroes. Sadly though, heroes which history has all but forgotten.
1

Red Wing Republican, October 12, 1899, p. 7.

2 Although officially declared

over there were still battles fought between the Americans and Filipino's until
1913, which would make this one of America's longest wars ever fought.
3
William Fitch and General C. Mc Reeve, 13th Minnesota Vols.: Historical Record in the War with Spain
(Minneapolis: Price Bros. Printing Co., 1900), 11.
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